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3 Abstract 
Building on prior research, I examine institutional factors that influence a firm’s choice to 
relocate HQ units abroad. I argue that coercive, isomorphic, and normative pressures affect 
HQ relocation decisions in addition to more traditional factors such as tax differentials for 
which I control. Furthermore, I investigate how the relocation patterns differ during times of 
economic crises vs. economic stability. I argue and find statistically that economic crises 
have a dual effect on the international configuration of HQ activities. First, during times of 
crisis, firms react stronger to coercive, isomorphic, and normative pressures. Second, 
economic crises directly influence the decision of firms to move away. My analysis builds on 
a hand-collected international dataset of HQ relocations in Europe between 2000 and 2012. 
My study contributes to an improved understanding of how institutional factors influence 
firm behavior under varying environmental conditions. Furthermore, I contribute to the 
literature on the role of economic crises in shaping economic organization, as well as to the 
literature on the neglected role of HQ units in recent MNC research. 
 
4 Problem statement 
The relocation of their headquarters (HQs) is one of the most important strategic decisions a 
multinational corporation (MNC) can make (Birkinshaw et al., 2006). The geographical 
location influences the ability of firms to create value and competitiveness. Any decision to 
shift the location of specific activities in a different country can influence the success or the 
survival of a MNC (Birkinshaw et al., 2006). A shift in HQ location reorganizes critical 
parenting activities, changes the interaction between HQs and subunits, and moves key 
decision makers of the firm (Barner-Rasmussen et al., 2007; Birkinshaw et al., 2006). As 
such, the relocation of HQs is often assumed to have a major impact on the strategy and 
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competitiveness of the firm (Campbell, Goold, & Alexander, 1994; Cantwell, 2009; Dunning, 
1998; Rugman & Verbeke, 2008). It influences the administrative and entrepreneurial role of 
HQ, and also its “vital role in mediating the relationship between the business units of the 
MNC and its external stakeholders” (Birkinshaw et al., 2006 p. 682). From a strategic 
perspective, the relocation of HQ can be considered as the last international business 
decision, “where a firm’s historical roots are revisited and challenged in order to optimize 
the firm’s global operations” (Laamanen et al., 2011 p.1). Forsgren et al. (1995) define the 
relocation of HQ as the “third degree of internationalization”. After the internationalization 
of sales, marketing and R&D functions (the first degree of internationalization), and the 
creation of centres of excellence (the second degree), the relocation of HQ units is the third 
stage to foster the MNC’s international involvement and configuration. 
Relocation decisions form an increasingly relevant area for international management 
research, as there is a clear and recent trend towards more frequent HQ relocations, especially 
across borders (Baaij et al., 2012; Benito et al., 2011; Birkinshaw et al., 2006; Laamanen et 
al. 2011; Wanner et al. 2004). Over the years, the number of HQ relocations has grown 
steadily and considerably (Birkinshaw et al., 2006; UNCTAD, 2003; Wanner et al., 2004). 
Wanner et al. (2004) show a high mobility of HQs to Switzerland before 2003. Most of these 
were regional or divisional, while few ones were global corporate HQs. The “World 
Investment Report” (UNCTAD, 2003) suggests that a “world market for division 
headquarters” is emerging. One example is Nokia that moved its corporate finance from 
Finland (home country) to New York in 2004. Tetra Pak moved its corporate headquarter 
from Sweden to Switzerland in 1981; instead, Ikea to Denmark in 1975 before to establish it 
definitely in Netherlands in 2001. Furthermore, Nissan, the Japanese automotive MNC, 
moved its European HQ from Netherlands to France in 2000 and its Divisional HQ (the truck 
division) from France to Switzerland in 2008. Other anecdotal examples are: Philips, SKF, 
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Australia’s BHP-Billiton, etc. (Birkinshaw et al., 2006, p.682). Companies are redefining 
their homes by unbundling their parenting activities and reallocating them opportunistically 
across nations (Desai, 2009). Desai (2009) identifies different “homes”, that are not 
necessarily co-located: financial, legal and managerial talent. 
While there is a well-established literature on the location of business activities such as 
manufacturing, sales, R&D and so on (Contractor et al., 2010; Dunning, 1981; Hennart, 
1982; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Kogut & Zander, 1993; Vernon, 1966), little is known about 
the (re)-location of HQ units. Even if empirical investigations highlight the relevance of this 
phenomenon, only recently scholars have begun to investigate it. Some studies focus on 
domestic relocation (relocation within the same country)(Aarland et al., 2007; Davis & 
Henderson, 2008; Henderson & Ono, 2008; Holloway & Wheeler, 1991; Klier, 2006; Klier & 
Testa, 2002; Ono, 2006; Strauss-Kahn & Vives, 2009); others on cross-countries relocations 
(Baaij et al., 2012;Forsgren et al., 1995; Birkinshaw et al. 2006; Barner-Rasmussen et al., 
2007; Benito et al. 2011; Laamanen et al., 2011).  As extant research highlights, the increase 
in relocations is partly driven by firm-specific variables, such as increased 
internationalization (Baaij et al., 2012; Benito et al. 2011; Birkinshaw et al. 2006; Forsgren et 
al., 1995; Laamanen et al., 2011). Furthermore, relocation decisions also appear to be driven 
by country-specific variables, such as differences in wage and tax levels, and access to higher 
quality strategic resources (Baaij et al., 2012; Barner-Rasmussen et al., 2007; Birkinshaw et 
al., 2006; Laamanen et al., 2011).  
Although extant work has contributed substantially to our understanding of this rather recent 
but relevant phenomenon, building on transaction cost economics and agency theory, it has, 
so far, predominantly focused on the managerial drivers and efficiency-enhancing effects 
of relocation decisions (Benito et al., 2011; Birkinshaw et al., 2006; Forsgren et al., 1995; 
Laamanen et al., 2011). Instead, little attention has been paid to behavioural and institutional 
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factors, even if some scholars mention the legitimacy-enhancing effects of imitating 
competitors (Laamanen et al., 2011), while others discuss the benefits to follow shareholders 
and stakeholders (Benito et al., 2011; Birkinshaw et al., 2006). Such studies represent an 
important attempt to move away from a myopic focus on efficiency motives to explain HQ 
relocation, but they focus only on mimetic institutional pressures. This lack of attention to a 
comprehensive institutional and behavioural approach implies that potentially important 
drivers and barriers of relocation decisions remain overlooked. Examples are the notion that 
MNCs often struggle to maintain legitimacy, and that important corporate decisions, such as 
HQ relocations, are subject to the scrutiny of different internal and external actors (Di 
Maggio & Powell, 1983; Kostova et al., 2008; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). In host countries, 
MNCs are exposed to different legitimacy standards and should behave in a different way 
with respect to domestic firms to establish reputation (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). 
Furthermore, they are critically involved in establishing and maintaining legitimacy in their 
multiple host environments (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). According to institutional theory, 
firms interact with several entities in their organizational field, such as competitors, suppliers, 
customers, regulators, trade unions, employees, etc. (Deephouse, 1999; Di Maggio & Powell, 
1983; Thompson, 1967), that can influence or modify their decisions.  
The lack of attention to institutional influences on relocation decisions is particularly 
problematic in the light of the current economic crisis. As extant work highlights, 
institutional pressures are often amplified during economic crises, leading to organizational 
and strategic reconfigurations (Chung & Beamish, 2005; Chung et al., 2010; Chung et al., 
2008; Grewal & Tansuhaj, 2001; Lee & Makhija, 2009), and pushing organizations to seek 
compromise with key constituent groups (Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002; Di Maggio & 
Powell, 1983). By their nature MNCs operate in different environments characterized 
frequently by anomalous events, referred to as crises, that generate high level of external 
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uncertainty and influence the MNCs’ behaviour  (Grewal & Tansuhaj, 2001; Smart & 
Vertinsky, 1984). Moreover, in their strategic decisions, firms emphasize institutional and 
behavioural considerations in these environments characterized by uncertainty and ambiguity 
(Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). While a focus on institutional factors may therefore contribute 
to a better understanding of how recent environmental dynamics impact HQ relocation 
decisions, such effects have yet to be investigated. 
 
5 Aims of the study 
In my research project, I aim to address these gaps by developing an institutional perspective 
on HQ relocations. The main focus will be set on the institutional reasons of HQ relocations. 
To this end, I develop a model of how institutional factors influence the decision of firms to 
relocate their HQs outside domestic boundaries. In particular, I investigate how coercive, 
normative and isomorphic pressures may differentially affect such decisions.   
Furthermore, I theoretically and empirically argue how economic crises influence the effect 
of the institutional factors in my model. Economic crises are unpredictable events that 
generate a turbulent, uncertain, and hostile environment posing a threat to MNCs’ growth and 
survival (Smart & Vertinsky, 1984). Following previous work, economic crises can be 
defined as situations in which real output (measured usually by gross domestic product 
(GDP) and employment rates decrease, levels of inflation increase, and many different 
macroeconomic indicators move (Lee & Makhija, 2009; Foss, 2010; Chung et al., 2010; 
Chung & Beamish, 2005; Fratzscher, 2009; Hoshi & Kashyap, 2004). I argue that an 
economic crisis situation affects the international configuration of HQ activities. During a 
crisis situation I predict that firms react more strongly to coercive, isomorphic, and normative 
pressures.  
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Expected contributions 
Although extant work has given valuable insights into the topic of HQ relocation (Benito et 
al., 2011; Birkinshaw et al., 2006; Forsgren et al., 1995; Laamanen et al., 2011), the 
understanding of the conditions under which MNCs move out their HQ units have received 
only little and mono-perspective attention. Thus, my research project addresses several 
questions pertinent in the recent literature, and tries to investigate them in a theoretical 
model: 
- Institutional perspective of HQ relocation: I want to contribute to the re-location 
literature, providing a complementary explanation of HQ relocation by drawing from 
institutional and behavioural theory. Starting from the assumption that firm decisions 
are not always based on purely efficiency motives, I argue that the relocation of 
parenting activities can be considered as an answer to multiple institutional pressures 
faced by MNCs in their multiple institutional environments. I argue that international 
reconfiguration of HQ activities is driven by the need to answer to coercive, 
isomorphic and normative pressures that come from MNC institutional environments. 
I stress the legitimacy need of MNCs, as a complementary explanation of relocation 
decision. 
- Institutional theory: I want to contribute to institutional theory by addressing some 
provocations of Kostova et al. (2008). In particular, I conceptualize a different 
definition of organizational field for MNCs and testify the isomorphic behaviour of 
MNCs in taking strategic and organizational decisions. Moreover, I contribute also by 
explaining how institutional factors act on firm behaviours under varying 
environmental conditions. In particular, I suggest that unexpected external events (like 
economic crises) influence institutional factors and impact on firm decisions, 
increasing institutional complexity. I argue that the increase in complexity of 
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institutional environment due to economic crises pushes MNCs to react more strongly 
to isomorphic, coercive and normative pressures. Economic crises de-legitimize 
MNCs, for nature un-proactive and un-flexible to rapid changes (Massey, 2001).  
- The role of economic crisis: I shed more light on the role of economic crises in 
shaping organizational behaviours. I argue that economic crises create an uncertain 
and turbulent environment that influences organizational actions and configuration. 
Economic crises play a dual role on the international configuration of HQ activities. 
Although they influence the relation between institutional factors and the likelihood 
of relocation, thereby exacerbating isomorphic, coercive and normative pressures as a 
consequence of growing external uncertainty, economic crises may also change 
negatively the characteristics of external environment, directly pushing firms to move 
out. 
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6 Literature review 
Over the past decades, many scholars have concentrated their studies on the 
internationalization process and the early stages have received a huge amount of knowledge 
(Forsgren et al., 1995; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 2003; Johanson & Wiedersheim-Paul, 
1975). The internationalization process starts from the transfer of firm functions such as sales 
and marketing overseas, i.e. the transfer of these functions to subsidiaries beyond the home 
boundaries. As it goes ahead, also other functions, such as production or research and 
development, are located abroad (Barner-Rasmussen et al., 2007). Forsgren et al. (1992) 
define the first part of internationalization process as the first degree and Benito & Larimo 
(2002) label it as strategic internationalization. In the more advanced stages, the proliferation 
of foreign subsidiaries increases and some subsidiaries receive world product mandates or 
evolve into strategic centres or centres of excellence with responsibilities that go over the 
home market (Andersson et al., 2002; Frost et al., 2002; O’Donnell, 2000). It is considered as 
the second degree of internationalization process. But, recently scholars have started to 
investigate new internationalization stages. In this research stream, the relocation of HQs 
beyond national boundaries is labelled by Forsgren et al. (1995) before and Barner-
Rasmussen et al. (2007) later as “the third degree of internationalization process”. 
 
6.1 Previous studies on HQs relocation 
Many studies are about geographical location decision (Bel & Fageda, 2007; Feinberg & 
Gupta, 2004; Garcia-Canal & Guillèn, 2008; Guillèn & Garcia-Canal, 2009; Holloway & 
Wheeler, 1991; Porter, 2000). They pay attention exclusively on the location advantages and 
on foreign market characteristics. However, these factors explain partially the relocation of 
HQs that is the result of deep connections between the characteristics of external context and 
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the evolving internal organizational configuration. Only recently scholars have started to 
investigate this phenomenon in detail, focusing especially on efficiency drivers. Efficiency is 
defined like the minimization of operation costs (for example, production or logistic) and 
organization costs, divided in transaction costs (in market governance modes) and in 
governance costs (in internal governance modes). MNCs choose the organizational design 
that minimizes costs in the long run (Williamson, 1985). So, considering the relocation of 
HQs as a way to modify MNC organizational configuration, they investigate how cost 
minimization affects the likelihood of a firm to move its HQ to different countries. Following 
a political and agency perspective, some scholars focus their attention on internal or 
governance costs (Forsgren et al., 1995; Birkinshaw et al., 2006; Benito et al., 2010), divided 
in bargaining, information, monitoring and bonding costs (Tomassen et al., 2012; Tomassen 
& Benito, 2009); while others focus on macro-economic country variables like taxation or 
employment rate (Baaj et al., 2012; Laamanen et al., 2011). Furthermore, previous study 
identifies relocations within the same country (domestic relocation), or across different 
countries, such as from a peripheral to a more central country. Following this classification, I 
divide previous studies in two main groups: domestic relocation, and cross-countries 
relocation. 
The first group is based on American studies that investigate the relocation of HQs within 
USA. These studies go back to Holloway and Wheeler (1991) until to include recently Klier 
and Testa (2002), Daicon and Klier (2003), Ono (2006), Davis and Henderson (2008), 
Henderson and Ono (2008) and Strauss-Khan and Vives (2009). They relate the relocation of 
HQs to the transformation in US metropolitan areas. A distinctive feature of the U.S. 
economic landscape is the concentration of HQs in a relatively small number of large 
metropolitan areas (Testa, 2006). There are two complementary explanations of this 
phenomenon. First, HQs are located in metropolitan areas because of the presence and wide 
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variety of business service suppliers (Davis and Henderson, 2008). “HQs perform various 
services from managing and coordinating the other parts of the firms to performing 
accounting, bookkeeping and taking care of legal issues” (Ono, 2006, p.130). To do them 
they need information and advices from specialists. Achieving such information and services 
requires constant face-to-face interactions and close geographical proximity between buyers 
and sellers. The disproportionately presence of service firms in larger cities is an attractive 
factor for HQ location, because it can benefit from the variety of differentiated suppliers 
(Davis & Henderson, 2008; Lovely, Rosenthal, & Sharma, 2005; Strauss-Kahn & Vives, 
2009). Thus, cities with high diversified business services are more attractive for HQs (Davis 
and Henderson, 2004). Aarland et al. (2007) find that if a firm concentrates its production 
primarily in a small city, it is more likely to relocate only its HQ in a larger metro area to 
better outsource service activities. The second explanation is about agglomeration of HQs, 
because clustering together they can exchange information about market characteristics 
(Davis and Henderson, 2008; Strauss-Khan and Vives, 2008). Spillovers effects are an 
important factor in influencing the HQ relocation decision. Firms can get powerful 
information about production, resource and technology locating their HQ in places 
characterized by high HQ presence (Davis and Henderson, 2008). Davis and Henderson 
(2004) find that cities with high HQ presence are more likely to attract new ones. Lovely et 
al. (2005) show a stronger agglomeration effect when firms are not able to obtain information 
on foreign markets. In addition to these factors, HQ relocation is influenced by the location of 
production facilities. Being close to production units can reduce communication and 
monitoring costs (Henderson Ono, 2007; Strauss-Khan and Vives, 2009). If production 
facilities are geographically dispersed, firms can reduce coordination costs by relocating their 
HQs close to these units. Aarland et al. (2007) find that firms, characterized by high 
geographical dispersion of production plants, are more likely to locate HQs in place where 
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they don’t perform any production activities, but central to all other production units. So, 
according to domestic studies, HQ relocation is especially driven by business services and by 
production plants, and firms need to decide between an improvement in outsourcing or in 
gathering information and a reduction in coordination costs (Henderson and Ono, 2007). 
Henderson and Ono (2007) suggest that “it is very costly for firms to send their first stand-
alone HQ away from the countries where they have production facilities, possibly due to 
increased communication and coordination costs. Thus, firms would not choose such 
countries unless the countries offer much variety of business service or, possibly for bigger 
firms, greater scale of other HQ activities” (Henderson and Ono, 2007, p.449). Moreover, 
Strauss-Khan and Vives (2009) show also the effects of corporate taxes and wages on HQ 
relocation decision. 
The second group focuses on the relocation among different European countries. These 
studies especially investigate the behaviour of Scandinavian enterprises and their decisions to 
relocate HQ units (Forsgren et al., 1995; Birkinshaw et al., 2006; Barner-Rasmussen et al., 
2007; Benito et al., 2011). Their main assumption is that Nordic countries are small, 
peripheral and highly dependent on foreign trade and investments (Benito & Narula, 2007), 
so when a Scandinavian firm with important cross-border activities decides to relocate its 
HQs, there is an high probability that they will be located outside national country (Benito et 
al., 2011). These studies highlight the double nature of HQ relocation (Barner-Rasmussen et 
al., 2007): 
 Full relocation: all HQ functions are moved away; 
 Partial relocation: only some activities are established overseas.  
Some studies looked at full relocation (Barner-Rasmussen et al., 2007; Birkinshaw et al., 
2006) while others used a more fine-grained approach to the relocation of HQ units (Forsgren 
et al. 1995; Birkinshaw et al. 2006; Benito et al. 2011). Moreover, MNCs can also relocate 
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virtually their HQ units (virtual relocation), where only the legal domicile is changed and 
most of the HQ functions are taken care of virtually (Barner-Rasmussen et al., 2007). The 
relocation phenomenon is defined as a “dynamic” process, where the concept of “HQ 
mobility” is emphasized (Barner-Rasmussen et al., 2007). Relocation is considered as a 
reversible decision and it is possible to theorize repeated relocations or the HQ returning to 
its original country (Barner-Rasmussen et al., 2007). These studies focus especially on a 
political and agency perspective, stressing the concept of internal efficiency, to explain this 
phenomenon. Through empirical investigation on Swedish MNCs, Forsgren et al. (1995) 
identify two important factors that can influence the relocation of divisional headquarters 
(DHQs) beyond home boundaries: the degree of internationalization of the company’s 
divisions; and the degree of internationalization of the corporation itself. According to their 
results, a greater degree of internationalization of the company’s divisions increases the 
likelihood of the relocation of divisional headquarters abroad; so a greater degree of 
corporate internationalization causes an opposite outcome, reducing the probability of DHQs 
relocation (Forsgren et al. 1995). Birkinshaw et al. (2006) introduce a clear and different 
definition between the relocation of corporate head office (corporate HQ) and of business 
unit headquarters (divisional/regional HQ). They define corporate HQ following the seminal 
work of Chandler (1991), distinguishing between “administrative” and “entrepreneurial” role. 
On the contrary, business unit headquarters are responsible for the formulation and 
implementation of competitive strategy (Birkinshaw et al., 2006). Underlining the roles, 
played by these two different units within MNCs, the authors identify different drivers of the 
relocation decision for each unit. In particular, two important factors increase the probability 
of corporate head office relocation overseas:  
1. A high percentage of equity held by foreign shareholders;  
2. The listing of company on a foreign stock exchange. 
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Shifting the attention on the relocation of business unit HQs, the authors identify other main 
factors:  
1. A high degree of company internationalization; 
2. The attractiveness of specific foreign locations.  
Finally, focusing only on listed Norwegian MNCs, Benito et al. (2011) show a negative 
impact of diversification on the likelihood of DHQ relocation. In contrast to what Forsgren et 
al. (1995) and Birkinshaw et al. (2006) find, the degree of internationalization and foreign 
ownership have not significant impact on the relocation decision. 
Recently, Laamanen et al. (2011) contribute to the cross-border relocation of HQs, using a 
multi-country dataset of 17 European countries. This international dataset allows the use of 
several macro-economic country variables, like GDP per capita or corporate taxation, and to 
consider different factors of cross border relocation with respect to a domestic one. The 
authors start from the assumption that the benefits and, of course, the costs of domestic 
relocation are less than an international one. As consequence, the relocations in a single 
specific country are driven by different factors than cross-borders relocations. The authors 
show an increasing trend toward relocations in Europe, affected by push and pull factors. 
According to them, HQ relocation decision is influenced by cost minimization and value 
creation motives. Taxation level and employment rate, for example, are two important drivers 
of HQ movement, as well as the proportion of revenues from sales, accumulated outside, and 
the presence of related HQs. In this direction, Baaij et al. (2012) examine the relocations of 
parenting activities, i.e. some parts of corporate HQ, to alternative host countries. Although 
full relocation of HQ units remains still rare, partial relocations are increasing. Surveying 58 
largest Dutch MNEs, they find that legal domicile and corporate functions are driven by 
target country attractiveness; while executive management team (EMT) is driven especially 
by the internationalization degree of stakeholders and assets. 
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In sum, independent of the type of relocation, previous research has predominantly examined 
how relocations are driven by efficiency and effectiveness motives. Cost reduction is seen as 
the main driver of HQ relocation. Some scholars focus on internal and governance costs 
(Aarland, Davis, Henderson, & Ono, 2007; Benito et al., 2011; Birkinshaw et al., 2006; 
Forsgren et al., 1995; Henderson & Ono, 2008; Lovely, Rosenthal, & Sharma, 2005; Ono, 
2006; Strauss-Kahn & Vives, 2009); others look at macro-economic country variables like 
taxation or employment rate (Laamanen et al., 2011; Strauss-Kahn & Vives, 2009) or at 
country attractiveness in terms of business service availability (Birkinshaw et al., 2006; 
Henderson & Ono, 2008; Ono, 2006). For example, Aviva Group, the world's sixth largest 
insurance group, moved its HQ from London to Dublin in 2009 for taxation issues; Reebok 
moved its European HQ from England to Netherlands in 2007 to be closer to subsidiaries 
under its responsibility, located in central Europe. Instead, Biolitec, a developer and 
manufacturer of diode lasers, optical fibres and accessories, relocated its HQ from Germany 
to Austria in 2012 both to be closer to Eastern European markets and for taxation benefits. 
Thus, HQ relocations often appear a result of the rational decision to seek efficiency and 
effectiveness by improving coordination and control, and reducing costs.    
The following Table 1 summarizes the main contributions on the HQ relocation. 
Table 1. Previous studies on HQ relocation. 
References Emphasis on Results 
Domestic relocation   
Klier and Testa (2002) The location trend of HQ 
units of publicly traded US 
companies for the years 1990 
and 2000 
HQs are relocated in cities 
with: 
 large urban areas; 
 availability of business 
services; 
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 considerable increase in 
population.  
Lovely et al. (2005) The spatial concentration of 
HQ units 
 HQ relocation is influenced 
by the agglomeration of 
other HQ units. 
Aarland et al. (2007) The spatial separation 
between HQ and business 
units’ activities and their 
location 
The relocation of HQs is 
driven by: 
 High availability of 
business services 
 Geographical dispersion of 
production activities 
 Agglomeration of HQs 
Henderson and Ono (2008) The relocation decisions of 
HQ units taken by 
manufacturing firms 
 Distance to production 
 Service availability 
Davis and Henderson 
(2008) 
The determinants of HQ 
agglomeration 
 Diversity of services  
 High wage level 
Strauss-Khan and Vives 
(2009) 
The reasons to locate and 
relocate HQ units in USA 
from 1996 to 2001 
Whether to relocate: 
 Larger size in terms of 
sales revenues; 
 Larger total number of 
headquarters; 
 Younger age; 
 M&A; 
 Foreign ownership; 
 Absence of 
infrastructure; 
 High corporate taxes 
Where to relocate: 
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 Lower wage level; 
 Lower corporate taxes; 
 Availability of 
infrastructures and 
business services; 
 Lower distance to own 
production sites; 
 Presence of other HQ 
units. 
Cross-border relocations 
Forsgren et al. (1995) Reasons that push MNCs to 
relocate division 
headquarters abroad. 
 The degree of 
internationalization of 
company’s divisions has a 
positive effect; 
 The degree of MNCs 
internationalization has a 
negative one.  
Birkinshaw et al. (2006) Business unit HQ and 
corporate HQ relocation 
abroad 
Business unit HQ relocation is 
influenced positively by: 
 the degree of MNCs 
internationalization; 
 the attractiveness of host 
country. 
Corporate HQ relocation is 
related positively to: 
 foreign ownership; 
 the listing of company on a 
foreign stock exchange. 
Barner-Rasmussen et al. Corporate HQ relocation Corporate HQ relocation is 
full, partial and virtual and it 
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2007 overseas is driven by symbolic and 
pragmatic motivations. 
Benito et al. (2011) Division Headquarters 
relocation abroad  
DHQ relocation is affected 
positively by: 
 the number of divisions; 
DHQ relocation is affected 
negatively by: 
 degree of diversification; 
 MNCs’ size 
 Concentration of 
ownership. 
Laamanen et al. (2011) Relocations of both 
corporate and regional 
headquarters in a multi-
country setting. 
The likelihood of HQ 
relocation is positively 
influenced by: 
 Corporate taxes at 
home country; 
 Employment rate at 
home country; 
 The amount of foreign 
revenues of the firm 
(used as a proxy of 
internationalization 
degree); 
 The type of HQ unit, 
e.g. the relocation of a 
regional HQ is more 
frequent than a 
corporate one. 
About where to relocate, 
HQ units are attracted by 
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locations characterized by: 
 Low corporate 
taxes. 
Baaj et al. (2012) The relocations of parenting 
activities, i.e. some parts of 
corporate HQ, to alternative 
host countries 
EMT is driven by: 
 Internationalization of 
stakeholders and 
assets. 
Legal domicile and corporate 
functions are driven by:  
 target country 
attractiveness  
6.2 Institutional Theory and relocation decisions. 
Institutional Theory explains the role of the institutional context in organizational decision-
making (Di Maggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995). Its early versions focused especially on the 
conception of institutional rules, myths and beliefs as shared social reality and on the process 
through which firms and, in general, organizations try to become integral part of society, 
sharing common values and social meaning (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Selzenick, 1949, 
1957). More recent interpretations have better investigated the nature and the variety of 
institutional forces and processes (Di Maggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Zucker, 1988) and the effects of these factors on firms’ strategic responses (Meyer et al., 
1987; Oliver, 1991; Scott, 1987) and on organizational change and configuration (Hinings & 
Greenwood, 1988; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). Institutional theory argues that organizational 
environments “…are characterized by the elaboration of rules and requirements to which 
individual organizations must conform if they are to receive support and legitimacy…” (Scott 
& Meyer, 1983; p.149). In this context, legitimacy is defined as the acceptance of the 
organization by its institutional environment (Di Maggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 
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1977). Moreover, legitimacy is necessary and vital for organizational survival and success 
(Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Hannan & Freeman, 1977). It is related to three main sets of 
factors (Hybels, 1995; Maurer, 1971):  
1. the environment’s institutional characteristics;  
2. the organization’s characteristics;   
3. the legitimation process by which the environment creates its perceptions of the 
organization.  
Organizational behaviour, decision making process and legitimacy are subject to institutional 
pressures (Oliver, 1991). Institutional scholars divide these pressures in three main 
categories: 
1. Coercive, that originates from political influence and legitimacy needs (Di Maggio & 
Powell, 1983). It occurs when an organization has to follow or adopt particular 
organizational norms and patterns, imposed by a more powerful authority. 
2. Mimetic, that is a result of standard responses to uncertainty (Di Maggio & Powell, 
1983). It occurs when an organization adopts organizational policies or procedures of 
other, seemingly more successful organizations to respond to uncertainty. 
3. Normative, that is associated with professionalization1 (Di Maggio & Powell, 1983). 
It occurs when an organization adopts particular patterns considered appropriate by its 
institutional environment.  
Conformity to social beliefs, values and norms is achieved by responding to mimetic, 
normative and coercive pressures (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983) and compliance may be for 
pragmatic reasons or due to pragmatic stasis (Oliver, 1991). Thus, according to institutional 
theory, social beliefs and norms play a significant role in determining organizational 
                                                 
1
 Professionalization   is defined as “the collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions 
and methods of their work, to control the production of producers” (Scarfatti-Larson, 1977; pp. 49-52). 
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behaviour. Furthermore, this organizational behaviour (to conform to institutional norms and 
beliefs) is not necessary driven by efficiency, but rather by the need to be legitimized by 
organizational field and to increase resources and survival capabilities (Di Maggio & Powell, 
1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Organizations conformed to institutional pressures are 
considered “optimal”, even if they are not efficient, i.e. it means that they are accepted by 
each actor in their organizational field, increasing their survival likelihood and minimizing, as 
a consequence, the risk of organizational death (Baum & Oliver, 1991). Even in competitive 
environments, efficiency may not be the only driving force: “…even among market driven 
organizations productive efficiency may have relatively little to do with survival” (Powell, 
1991; p. 187). “While allowing for a nominal amount of agency, neo-institutionalists largely 
suggest that incorporation of institutionally mandated elements allows organizational actors 
to portray the organization as legitimate, thereby enhancing its likelihood of survival” 
(Kostova et al., 2008; p. 997). Thus, the institutional theory considers the social part of 
organizational behaviour, and “recognizes the limits imposed by social constraints on a 
purely economic basis” (Puck et al., 2009; p. 392).  
Institutional pressures are strongly influenced by the complexity of institutional environment 
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). According to organizational and institutional scholars, this 
complexity comes from the multiple institutional “pillars” (Scott, 1995), the multiple task 
environments (Galbraith 1973), the multiple resource providers (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978) 
and the multiple stakeholders (Evan & Freeman 1988). Complexity influences the challenge 
of firms to establish and maintain legitimacy in their environment (Kostova & Zaheer 1999; 
Henisz & Delios 2001; Di Maggio & Powell 1983;  Haveman 1993). 
An increasing number of scholars is applying institutional theory to international business. 
They are attracted by the unique institutional complexity faced by MNCs in their multiple 
institutional environments and by their struggle to establish and maintain legitimacy (Kostova 
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& Roth 2002; Kostova & Zaheer 1999). MNCs address many different and conflicting 
institutional pressures (Westney, 1999). In particular, they investigate how concepts like 
organizational field, legitimacy, isomorphism, and mechanisms of institutional pressures can 
influence international decisions of MNCs. These concepts are used to analyse home and host 
country environments in terms of regulatory, cognitive and normative “pillars” (Kostova & 
Zaheer, 1999; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Xu & Shenkar, 2002), to explain the similarities in 
organizational practices across organizations (Child & Tsai, 2005; Davis, Desai, & Francis, 
2000; Flier, Bosch, & Volberda, 2003; Yiu & Makino, 2002), to study constraints on the 
diffusion and institutionalization of organizations’ practices across borders and units of 
MNCs (Guler, Guillén, & Mcpherson, 2002; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Kostova & Roth, 
2002); to explain the relationship between MNCs and their host environments, focusing on 
legitimacy, liability of foreignness, and modes of entry (Guler, Guillén, & Mcpherson, 2002; 
Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Puck et al., 2009). However, the 
provocative paper of Kostova et al. (2008) shows the main theoretical gaps in applying 
Institutional Theory (IT) to the International Business (IB) context. In particular, they raise 
many fundamental questions about the usefulness of IT in IB, such as “Is Institutional theory 
useful in international management research? Are its main ideas valid in the MNC context? 
Which of them apply, which don’t, and which need to be modified and further developed?” 
(Kostova et al., 2008; p. 1003). Kostova et al. (2008) stimulate more critical thinking about 
the relation between IT and IB and how the notions of organizational field, isomorphism and 
legitimacy should be used in a MNC context.    
Applied to relocation decisions, several authors mention the legitimacy-enhancing effects of 
imitating competitors (Laamanen et al., 2011), while others discuss the benefits to follow 
stakeholders (Benito et al., 2011; Birkinshaw et al., 2006). Such studies focus especially on 
the mimetic pressures to explain the relocation of HQ units overseas. They focus especially 
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on the concept of institutional isomorphism, defined as firms’ attempts to act in line with 
regulative, normative or cognitive societal expectations (Yiu & Makino, 2002). Such studies 
build on the argument that firms are often strongly influenced by the behaviour of their main 
competitors and stakeholders (Hutzschenreuter, Pedersen, & Volberda, 2007; Zhou, Wu, & 
Luo, 2007), and often adopt their practices as means of establishing legitimacy (Di Maggio & 
Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). When a practice is accepted by other entities, it 
becomes the cue of normality, making firms that do not follow this practice appear abnormal 
and illegitimate to their stakeholders and to other institutional entities in the institutional field 
(Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1993).  
Such studies represent an important move away from an overly myopic focus on efficiency 
motives to explain HQ relocation. Nonetheless, by focusing on a single type of actor, 
namely MNCs’ main competitors, such studies may overlook that firms interact with several 
entities in their organizational field, such as suppliers, customers, regulators, trade unions, 
employees, stakeholders, and others (Deephouse, 1999; Di Maggio & Powell, 1983; 
Thompson, 1967). Thus, extant studies on HQ relocation may overlook that MNCs are 
subject to multiple institutional pressures that can influence or modify their organizational 
decisions.  
 
6.3 The role of HQ units and HQ complexity. 
Building on the prior literature and on Birkinshaw et al. (2006), HQ is composed by two main 
elements: a top management group characterized by the presence of an official location 
where it meets, and different HQ functions, like treasury, investor relations, corporate 
communications, ICT and so on…, with a clear and identifiable geographical location. Only 
for corporate HQ there is also a third element, i.e. the legal domicile, defined as “the 
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registration of the MNC in a particular sovereign nation, under which all the other legal 
entities that make up the MNC can be grouped” (Birkinshaw et al., 2006, p.684). Its size is 
not merely the result of an arbitrary choice between locating employees in HQs or in business 
unit, but it is related to its role within MNC and to the number of its activities (Collis, Young, 
& Goold, 2007). HQ activities are often defined as “parenting activities” divided usually in 
three different categories, and allocated to different types of HQs as well as corporate, 
divisional or regional HQs (Chandler, 1991; Goold, Pettifer, & Young, 2001). There is a 
well-established literature on the role of headquarters (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010; 
Chandler, 1991; Foss, 1997; Goold & Young, 2002). Divisional and regional HQs are 
responsible for the formulation and implementation of competitive strategy – “the positioning 
of the business within its industry and the means by which it strives to achieve above average 
returns within that industry” (Birkinshaw et al., 2006, p.683). They are intermediary lines of 
control between corporate headquarters and local subsidiaries, and are subject to push and 
pull pressures. From one side, they need to stay close to corporate headquarter for helping 
and influencing the overall strategic process including the allocation of resources (pull 
pressures). From the other side, their main task is to coordinate and control activities of local 
subsidiaries under their responsibility and for this scope they need to be close to subsidiaries 
to get reliable information about their operations and their environment (push pressures) 
(Forsgren et al., 1995; Birkinshaw et al., 2006; Benito et al., 2011). Corporate HQs use to 
develop long term strategies and allocate resources. In theory, they play two main roles 
within MNCs: “entrepreneurial” (value creating), and “administrative” (loss prevention) 
(Chandler 1991). 
 The first is entrepreneurial or value creating, that is, to define strategies to preserve 
“for the long-term the firm’s organizational skills, facilities and capital and to 
allocate resources -capital and product-specific technical and managerial skills- to 
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pursue these strategies” (Chandler, 1991 p.33). Through this role, HQ discovers and 
explores new business opportunities worldwide, stimulates the subsidiaries in 
understanding the attributes of their markets and their changing nature and helps them 
to assimilate these changes into their business strategies.  
 The second is more administrative or loss-preventive, that is, to monitor the 
performance of the operating units; to check on the use of the resources allocated; 
and, when necessary, to re-define product lines so as to use effectively the firm’s 
organizational capabilities (Chandler, 1991). 
Moreover, in literature, scholars identify also a third role of Corporate HQ, defined by Goold 
et al. (2001) as the minimum parenting role such as legal and firm representative, basic 
financial aggregation, or regulatory work. At the corporate HQ level, all the mandatory 
reporting and compliance functions, like legal, financial, or regulatory, have to be performed. 
“This role as the representative of the firm to external constituencies is a pure overhead 
expense since it has no operational benefits” (Collis et al. 2007; p. 388). Furthermore, 
tipically Corporate HQs deal also back office functions, such as payroll processing, but they 
could be as efficiently delegated at business units, or even outsourced to external parties 
(Collis et al., 2007). 
In literature, HQ activities and roles have been analyzed through two completely different 
approaches: on one side, there are olistic studies, that try to figure out the types of activities 
allocated to each unit, e.g. corporate HQ, divisional HQ, regional HQ or centers of excellence 
(Goold et al., 2001; Chandler, 2001; Williamson, 1975). On the other side, there are studies 
that focus their attention on a particular HQ unit and investigate the types of activities 
realized (Piekkari et al. 2010; Lehrer & Asakawa 1999; Ambos & Schlegelmilch 2010).  
Although these studies show many evidences on the type of activities and the size of different 
HQ units, extant literature has given little emphasis to the actual geographical configuration 
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of HQ activities, and the obvious complexity related to this phenomenon (Birkinshaw et al. 
2006; Nell & Larsen, 2012). Following Nell & Larsen (2012), the actual HQ system can be 
described through two different dimensions: the geographical dispersion of HQ activities (i.e. 
the HQ relocation phenomenon) and the relocation or allocation of these activities to different 
units (i.e. the degree of organizational differentiazion). For example, two opposite situations 
could be identified: on one side there are some MNCs, that allocate all parenting activities to 
a unique HQ unit (often corporate headquarter), established in the home country; while on the 
other, some MNCs spread and differentiate their HQ activities in multiple different locations. 
Considering the two identified dimensions, Nell and Larsen (2011) show four possible 
configurations of HQ activities, as the following Figure 1 shows.  
Figure 1. HQ configurations 
 
Source. Nell & Larsen (2012) 
 
The first situation (Cell I) is characterized by the allocation of all HQ activities to one classic 
corporate HQ established frequently in the home country. It is typical of single-firm business, 
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but this situation could also include firms that decide to allocate all parenting activities (so 
corporate HQ) to another country. For example, Scandinavian MNCs use to move out of their 
home country their HQ units (Birkinshaw et al., 2006; Benito et al., 2011).  
The next situation (Cell II) is represented by firms that operate with one single HQ unit, but 
HQ activities are allocated to a multitude of units. It’s a typical case of divisionalized 
corporations. Divisionalization is a way to handle increasing size, operational diversity and 
geographical dispersion making a clear distinction between operational and strategic question 
in the organization (Forsgren et al., 1995; Hendlund and Aman, 1984; Nell & Laursen, 2012).  
In the third situation (Cell III) MNCs decide to operate with one single corporate HQ unit 
with top management located in different places. Barner-Rasmussen et al. (2007) speak about  
virtual relocation and describe the case of the Swedish based bank Nordea. 
The last situation (Cell IV) is characterized by HQ activities dispersed geographically and 
relocated outside national country (Birkinshaw et al. 2006). In this case, it is more difficult to 
clearly identify corporate, divisional or regional HQs (Barner-Rasmussen et al. 2007).  
In sum, the actual make-up of HQ units varies enormously from case to case (Birkinshaw et 
al. 2006), increasing complexity in management parenting activities. MNCs present different 
HQ configurations and an increasing geographical dispersion of HQ units. However, the 
actual geographical configuration of HQ activities, stressed by the recent phenomenon of HQ 
relocations, deserves more careful academic investigations.  
 
6.4 Economic crisis and Organizational behaviour.  
Crisis is an occasional event, that influences considerably the life cycle of a business or an 
organization, and the economic life of a country (Grewal & Tansuhaj, 2001; Pearson & Clair, 
1998; Sayegh, et al., 2004). Weick (1988; p. 305), for example, argues that crises are “low 
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probability/high consequence events, that threaten the organization and its goals”. Person 
and Clair (1998; p.60) state that “a crisis is a low probability, high impact event that threaten 
the viability of the organization and is characterized by ambiguity of cause, effect and means 
of resolution, as well as by a belief that decisions must be made swiftly”. In this stream, 
Barton (1993; p.2) defines crisis as “a major unpredictable event that has potentially negative 
results”. Crises can be defined also as “transient perturbations whose occurrences are 
difficult to foresee and whose impacts on organizations and institutions are disruptive and 
potentially inimical” (Meyer, 1982; p.515). According to the extant literature crisis is 
considered as a specific, unexpected and non-routine exogenous event that can change the 
“rules of the game” and disrupt established organizational structures, routines, procedures, 
relationships, norms and belief systems. Whether imposed on the organizations by outside 
forces or initiated by management behaviour and decisions, crises are sources of profound, 
significant, often precipitating radical, rapid and negative changes (Seeger et al., 2005). 
These circumstances generate an incredible amount of uncertainty, confusion and fear, 
pushing organizations to take fast, but at the same time relevant decisions to increase the 
likelihood of survival. However, uncertainty reduces the availability of information, that can 
often be inaccurate, incomplete or confusing (Sayegh et al., 2004). From an organizational 
perspective, crisis can be viewed as “a decision situation that may equate to an 
endangerment of the organization’s health and, therefore, survival” (Sayegh et al., 2004; 
p.183). Summing up the main contributions about crisis topic, it is possible to identify four 
major possible attributes of crisis:  
1. high ambiguity with unknown causes and effects;  
2. unusual and unfamiliar event;  
3. serious threats for the survival of the organization and its stakeholders;  
4. organizational dilemma between inertia and taking fast and important decisions.   
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Despite the different forms of crisis, I focus in particular on the effects of economic crisis on 
firms’ and institutions’ behaviour. Scholars link economic crises to the concept of business 
and country cycles (Grewal & Tansuhaj, 2001) and to periods of expansion and contraction. 
However, not all periods of contraction can be classified as an economic crisis (Grewal and 
Tansuhaj, 2001). Economic crises are defined as contractions in which real output 
(measured usually by real gross domestic product (GDP)) and employment rate decrease, 
level of inflation increases, currency becomes unstable and many different macroeconomic 
indicators move (Foss, 2010; Fratzscher, 2009; Hoshi & Kashyap, 2004). Moreover, another 
proxy of economic crisis could be the stock market fluctuations. In particular, negative and 
persistent stock market trends are evidences of economic crises (Wadhwani, 1999; Lim et al., 
2008; Kotz, 2009).  Economic crises can affect a country (like in Mexico in 1994) or a region 
(like in Asia in 1997) or different countries at the same or in different time (like the current 
economic crisis). In the past, the main economic crises were the Great Depression of the 
1930s, characterized by a chronic insufficiency of demand, the oil shock of 1970s, attributed 
to an external shock, the Brazilian crisis of the 1980s, generated by governmental failures, the 
recent Asian crisis, caused by antiquated practices and idiosyncratic cultural elements, and, 
finally, the current global recession, that is affecting all countries in the world at different 
degrees. For example, currently Greece and Spain are strongly affected by economic crisis, 
but it is not possible to say the same for Germany as well. 
How do firms, in general, and MNCs, in particular, react to economic crises? MNCs are 
organizations, spread worldwide and strongly affected by external environment. The major 
consequences of economic crises for MNCs can be summarized in (Chung & Beamish, 2005; 
Chung et al., 2008; Singh & Yip, 2000):  
 losses of markets, because sales decline significantly as purchasing and confidence 
decline;  
40 
 
 disruption of supplier and buyer chains and collapse of local partners, because many 
local enterprises fail or lack the resources to operate reliably;  
 increase in financial risks, because of uncertainties in exchange rates, inflation, 
interest rates and the availability of funds;  
 disruption of cost structures, as a consequence of increase in financial costs and risks, 
and the loss of sales and market shares;  
 greater political risk, because countries can answer to crisis undergoing unscheduled 
or unexpected changes in political leadership and increasing bureaucracy and control.  
These unstable and high risky situations are the primary threat to organizational stability and 
status quo, increasing the vulnerability of organizations to takeover and bankruptcy (Seeger 
et al., 2005; Smart & Vertinsky, 1984). Clearly, scholars have shown that “some MNCs tend 
to be more accident prone than others, and some are less prepared to respond to crises than 
others” (Greening & Johnson, 1997; p.335). After a first time of “organizational inertia” 
(MNCs are confused and don’t know what to do at the beginning of crisis), MNCs’ responses 
to economic crisis are driven especially by efficiency needs (Greening & Johnson, 1997; 
Singh & Yip, 2000; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). During times of crisis, many firms 
naturally try to minimize losses through asset conservation, centralization of authority and 
increase in formalization (Staw et al., 1981; Singh and Yip, 2000). Cost reduction is required, 
especially, if rapid growth prior to the crisis can have hidden inefficiencies within firms. 
When markets start to decline, it is important to address these inefficiencies (Singh and Yip, 
2000). Outsourcing or other eliminating not core activities may be ways to react during 
economic crisis (Foss, 2010). However in economic literature the most widely acknowledged 
response to economic crisis is the centralization of authority, in terms of reduction in 
autonomy and local decision power (Greening & Johnson, 1997; Prechel, 1994; Staw et al., 
1981). In the context of MNCs, it means to centralize decision making authority and core 
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functions at the headquarters level (Egelhoff, 2010; Young & Tavares, 2004), reducing or 
limiting local decision power. This tendency is particularly great when the crisis is felt by 
distant subsidiaries.  
Scholars have also shown that during crisis MNCs are driven by the need to repair 
legitimacy, even because in these times managers have little rational basis for taking 
decisions (Foss, 2010). MNCs can experience a loss in legitimacy if their actions no longer 
conform to what is considered to be an appropriate organizational behaviour (Massey, 2001). 
Organizational and strategic actions are subject to scrutiny of different internal and external 
actors. Crisis increases uncertainty in external environment that can de-legitimate MNCs, for 
nature un-proactive and un-flexible to rapid change (Massey, 2001). It also increases 
considerably stakeholder heterogeneity, becoming more challenging for MNCs to satisfy 
constantly all their various stakeholders. One important strategy to regain legitimacy for 
MNC can be to restructure its internal configuration (Suchman, 1995). Thus, during 
economic crises, MNC behaviour is subject to two different pressures: from one side the need 
to minimize losses and to improve internal efficiency; from the other the need to repair both 
internal and external legitimacy.          
Nevertheless, extant studies have paid limited attention to the effects of environmental 
dynamics, such as economic crises, and how such dynamics affect the institutional pressures 
on MNCs. These changes influence both MNCs’ behaviour, affecting their organizational 
configuration and strategic choices, and the institutional environment, reflecting on the main 
domains of institutions (normative, regulatory and cognitive) (Chung et al., 2010, 2008; 
Chung & Beamish, 2005; Grewal & Tansuhaj, 2001; Lee & Makhija, 2009). By increasing 
unemployment or exchange rate volatility (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994; Reuer & Leiblein, 
2012), as well as political or country risks (Makhija & Stewart, 2012; Makhija, 2012; 
Slangen & van Tulder, 2009), economic crises push MNCs to reconfigure their value chain 
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activities, relocating their business units (Volberda, 1997) or even Headquarter units, 
worldwide. For example, recently Akeydor, a Greek global distributor of secure and robust 
software technologies, systems and device, relocated its corporate HQ in UK to avoid the 
effects of the current economic crisis that is decreasing the quality of institutions in Greece. 
In particular, the strong institutional control, the huge bureaucratic procedures and political 
instability are some of the main reasons that pushed this firm to move its HQ out of its home 
country.       
 
6.5  Summary of literature review       
In sum, I see a need to further investigations on the antecedents of HQ relocations overseas, 
because potentially important drivers and barriers of relocation decisions still remain 
overlooked. In detail, future study should move away from an overly myopic focus on 
efficiency motives to explain HQ relocation and consider other possible complementary 
explanations of this phenomenon. As shown from some empirical evidences, HQ relocations 
are not purely driven by efficiency/rational criteria, but also by the need to give an answer to 
the coercive, normative and isomorphic pressures from institutional field. 
1. Existing research focuses attention on one single country or domestic relocations, 
neglecting the possible impacts of institutional country differences on the decision to 
relocate HQ units. Moreover, relocations within one single country are likely to be 
explained by different factors with respect to those among different countries, 
characterized by completely different attributes and environments (Laamanen et al., 
2011). 
2. The literature shows that there is a gap regarding the antecedents of HQ relocations 
and the parenting activities’ geographical distribution. Although some studies 
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represent an important move away from an overly myopic focus on efficiency motives 
to explain HQ relocation (Benito et al., 2011; Birkinshaw et al., 2006; Laamanen et 
al., 2011), they overlook that MNCs are subject to multiple institutional pressures that 
can influence or modify their organizational decisions. Thus, there is needed a more 
careful investigation of the impacts of institutional factors on HQ relocation decisions, 
both as complementary and as alternative explanations of this phenomenon. 
3. Extant studies have paid limited attention to the effects of environmental uncertainty, 
such as external and unpredictable shock, and how such uncertainty affects the 
institutional pressures and efficiency/effectiveness drivers on MNCs, and in particular 
on relocation decisions. These changes influence both MNCs’ behaviour, affecting 
their organizational configuration and strategic choices, and the institutional 
environment, reflecting on the main domains of institutions (normative, regulatory 
and cognitive) (Chung et al., 2010, 2008; Chung & Beamish, 2005; Grewal & 
Tansuhaj, 2001; Lee & Makhija, 2009). These dynamics can push MNCs to 
reconfigure their value chain and parenting activities.       
I have summarized the research gaps in the following Figure 2, that shows the extant study 
and the possible future avenues.  
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Figure 2. Enlarged framework of HQ relocations. 
 
 
Furthermore, looking only at relocation literature, although the HQ relocation abroad 
increases operating costs of organization because such operating activities, like human 
resources, play more active role in the overall process of relocation (Gregory et al., 2005), 
and complexity in HQ configuration (Nell & Larsen, 2011), extant studies have paid little 
attention to the consequences of HQ relocation on the organizational and financial 
performance of MNCs. Moreover, the relocation decision process has not received attention 
in the extant literature, even if it could be related to the offshoring process. In this direction, 
there are many studies about offshoring process in the offshoring literature.  
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7 Theoretical framework and hypotheses development2  
The theoretical basis of my research is the institutional theory (IT). I take into account the 
social construction of organizational behaviour and recognize the limits imposed by social 
constraints on a purely economic basis. Often, organizational actions are driven by pressures 
from other actors in the organizational field and by the need to respond to these pressures to 
achieve legitimacy.   
My research will be based on the enlarged framework of HQ relocations as depicted in Figure 
2. I focus on the previous identified research gaps 1-2-3. In particular, I investigate the 
impacts of coercive, isomorphic and normative pressures on HQ relocation decisions in 
multi-country settings (Gaps 1-2) and I explore the possible impacts of unexpected changes 
in environment, caused for example by external events like economic crises, on the 
institutional factors and on the HQ relocation decision (Gap 3). Hence, I will focus on certain 
parts of the above-mentioned framework. My research model will integrate the relationships 
B, C, and E (see Figure 2).     
 
7.1 Model of HQ relocation through an institutional perspective 
Based on the literature review, I suggest that HQ relocation is driven not only by efficiency-
effectiveness motives, as the previous research testifies, but also by behavioural and 
institutional factors. This lack of attention implies that potentially important drivers and 
barriers of relocation decisions remain overlooked. Firm behaviour is not always based on 
“managerial” throughts and driven by efficiency needs, in terms of cost minimization, even 
in high competitive environments. Sometimes, firms struggle to achieve legitimacy, facing 
                                                 
2
 The theoretical framework of the current study is part of Valentino et al., (2013). “Time to move on? The 
impact of institutions and economic crises on headquarter mobility”, accepted at the 2013 Annual Meeting of 
Academy of International Business.  
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pressures to conform to their institutional environments. Thus, I show how institutional and 
behavioural needs can influence the behavior of MNCs and, in particular, their relevant 
decision to relocate HQ units. I highlight how the three main institutional pressures, i.e. 
isomorphic, coercive, and normative, can differentially impact on such decision.    
Furthermore, I complicate my theoretical model, addressing the effects of an external and 
unpredictable shock, like economic crises, that generate a turbulent, uncertain, and hostile 
environment. I show how an economic crisis situation plays a role on the international 
configuration of HQ activities. During a crisis situation I expect a more strongly reaction of 
MNCs to coercive, isomorphic, and normative pressures.  
The model consists of different elements related to the institutional pressures, as well as to 
crisis situation. Regarding the institutional pressures, I will study: 
 the mimetic isomorphism, in terms of institutional isomorphism;  
 the coercive pressure, in terms of the degree of ownership structure concentration;  
 the normative pressures, in terms of the institutional quality of HQ location;  
 the concept of institutional remoteness in the HQ configuration. 
Moreover, building upon the findings in my literature review, I will study the role of 
economic crisis, comparing what happens in crisis situation vs. times of stability.  
The following Figure 3 illustrates my research model and the effects of economic crisis. 
 
47 
 
Figure 3. Theoretical Model 
 
 
7.2 Mimetic Isomorphism 
As I wrote in the literature review, one of the most important processes through which 
organizations achieve conformity is isomorphism or mimetic isomorphism. It occurs when 
organizations respond to uncertainty by adopting the patterns of other successful 
organizations (Kostova & Roth, 2002). Organizations use to model themselves on similar and 
comparable organizations that are more legitimized by institutional actors in their field (Di 
Maggio & Powell, 1983). “The ubiquity of certain kinds of structural arrangements can more 
likely be credited to the universality of mimetic processes than to any concrete evidence that 
the adopted models enhance efficiency” (Di Maggio & Powell, 1983; pp. 150-151). Thus, 
mimetic isomorphism can be defined as a process through which organization changes its 
configuration over time, becoming more similar to other organizations in its environment. 
When faced with uncertainty, firms are more likely to imitate the actions and patterns of other 
organizations, replacing institutional rules with technical rules (Meyer & Scott, 1983). 
48 
 
Sociologists, under the banner of institutional theory (Di Maggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1987; Zucker, 1987), speak about “institutional isomorphism” as a 
driver of mimetic behaviour. Moreover, isomorphism can be external and internal 
(Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991). External isomorphism means that MNCs need to respond to 
external pressures from other actors of its organizational field, while internal one originates 
from other entities within MNCs. 
 
7.2.1 Institutional isomorphism 
Institutional isomorphism can be defined as the extent to which an organization’s strategy 
resembles the strategy and the behaviour adopted by main competitors or other related and 
similar actors (for example, customers, suppliers, institutions, and so on) in its competitive 
environment (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1993; Henshel & Johnston, 1987; Hutzschenreuter, 
Pedersen, & Volberda, 2007; Zhou, Wu, & Luo, 2007). The mere fact that main competitors 
or other firms in the firm’s institutional field have relocated their headquarters units overseas 
becomes the cue of normality. When it happens, MNCs that don’t relocate their HQs, appear 
abnormal and illegitimate to their stakeholders (Abraham & Taylor, 1993). Such behaviour is 
not necessarily efficient in terms of its direct effects on performance, but the social 
legitimacy, it provides, can generate benefits in the long run. “Structural change in 
organizations seems less and less driven by competition or by the need for efficiency” (Di 
Maggio and Powell, 1983; p.144). In the context of MNCs, mimetic isomorphism is limited 
by the multiplicity and ambiguity of organizational field (Kostova et al., 2008): “The 
diversity among the many institutional systems that they are exposed to and the unique sets of 
arrangements that each MNC unit faces give these organizations broader latitude in picking 
and choosing which models to adopt and to what extent they should respond to institutional 
influences” (Kostova et al., 2008; p.999). One precise organizational field is arguably very 
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difficult to identify. MNCs and their subunits operate in different, fragmented, nested, and 
sometimes conflicting institutional environments (Kostova et al., 2008). These multiple 
organizational fields reduce the need of isomorphic behaviour, especially at the meso-level. 
However, it doesn’t mean that MNCs don’t tend to model each other, originating mimetic 
processes and isomorphic pressures. To identify this mimetic behaviour, I adopt a different 
definition of organizational field, switching my attention from the meso- to the meta-level of 
analysis. Meta-institutional field is a broad, but at the same time a narrow concept: it is broad, 
because it refers to MNCs on the whole, and narrow in consideration of the number and the 
amount of institutionalized values and practices that it encompasses (Kostova et al. 2008). 
Through their international configuration, MNCs interact with many different, but at the same 
time comparable actors, that are part of their meta-organizational field and can influence their 
behaviour. Thus, I expect a positive but weak effect of previous relocations of other MNCs 
on HQ relocation decisions by individual firms. 
However, it has also been argued that mimetic isomorphism becomes more important when 
external uncertainty and turbulence increase (Di Maggio & Powell, 1983; Haveman, 1993; 
Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Uncertainty is a powerful force that encourages imitation and 
pushes organizations to model themselves on others (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983). When 
faced with high uncertainty and turbulent environment, like during economic crises, imitating 
the actions of other organizations, economizing on search costs, is seen as a good and easy 
response (Haveman, 1993). In these situations, a firm models itself on other organizations, 
especially on the organizations that are closely comparable to it, in response to the uncertain 
environment (Lai et al., 2006). For example, in 2008, Yahoo! relocated its European 
Headquarters from London to Switzerland, after studying and speaking to other “comparable” 
companies that had moved there. Yahoo had analysed EA, Cisco System, Kraft Foods and 
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Google, that had all established their European Headquarter in Switzerland in the previous 
few years (The Guardian, 2008). Therefore, 
Hypothesis 1a: Previous HQ relocations, taken by other MNCs, increase the likelihood of 
further imitative HQ relocations. 
Hypothesis 1b: During times of economic crisis, previous HQ relocations by other MNCs 
increase the likelihood of further HQ relocations more than during times of economic 
stability. 
 
7.3 Internal coercive pressure 
I argue that coercive institutional pressures against or in favour of relocation can be related 
to the ownership structure of the firm. The ownership structure of the firm can be considered 
as a relevant internal institutional constrain (Chizema & Kim, 2009; Eden & Miller, 2004). 
Owners not only monitor and control the actions of managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), but 
also create an internal culture and identity. Identity can be defined as the sharing of 
conventions and rules by which different units coordinate their behaviour and decision 
making (Kogut & Zander, 1996). Identity makes the formation of shared values easier, lets 
expectations among units converge, and fosters ties and similarity among them. In sum, a 
firm’s identity is likely to reflect the values, principles, norms, believes, and ideals of the 
firm’s owners. This coercive pressure is stronger when a family owns the firm, and weaker 
when there is dispersed ownership. For example, Benito et al. (2011) argue that “when shares 
are widely dispersed, no single owner is in a position to exert pressures to keep headquarter 
functions at home” (Benito et al., 2011, p.381). In a situation of dispersed ownership, all 
investors are minority owners with different values, principles, rules and so on, and none of 
them can achieve a dominant position. In literature, three different ownership models can be 
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identified: dispersed ownership, where the ownership is widely dispersed; dominant 
ownership, where one owner owns between 20 and 50 percent of the shares and he can be 
defined as the main owner of the company; finally, family ownership, in which a family owns 
the majority of shares (Pedersen & Thomsen, 1997). Therefore, I expect that ownership 
concentration and especially family ownership are negatively related to the likelihood of HQ 
relocation. This situation is exacerbated during economic crises. External uncertainty changes 
the “rules of the game”, modifying established relationships. The familiarity of firms’ internal 
environment and the firms’ identity are considered as a safe refuge to understand how to react 
and which strategic and organizational moves to make. Moreover, the high uncertainty 
generated by economic crisis pushes owners to be more anxious and careful on strategic and 
organizational decisions leading towards more centralization. Thus, I expect that concentrated 
ownership structure is a more powerful constrain in economic crises than in stable 
environment. 
Hypothesis 2a. An increase in ownership concentration decreases the likelihood of HQ 
relocation. 
Hypothesis 2b. During times of economic crises, ownership concentration is a more powerful 
constraint for HQs relocation than during times of economic stability. 
 
7.4 The Effect of Institutional Remoteness. 
MNCs are, by definition, geographically dispersed. Therefore, there is to vary extent 
“distance” between them that has to be bridged. The MNC is willing to coordinate their 
activities across the markets in which the MNC is active. Distance can be understood as a 
multi-dimensional construct covering many institutional aspects such as administrative, 
cultural, and political differences between countries (Berry, Guillén, & Zhou, 2010). In the 
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institutional literature, administrative distance is defined like the differences in bureaucratic 
models caused by language, religion and legal systems (La Porta et al., 1998; Henisz, 2000; 
Berry et al., 2010). Scholars have analysed administrative distance by identifying if countries 
have a common language or a common legal system (Berry et al., 2010; Guillén & Suárez, 
2005). On the other hand, cultural distance derives from the differences in behaviour toward 
authority, trust, individuality and the importance of work and family (Berry et al., 2010; 
Hofstede, 1980; Inglehart, 2004). Finally, the institutional literature has also emphasized that 
countries can be different for the nature of their political systems (Henisz & Williamson, 
1999; Henisz, 2000). In this direction, scholars have measured political distance both in 
dichotomous terms (for example, democratic or autocratic regimes) and through continuous 
political dimensions, like institutional checks and balances, democratic character, the size of 
the state relative to the economy and external trade associations (Berry et al., 2010; Brewer, 
2007; Demirbag et al., 2007). These institutional differences take into consideration the main 
specific attributes of a country and they are considered as important key dimensions to 
identify institutional differences across countries. Previous research underlines how each 
dimension of distance can influence organizational or strategic decisions (Berry et al., 2010; 
Demirbag, Glaister, & Tatoglu, 2007; Ghemawat, 2001; La Porta et al., 1998). HQ units 
(DHQ and RHQ) are intermediary lines of control between CHQ and local subsidiaries 
(Forsgren et al., 1995). From an institutional perspective, they are subject to push and pull 
legitimacy pressures. On one side, they need to be closer to CHQ that vests them with 
internal authority, power and legitimacy. Differences in cultural, political, and administrative 
experience reduce the possibility of CHQ to intervene in and to communicate with HQ units. 
On the other side, distance between the HQ unit and its subsidiaries reduces the ability of the 
HQ unit to exert its power and authority on the subsidiaries, because it is not legitimized by 
them (Brenner & Ambos, 2012). Distance increases the likelihood that HQ units do not share 
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the same values, culture, language, and knowledge and the institutional context of their CHQ 
and their subsidiaries (Brenner & Ambos, 2012; Suchman, 1995). From subsidiaries’ and 
CHQ’s perspective, distance reduces legitimacy of the HQ unit which, in turn, can lead to 
more subsidiary resistance, misunderstandings, or increased coordination efforts. Thus, HQ 
units struggle with an institutional dilemma between receiving/fostering legitimacy with the 
CHQ versus receiving/fostering legitimacy with local subsidiaries. They cannot be too far 
from CHQ, but at the same time they should be closer to their centre of gravity, i.e. the 
subsidiaries under their control. One way to overcome this internal legitimacy dilemma is to 
reduce institutional distance, relocating HQ unit. Institutional distance plays an important role 
in balancing internal legitimacy. This relocation is perceived as an attempt of HQ units to be 
more involved in CHQ’s or subsidiaries’ business, environment and values. Thus, I expect 
that an increase in multidimensional distance from CHQ and remoteness between the HQ unit 
and the centre of gravity increases the likelihood of HQ relocation. During times of economic 
crises, I expect that firms react more sensitively and quickly to growing distance and 
remoteness of their HQ units. For example, in the on-going economic crisis, a firm might 
experience declining Western markets while Asian markets continue to grow. Thus, the HQ 
is increasingly remote from the most important markets and firms might react quickly to 
move their HQ to Asia. But, at the same time MNCs use to response to economic crises 
reducing local autonomy and decision power in favour of a stronger hierarchical control 
(Staw et al., 1981; Greening and Johnson, 1997; Singh and Yip, 2000). The result is a 
reduction in decision units and decision makers in the organization (Hermann, 1963; Prechel, 
1994). As a direct consequence, I expect a stronger influence of CHQ on the relocation 
decision of HQ units. To maintain and foster their internal legitimacy and power, divisional 
and regional HQs move closer to CHQ than their centre of gravity. Managers are more 
confident if HQ units “are located close to CHQ to reduce distance and ensure rich, quick, 
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and unbiased communication” (Lunnan et al., 2011; p.132). So, during times of economic 
crises, distance from CHQ influences the likelihood of HQ relocation stronger than the 
remoteness between HQ unit and local subsidiaries. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 3a: An increase in institutional distance from CHQ increases the likelihood of 
HQ relocation.   
Hypothesis 3b: An increase in institutional remoteness between HQ units and local 
subsidiaries increases the likelihood of HQ relocation. 
Hypothesis 3c: During times of economic crisis, an increase in distance from CHQ and 
institutional remoteness has a stronger effect on the likelihood of HQ relocation than during 
times of economic stability. 
Hypothesis 3d: During times of economic crisis, distance from CHQ has a stronger effect on 
the likelihood of HQ relocation than the remoteness between HQ and local subsidiaries. 
 
7.5 Institutional Quality Effects 
Institutional quality can be defined as the quality of state political and legal institutions, and 
governance infrastructure of a certain country (Chong & Calderón, 2000; Huang & Wei, 
2006; Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2009; Kaufmann & Kraay, 2003; Levchenko, 2007; 
Sobel, 2008). In this context, it is considered as a strong normative institutional pressure 
on firm behaviour, related to the characteristics of HQ location. Following Kaufmann et al. 
(2009), the institutional quality is related to 6 specific indicators that change over time:  
 voice and accountability, the extent of the citizen participation in selecting 
government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free 
media;  
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 political stability and absence of violence, the likelihood of government 
destabilization through unconstitutional or violence means;  
 government effectiveness, the quality of public and civil services and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of government;  
 regulatory quality, perceptions of the government ability to formulate and implement 
policies and regulations;  
 rule of law, the quality of contract enforcement, the police and the courts;  
 control of corruption, the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain.  
“Good governance” is seen as a means of achieving development and a development 
objective in itself (Thomas, 2009). Moreover, institutional differences are considered as 
source of country comparative advantage (Levchenko, 2007). The growing interest in this 
concept has attracted also international business scholars. In particular, they relate the 
institutional quality to entry mode choices and location decision, focusing on corruption, 
government effectiveness, and political risk issues (Kwok & Tadesse, 2006; Slangen & van 
Tulder, 2009). Of course, multinational corporations are sensitive to their home location’s 
institutional quality and to its changes over time. Political instability, corruption, or a weak 
legal system can lead to large risks and costs. The institutional quality of certain countries can 
have a direct effect on the likelihood of HQ relocation, because sometimes changes in the 
government system can push down regulatory quality and government effectiveness 
(Hopkins, 2006). These changes can therefore have substantial influence on the various 
dimensions of institutional quality, decreasing country freedom and growth (Ali & Crain, 
2001). Demonstrations, strikes, and street violence / riots can increase in these circumstances 
as well corruption. Other countries, instead, can experience a shift towards hard-playing 
governments that reduce freedom of speech and influence media more strongly. For example, 
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Hungary lost 17 positions in the press freedom index from 2010 to 2012 after the 
parliamentary election in 2010. In such problematic situations MNCs need to engage in many 
difficult interactions with many different institutional actors that become more oppressive on 
MNCs’ actions. Firms faced with such problematic institutional quality are more likely to 
search for safe havens (similar to the movements of capital) and, therefore, to relocate their 
HQs away from the troublesome countries. Thus, I hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 4a: A decrease in the institutional quality of the HQ location increases the 
likelihood of HQ relocation. 
 
7.6 Summary of the theoretical framework 
In sum, I would like to investigate the effects of institutional pressures, divided into 
isomorphic, normative and coercive, on the decisions to relocate HQ units overseas. Each 
hypothesis takes into consideration a precise institutional pressure. I consider as an 
isomorphic pressure, the institutional isomorphism; as a normative pressures, the institutional 
quality of HQ home country; and, finally, as a coercive pressure, the ownership structure. 
Furthermore, the institutional remoteness cannot be exclusively related to a specific 
institutional pressure. It includes aspects in common to the three main types of institutional 
pressures at the same time. For example, distance increases the likelihood that HQ does not 
share the same values, culture, language, and knowledge of the subsidiaries, loosing internal 
legitimacy. In this sense, the movement close to the subsidiaries can be driven by internal 
isomorphic pressure (to be similar to internal units, in this case subsidiaries), and by coercive 
pressure (to re-establish internal legitimacy). Thus, for the sake of simplicity I include 
institutional remoteness in each institutional pressure in Table 2. 
57 
 
So, the aim of the following Table 2 is just to relate easily and clearly each hypothesis to the 
own institutional pressure. 
Table 2. Institutional pressures and HQ relocation 
Isomorphic Pressures Normative Pressures Coercive Pressures 
Institutional Isomorphism Institutional quality Ownership structure 
Institutional remoteness Institutional remoteness Institutional remoteness 
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8 Methodology 
8.1 Research context 
In my dissertation, I focus my attention on the movement of HQ units outside national 
countries. In particular, I consider the relocation of every type of HQs (corporate, divisional 
and regional ones) inward and outward European countries from 2000 to 2012.  
My unit of analysis is the HQ unit. I am interested into investigate the reasons that push HQs 
to move out their home country.  
I constructed by hand a multi-country dataset, focusing my attention on different European 
countries. An international dataset offers many different and valuable advantages. First of all, 
I can compare the different institutional situations in European countries, considering 
variables like GDP per capita or employment rate, or cultural and administrative differences, 
and investigate their impacts on relocation decisions. Moreover, these variables “are likely to 
exhibit more variation in an international rather than a national setting (such as in the case 
of differences between US states)” (Laamanen et al., 2011; p.3). Second, a multi-country 
dataset gives the opportunity to consider to some extent completely different variables and 
factors of HQ relocation respect to a single and domestic one (Laamanen et al. 2011). 
Moreover, the benefits and, on balance, the costs of multi-country relocations are presumably 
different and greater than domestic or one country relocation. Finally, but not less important 
than the previous, this particular dataset is interesting also from a descriptive statistical 
perspective. In fact, it gives the possibility to better show the trend and the distribution of 
relocation decisions with particular attention to the kind of firms relocating, their ownership 
structure, size, sector of activity, country of origin; frequent home and host locations, and the 
timing of the relocations. In addition, it compares and contrasts the different motivations and 
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triggers of HQs relocation. Thus, this international dataset can give an answer also to more 
practical and managerial questions about relocation decisions.     
 
8.2 Data  
8.2.1 Target sample 
My target sample is composed by the relocations of HQ units, divided into corporate, 
divisional and regional HQs, occurred in European countries during 2000-2012. In particular, 
unlike Laamanen et al. (2011), I considered the movements in 27 European countries, i.e. 
EU-25 plus Norway and Switzerland. Laamanen et al (2011) justify their decision to consider 
only EU-15, because the lower availability of quality internet sources in newer EU states, 
especially in the earlier years of their sample (1996), could decrease quality. However I 
started to collect data from 2000 and newer EU states (I mean Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, 
Latvia, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Malta, Lithuania, Estonia and Slovakia) were accepted at 
the beginning of 2004, submitting application in 1998. Moreover, they adopted the European 
Union standards just before 1998 to submit the application. For the same reasons of 
Laamanen et al. (2011), I excluded from my analysis the latest members, Bulgaria and 
Romania.  
I started to collect data from 2000, even if there were few prior cases of relocation going back 
as far as 1988. I excluded those cases, because the lack of information about them could 
reduce the quality of my sampling procedure.  
I focused only on HQ relocations, i.e. any movements of subsidiaries or other facilities, like 
production, R&D or customer service centres, are not included. Based on my previous 
literature review, relocation is a process through which a firm moves its HQ from one country 
to another and HQ unit maintains “a degree of continuity in identity” (Laamanent et al., 2011; 
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p.9). The first establishment of HQ in an European country from other locations, like for 
instance USA, China, or India, is also included in the previous definition. Finally, in the 
sampling procedure I considered any movements of HQs among European countries and 
inward/outward Europe. 
The sampling procedure was based on LexisNexis
3
 and Factiva
4
, two different news 
databases that collect articles from main magazines and journals. I paid particular attention on 
the issue of potential false positives in sampling. When do false positives occur? A false 
positive occurs when observations, in this particular context HQ relocations, that really didn’t 
happen, are included in the sampling activity. For example, newspapers can anticipate a 
relocation event, that doesn’t come true indeed, or that has not yet been realized. I didn’t 
include these cases in my sample. I controlled also for the opposite case of potential false 
negatives in sampling. Of course, they occur when I miss any HQ relocations that actually 
took place. To reduce these two kinds of sampling error, I went through several other sources 
of information in addition to LexisNexis and Factiva. For example, I went through stock 
market notifications, local business press, financial press and Google news. Moreover, I made 
an extra check on firm archive documents per each relocation event within my sample to 
exclude the possible presence of false positives. 
I analysed also previously described relocation cases in the literature. If these relocation cases 
happened during my time frame (2000-2012), I included them in my sample after a careful 
check on news databases, Google news and annual report.  
                                                 
3
 LexisNexis is “a leading global provider of content-enabled workflow solutions designed specifically for 
professionals in the legal, risk management, corporate, government, law enforcement, accounting, and 
academic markets” (http://www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/about-us/about-us.page). It has the world’s largest news 
database for legal and economic information. 
4
 Factiva is a business information and research tool owned by Dow Jones & Company and takes into 
consideration news that come from both licensed and free sources. It provides access to more than 36.000 
sources from different countries and in different languages. 
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I expect my sample as a complete set of relocation phenomena occurred in Europe in my time 
frame and considered important enough to be mentioned by international financial press and 
by stock exchange documents. My sample doesn’t include information on small companies 
and on relocations that don’t bait the attention of financial press. It should be considered as 
“applying to the context of larger European companies rather than, for example, SMEs” 
(Laamanen et al., 2011; p. 10).  
Following this sampling procedure, I found out 126 HQ movements in European countries 
from 2000 to 2012. Unlike Laamanen et al. (2011), I found also multiple movers, i.e. some 
companies relocated more than once during 2000-2012. However, even if these multiple 
movements could be very interesting to investigate, the few observations would not allow a 
significant quantitative analysis. Thus, I leave aside multiple relocations from my sample. As 
better described in the following sections, I constructed a unique panel dataset collecting 
data per each movement and per each company through a multi-methodological approach. 
Then, I constructed a cross sectional dataset from the panel one. I collected secondary data, 
merging different databases (Orbis, OECD statistics, Total Economy Database, World 
Governance Indicators database) and going through annual reports, quarterly reports and SEC 
filings. In addition, I collected also primary data, contacting directly managers at corporate, 
and divisional or regional HQ level to get more information on each movement. I got through 
to managers via mail before and later through a Skype interview. 
 
8.2.2 Sample selection bias and control group 
My sample includes 126 movements of HQ units in a time frame 2000-2012. It has been 
drawn from the news databases LexisNexis and Factiva. This sampling procedure could 
generate potential sample selection biases, because it consists only of relocated HQ units 
without a random selection. To reduce this error, I constructed a control group of HQ units 
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that did not experience a relocation event in the considered time frame. I followed a matched 
sampling procedure. The aim was to construct a comparable group of HQ units that had not 
relocated. I identified a sub-population of firms through three main matching criteria: 
 Industry, taking into consideration the 3-digit SIC code of HQ unit; 
 Size, in terms of revenues (expressed in USD) of the last available year. To be 
precise, I identified five main revenue ranges and I assigned to them the units 
considered in the relocation sample; 
 European experience, considering the HQ relocation in European countries, I took 
into consideration for my control group firms with at least one unit in Europe. 
Starting from this sub-population, I randomly selected 200 companies/units matched by, to 
the extent possible, industry, size and EU experience distribution. Following these three main 
criteria, I constructed a comparable control group, in terms of main characteristics, to the 
relocation group. Data were collected at the last available year. I used the Orbis database to 
identify each unit in my control group and to collect information about them. In addition, I 
used also archive data, like annual reports, quarterly reports and SEC filings. 
 
8.2.3 Data collection 
The information has been based on the following procedure:  
 Identification of HQ relocations as provided by LexisNexis and Factiva database; 
 Random identification of control group as provided by Orbis database; 
 Collection of firm and unit data from Orbis database, archive sources (annual reports, 
quarterly reports and SEC filings) and direct interviews to corporate or 
regional/divisional managers.  
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 Collection of country data as provided by OECD statistics, Total Economy Database, 
World Governance Indicators database. 
First of all, I identified the relocation events from news databases (LexisNexis and Factiva), 
using different key words related to the phenomenon under investigation (the relocation of 
HQ unit). In particular, I used key words like “relocation”, “movement”, “relocate”, “move”, 
“corporate headquarter”, “HQ”, “European headquarter”, “divisional headquarter”, and 
their other possible combinations. Moreover, I set the research as follow: 
 Main financial/management newspapers in English, German, French, Italian and 
Spanish; 
 European countries and, in particular, EU-25 plus Norway and Switzerland, as the 
context of the research; 
 Time frame from 2000 to 2012. 
Once identified a relocation, I went through archive data and Google news to look for 
evidences of the movement and to minimize potential false negatives and positives, before to 
include in my sample. At the same time, I contacted directly the enterprise by mail, asking for 
more information about the movement and its main reasons, and for the contact details of 
managers at corporate and regional/divisional HQ level. Then, I contacted directly these 
managers by mail, fixing a Skype interview, when they were available. The interviews aim to 
collect qualitative information on the movement and, in particular, about practical and 
empirical reasons that push top management to move a HQ overseas. Moreover, I analysed 
also previously described relocation cases in the literature. If my sample had not included 
these cases, happened during my time frame, I added them after a careful check on news 
databases, Google news and annual reports. In particular, I checked the real accomplishment 
of the movement. 
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Then, I built a matched control group of HQs that were not relocated from 2000-2012. Each 
HQ was identified in Orbis database. I constructed a sub-population of firm units through 
three main matched criteria, previously described: industry (3-digit SIC code), size (USD 
revenues), and European experience. Once identified every unit that matched with those 
criteria, I randomly selected them into my control group so as to represent the distribution of 
units in the relocation sample. 
Finally, I have manually collected the data on an observation by observation level for the 
time frame (2000-2012). To do this, I merged different secondary sources. In particular, as 
better explained later on, firm data were collected from Orbis; while country data through 
OECD statistics, Total Economy Database, World Governance Indicators database, and other 
similar databases. 
 
8.2.4 Cross-sectional dataset 
I constructed also a cross-sectional dataset from my panel one. This dataset is composed by 
326 observations (126 in the relocation group and 200 in the control). Each observation in the 
relocation group refers to the year in which the HQ was relocated. I developed this dataset 
following the same procedure of Laamanen et al. (2011). Following Laamanen et al. (2011), 
the value of each variable is one year lagged. I consider the value that specific variable has in 
the year prior to the relocation-year observation. I do that, because the decision to relocate 
HQs requires time and it is strongly influenced by what happened before.     
A critical issue was the construction of control group, which needs to have the same 
characteristics of the relocation group. I followed the same matched criteria identified before 
(industry, size, and European experience). However, I matched also for an additional one, i.e. 
the year of relocation. The control group is constructed to match, to the extent possible, not 
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only the industry, size and European experience distribution, but also the year distribution of 
the main relocation group.   
  
8.3 Operationalization and measures 
Measures of all constructs were developed based on an in-depth review of the literature. 
Some scales are adapted and modified from prior major studies. The following paragraphs 
describe the main variables (dependent, independent and control) used in my model and how 
I operationalize them grounding on previous literature.  
 
8.3.1 Dependent variable: HQ relocation 
My aim is to understand how institutional pressures can affect the decision to relocate HQ 
units outside home country. Thus, my dependent variable is easily represented by the 
decision to relocate HQ. In line with Laamanen et al. (2011), it is measured using a 
dichotomous variable, which takes value 1 for the HQ units relocated overseas, and value 0 
otherwise. I used the news databases (LexisNexis and Factiva) to identify the relocation 
events. 
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8.3.2 Independent variables 
 
Institutional Isomorphism 
In literature, institutional isomorphism is related to the imitative behaviour by MNCs. Firms 
use to imitate the behaviour of other actors in their organizational field. Laamanen et al. 
(2011) operationalized this mimetic behaviour through a trend variable, counting “the number 
of relocation events in the year prior to the firm-year observation” (Laamanen et al., 2011; 
p.14). Measured in that way, the trend variable doesn’t capture completely the imitative 
behaviour by companies. It is a myopic measure, because it considers only the relocation 
events taken by other firms in the year prior to the firm-year observation. It forgets 
completely other possible relocations happened in the past, that can influence the behaviour 
of other firms. To avoid this error, in addition to Laamanen et al. (2011)’s trend variable, I 
measure the institutional isomorphism through a more fine grained approach. Taking into 
account the meta-organizational field, I calculated the accumulated trend of relocation events 
happened in the years prior to the firm-year observation. Of course, I limited the count of the 
relocation events to my time range (2000-2012). For example, in 2004 the value of the 
accumulated trend variable is the sum of relocation events happened in 2000, 2001, 2002, and 
2003. So, I can capture all previous relocations that can push to take an imitative behaviour. 
Moreover, the most of relocated HQs in my sample occur in a small range of industries. As I 
will show later, these firms are mainly in manufacturing and service industry. This can help 
the accuracy of isomorphic measure used in the current study.   
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Ownership structure 
In literature, there are many different ways to measure the percentage of voting shares held 
by the shareholders. I divided the ownership structure in two main categories with respect to 
the percentage of voting shares held by each owner:  
1. Dispersed ownership, where no single shareholder holds more than 20 percent of the 
voting shares; 
2. Concentrated ownership, where one shareholder owns more than 20 percent of the 
voting shares. 
I used Orbis database
5
 to identify the percentage of the voting shares owned by each 
shareholder and the ownership structure of the firm. I check also for possible changes in the 
percentage of the voting shares during my time frame (2000-2012). So, I created a binary 
variable, that takes value 1 for dispersed ownership, and value 2 for concentrated ownership, 
as shown in the following Table 3. 
Table 3. Overview: Ownership structure 
Variable Description Value In model 
Dispersed Ownership 
No single shareholder 
holds more than 20 
percent of the voting 
shares. 
1 Dummy_ownership1 
Concentrated 
Ownership 
One shareholder owns 
more than 20 percent 
of the voting shares. 
2 Dummy_ownership2 
  
 
                                                 
5
 Orbis database contains firm data and their ownership. 
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Institutional remoteness 
This variable is a multi-dimensional construct covering many “distance” aspects. In 
particular, I focus on administrative, cultural and political differences. Moreover, for each 
dimension I measure two different distances between the country of the HQ unit and the 
country of Corporate HQ, and between the country of the HQ unit and the countries of 
different subsidiaries
6
 under its control. 
Some scholars have already defined and measured these different types of distances (Berry et 
al., 2010; Berry, 2006; Campa and Guillen, 1999; Fratianni and Oh, 2009; Garcia-Canal and 
Guillen, 2008; Guler and Guillen, 2010; Kogut and Singh, 1988; La Porta et al., 1998; 
Shenkar, 2001). So, building on this previous study, I define administrative distance like the 
differences in bureaucracy, language, religion and the legal system between countries (Berry 
et al., 2010; La Porta et al., 1998). To calculate the distance per administrative dimension, I 
used the CIA Factbook
7
 and the World Development Indicators (WDI)
8
. This distance is 
more or less stable during time. 
Then, I define the cultural distance, as the “differences toward authority, trust, individuality, 
and importance of work and family” (Berry et al., 2010; p.1464). Following Berry et al. 
(2010), I create my measure of cultural distance using public opinion data from four waves of 
the World Values Survey (WVS). Cultural distance between countries evolves and varies 
over time (Inglehart and Baker, 2000). So, the WVS allows me to take into consideration and 
capture these changes, because the surveys are conducted every 5 years around the world. 
                                                 
6
 Subsidiaries are defined like an operating unit under the ownership of the MNC, and the control of a specific 
HQ unit, and located in a host country (Birkinshaw, 1997). 
7
 The CIA Factbook or the World Factbook is an annual publication by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
that reports every statistical information regarding all countries in the world.  
8
 The World Develompment Indicators (WDI) is a World Bank database that contains information about 
development indicators collected by official international sources. 
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Based on the extant literature (Berry et al., 2010; Brewer, 2007; Demirbag et al. 2007; Dow 
and Karunaratna, 2006), I measure political distance like the differences among countries in 
democratic character, the size of the state relative to the economy, and external trade 
associations. To do this, I used data from the World Development Indicators (WDI), from the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) databases, and from Political Constrain Index 
(POLCONV).  
Finally, I computed the geographical distance in kilometres between the capital of the HQ 
unit country and the capital of the CHQ and the each subsidiary country. I used distance 
calculator, one of the applications in Google Maps.   
The following Table 4 summarizes these definitions, including some theoretical and 
empirical examples, and the sources. 
Table 4. Dimension of cross-national distance 
Dimension  Definition Source Theoretical and 
Empirical studies 
Administrative Differences in 
language, religion, 
and legal system 
CIA Factbook  
World Development 
Indicators 
Berry et al. (2010), 
Guler and Guillen 
(2010) 
Cultural Differences in 
considering 
authority, trust, 
individuality, and 
relevance of work 
and family 
World Values Survey Berry et al. (2010), 
Kogut and Singh 
(1988), Shenkar 
(2001) 
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Political Differences in 
political stability, 
and democracy 
World Development 
Indicators 
World Trade Organization  
Political Constrain Index 
Berry et al. (2010), 
Delios and Henisz 
(2000), Garcia-Canal 
and Guillen (2010), 
Henisz and Delios 
(2001) 
Geographic Distance in 
kilometres between 
the capitals of two 
different countries 
Google Map Distance 
Calculator 
Berry et al. (2010), 
Fratianni and Oh 
(2009) 
Source. Berry et al. (2010) 
 
To operationalize each distance dimension, I used the Mahalanobis method, originally 
formulated in 1936, even if the most of extant literature uses the Euclidean one
9
. Following 
Berry et al. (2010), the Mahalanobis distance is a better choice than the Euclidean method 
because it takes into consideration the following three main aspects: 
1. country variables are highly correlated with each other; 
2. the variance of the variables differs massively both across nations and over time; 
3. country characteristics are typically measured on different scales. 
Afterwards, I calculated the remoteness per each distance dimension. Following Laamanen et 
al. (2011) I calculated the geographical remoteness as the sum of logarithms of geographical 
distances (in Km
2
) between the country of HQ unit and the countries of each subsidiary under 
its control. Then, I divided the result by the number of local subsidiaries, through the 
following formula:  
                                                 
9
 See the appendix 13.1 for more information about Mahalanobis and Euclidean distance. 
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Where, i is the HQ unit, j is the subsidiary and 13 is the highest number of subsidiaries under 
the HQ’s control in my sample. 
I calculated the administrative, political and cultural remoteness through the approach 
adopted by Berry et al. (2010), as the average of each distance dimension. For example, 
administrative remoteness is the result of the sum of each distance between HQ and local 
subsidiaries, divided by the number of local subsidiaries. I used the following formula: 
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Where, i is the HQ unit, j is the subsidiary and 13 is the highest number of subsidiaries under 
the HQ’s control in my sample. 
These remoteness variables have different scales. To solve this problem, I generated per each 
distance standardised variables, that are variables with a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of one. For example, 
 
ij
ijij
ij
motenessAdm
remotenessZadm

Re_
:_  
Where μij is the mean of the variable (in this case the mean of administrative remoteness) and 
σij is its standard deviation. I followed this procedure for each remoteness dimension. 
Moreover, these variables were highly correlated with each other. To solve the 
multicollinearity issue, for the construct of institutional remoteness 
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(“inst_remoteness_factor”) all cases were factor analysed10 in an EFA. All four items of 
remoteness (Zadm_remoteness, Zgeo_remoteness, Zcul_remoteness, and Zpol_remoteness) 
were significantly correlated to each other, and the KMO (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin) measure of 
0.870 indicates very good fit. Bartlett’s test of sphericity is highly significant. Afterwards, I 
used a non-orthogonal rotation method (PROMAX)
11
 so that I allowed for correlation among 
the emerging factors. Based on this type of rotation I derived one single factor. Cronbach’s 
alpha is 0.975 indicating an excellent overall reliability (detailed analysis can be found in the 
appendix 13.4). Finally, I generated my construct (“inst_remoteness_factor”) taking the 
weighted average of the four items. 
Table 5. Factor analysis institutional remoteness (EFA) 
Items Factor 
loadings 
Zadm_remoteness .968 
Zgeo_remoteness .974 
Zpol_remoteness .937 
Zcul_remoteness .981 
  
On the other hand, I calculated the distance between the country of the HQ unit and the 
country where the corporate HQ is located. To do this, I measured individually the value of 
each distance dimension between HQ unit and CHQ. I found the same problems of multiple 
scales and multicollinearity, and I solved them following the previous procedure. All cases 
were factor analysed in an EFA. For the construct institutional distance from CHQ 
(“distancefromCHQ) all four items of distance (Zadm_distance_CHQ, Zgeo_distance_CHQ, 
                                                 
10
 “Factor analysis is a method for investigating whether a number of variables of interest Y1, Y2, Y3, …., Yl are 
linearly related to a smaller number of unobservable factors F1, F2, F3, …., Fk” (Tatahi, 2010; p.15). 
11
 Promax rotation is an alternative non-orthogonal (oblique) rotation method, faster than other rotation methods 
(oblimin) and used for big database (Hendrickson & White, 2011).  
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Zpol_distance_CHQ, and Zcult_distance_CHQ) were correlated to each other, and the KMO 
measure of 0.673 indicates an acceptable fit. Bartlett’s test of sphericity is highly significant. 
Based on PROMAX rotation I derived one single factor. Cronbach’s alpha is 0.776 indicating 
an acceptable overall reliability (detailed analysis can be found in the appendix 13.5). Finally, 
I generated my latent construct (“distancefromCHQ”) taking the weighted average of the four 
items. 
Table 6. Factor analysis institutional distance from CHQ (EFA) 
Items Factor 
loadings 
Zadm_distance_CHQ .493 
Zgeo_distance_CHQ .841 
Zpol_distance_CHQ .922 
Zcult_distance_CHQ .814 
    
Institutional quality 
As I wrote before, the institutional quality of a country is related to 6 specific variables 
(Kaufmann et al., 2010):  
 voice and accountability, the extent of the citizens participation in selecting 
government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free 
media;  
 political stability and absence of violence, the likelihood of government 
destabilization through unconstitutional or violence means;  
 government effectiveness, the quality of public and civil services and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation and the credibility of government;  
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 regulatory quality, perceptions of the government ability to formulate and implement 
policies and regulations;  
 rule of law, the quality of contract enforcement, the police and the courts;  
 control of corruption, the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain.  
I used the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)
12
 to measure the six specific variables 
that define the quality of governance in a specific country. Kaufmann et al. (2010) used an 
Unobserved Components Model (UCM) to calculate the measure of the individual indicators 
for each used source. The composite measures of institutional quality, achieved through 
UCM, are in units of a standard normal distribution, with mean zero, standard deviation of 
one, and in a range from approximately -2.5 to 2.5 (Kaufmann et al., 2010). A higher value 
corresponds to a higher institutional quality.  
As expected, these six variables were highly correlated to each other. To solve the problem of 
multicollinearity, for the construct of institutional quality (“inst_quality”) all cases were 
factor analysed in an EFA. All six items (“voice_accountability”, “political_stability”, 
“government_effectiveness”, “regulatory_quality”, “rule_of_law”, and 
“control_of_corruption”) were significantly correlated to each other, and the KMO (Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin) measure of 0.714 indicates a good fit. Bartlett’s test of sphericity is highly 
significant. Afterwards, I used a non-orthogonal rotation method (PROMAX)
13
 so that I 
allowed for correlation among the emerging factors. Based on this type of rotation I derived 
one single factor. Cronbach’s alpha is 0.854 indicating a good overall reliability (detailed 
                                                 
12
 The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WDI) is a research dataset realized by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay 
and Massimo Mastruzzo. It summarizes the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of 
enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries.  
13
 Promax rotation is an alternative non-orthogonal (oblique) rotation method, faster than other rotation methods 
(oblimin) and used for big database (Hendrickson & White, 2011).  
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analysis can be found in appendix 13.6). Finally, I generated my construct (“inst_quality”) 
taking the weighted average of the six items.     
Table 7. Factor analysis institutional quality of HQ location (EFA) 
Items Factor 
loadings 
Voice_accountability .796 
Political_stability .780 
Government_effectiveness .598 
Regulatory_quality .787 
Rule_of_law .894 
Control_of_corruption .837 
       
Economic Crisis 
In literature, scholars used to define economic crisis as persistent contractions in which real 
output (measured usually by real gross domestic product (GDP)) and employment rate 
decrease, level of inflation increases, currency becomes unstable and many different 
macroeconomic indicators move (Foss, 2010; Fratzscher, 2009; Hoshi & Kashyap, 2004). 
Building on this previous study, I constructed a dichotomous variable of economic crisis per 
year and I measured it using data on GDP per capita and employment rate from the OECD 
statistics. In particular, I defined two different level of economic crisis: crisis at the European 
level and at each European country level. Then, I calculated the growth in GDP per capita 
and in the employment rate per each year in my time frame (2000-2012). Afterwards, to 
identify crisis year at the two levels of analysis, I used two main parameters, that are able to 
capture the persistent contraction in economic variables generated by crises:  
1. negative employment growth rate compared to previous year; 
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2. Yearly GDP per capita growth rate below 1.5% with a negative growth rate in at least 
two quarters compared to the same period of the previous year. 
These two parameters are able to capture the characteristics of an economic crisis for two 
main reasons. First, following the extant literature, a negative growth in employment rate is a 
real warning alarm for the economic development of a country and one of the crisis factors 
(Demyanyk & Van Hemert, 2011). Second, the yearly GDP growth rate in Europe is annually 
above 1.5% on average. Thus, a growth below this level can be considered as a contraction in 
GDP growth. This contraction becomes economic crisis, if in the same year quarterly GDP 
growth rate is negative in at least two quarters compared to the same period of the previous 
year. The negative growth in two quarters of the same year testifies the non-temporary nature 
of the contraction. Furthermore, to strengthen my argumentation about my measure of 
economic crises, both parameters have to be satisfied in order to define a year in crisis. 
The following Figure 4 shows, for example, the European growth rate in GDP per capita and 
in employment rate in my time frame (2000-2012). 
Figure 4. The trend in GDP per capita and employment rate from 2000 to 2012 
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The following Table 8, instead, shows the quarterly GDP growth rate compared to the same 
quarter of previous year. The negative quarterly growth rate is written in red colour. So, 
according to the two parameters, defined before, and considering the Figure 4 and Table 8, 
the crisis years at the European level are: 2002, 2003, 2008, 2009, 2011, and 2012. In my 
dataset, crisis variable at the European level takes value 1 in correspondence to these years, 
and 0 otherwise. Following the same procedure, I constructed also the country crisis variable, 
that takes value 1, when country is in economic crisis, and 0 otherwise. 
 Table 8. GDP: growth rate compared to previous quarter 
Q1-
2000 
Q2-
2000 
Q3-
2000 
Q4-
2000 
Q1-
2001 
Q2-
2001 
Q3-
2001 
Q4-
2001 
Q1-
2002 
Q2-
2002 
4.32 4.63 3.81 3.22 2.93 -2.13 -1.93 1.56 -0.85 -1.32 
 
Q3-
2002 
Q4-
2002 
Q1-
2003 
Q2-
2003 
Q3-
2003 
Q4-
2003 
Q1-
2004 
Q2-
2004 
Q3-
2004 
Q4-
2004 
1.48 1.51 0.46 -0.08 1.34 1.95 2.43 2.69 2.37 1.99 
 
Q1-
2005 
Q2-
2005 
Q3-
2005 
Q4-
2005 
Q1-
2006 
Q2-
2006 
Q3-
2006 
Q4-
2006 
Q1-
2007 
Q2-
2007 
1.63 2.00 2.33 2.62 3.28 3.38 3.36 3.62 3.61 3.20 
 
Q3-
2007 
Q4-
2007 
Q1-
2008 
Q2-
2008 
Q3-
2008 
Q4-
2008 
Q1-
2009 
Q2-
2009 
Q3-
2009 
Q4-
2009 
3.32 2.82 1.34 1.38 -0.16 -2.46 -5.36 -5.30 -4.25 -2.08 
 
Q1-
2010 
Q2-
2010 
Q3-
2010 
Q4-
2010 
Q1-
2011 
Q2-
2011 
Q3-
2011 
Q4-
2011 
Q1-
2012 
Q2-
2012 
1.02 0.54 1.20 1.75 -0.35 0.18 0.76 -0.80 -0.13 -0.30 
  
Q3-2012 Q4-2012 
-0.40 … 
 
Before to introduce the control variables, Table 9 shows an overview of the link between the 
hypotheses and the variable operationalization. 
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Table 9. Overview Hypotheses and variable operationalization. 
Hypothesis # Hypotheses Measure  Tested in the model 
1a 
Institutional 
isomorphism  
The sum of relocation 
events happened in the years 
before 
Accumulatedtrend 
2a 
Internal coercive 
pressure: Ownership 
structure  
Ownership dummy: 1 = 
dispersed (<20%) 
Ownership_dummy1 
3a – 3b 
Institutional 
remoteness  
Institutional remoteness 
(from subsidiaries) 
Institutional distance (from 
CHQ) 
 
Factor score based on 
geographic, cultural, 
political, and administrative 
distance (Berry et al, 2011) 
 
Inst_remoteness_factor 
 
Distance_from_CHQ 
4a Institutional quality  
Factor score based on 
Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (Kaufmann et al. 
2010) 
- Voice and 
accountability 
- Political stability and 
absence of violence 
- Government 
effectiveness 
- Regulatory quality 
- Rule of law 
- Control of 
corruption 
Inst_quality 
1b-2b-3c-3d Economic crisis  On a country-level and Country_crisis 
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European level, based on 
output decline and 
employment rate decline 
- GDP per capita 
- Employment rate 
Both from OECD. 
(country level) 
 
EU_crisis (European 
level) 
 
8.3.3 Control variables 
In order to control for other effects than hypothesized, I used several control variables which 
I drew from the extant literature. 
HQ size 
The size of HQ unit can be a signal of the number of parent activities realized and its 
importance within the organization. HQ size was measured as the number of employees at the 
HQ level. The information was collected by Orbis database, SEC filings, and annual reports. I 
took the natural logarithm of the real size. 
Revenues 
The revenues can be a way to measure the size of enterprise that can influence the decision of 
MNCs to relocate overseas their HQs. The information was collected from SEC filings, 
annual reports, and Orbis database. All currencies are converted to USD dollar at the year-
end values and all values are expressed in thousands of dollars. I took the natural logarithm of 
the amount of revenues. 
Degree of internationalization 
I measure the degree of internationalization of each enterprise in my sample like the ratio 
between the amount of exports (revenues generated outside the home country) and the total 
amount of revenues generated by the firm. Previous study has shown that MNCs with a high 
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internationalization degree are more likely to relocate their HQs. Following Laamanen et al. 
(2011), I collected data on this variable through several ways: 
1. Calculated by using data from Orbis database; 
2. Collected directly from Orbis (when available) and annual reports; 
3. Combined from these different sources. 
Industry  
This is a categorical variable, that takes values from 1 to 4 based on 2-digit SIC code, as 
shown in the following Table 10. The information was collected from Orbis database.  
Table 10. The value of industry variable 
Industry – sector of activity Value of the variable 
Manufacturing 1 
Commerce 2 
Finance 3 
Services 4 
 
Status  
Previous study shows that HQ relocation could be a consequence of M&A operations. The 
decision to engage in a merger or acquisition with a foreign company can push firm to 
negotiate about the location of the new corporate or business unit HQs (Birkinshaw et al., 
2006). Using the Thomson Financial Mergers & Acquisition database and LexisNexis I 
examined whether the relocations are linked to previous acquisitions. So, I created a control 
variable for that. “Status” is a dummy variable that takes value 1 in case the firm experienced 
an M&A in the year before the relocation, and 0 otherwise. In the control group, I followed a 
different line of reasoning to collect data for this variable. It takes value 1 in case the firm 
experienced an M&A during my time frame (2000-2012), and 0 otherwise. The variable was 
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measured at the HQ level. The information was collected from Thomson Financial Mergers 
& Acquisition database, Orbis database, SIC filing and annual reports. 
Tax rate 
Following Laamanen et al. (2011), that found a positive and significant impact of corporate 
taxes on relocation decision, I control for this effect. This variable is the corporate tax rate for 
each year in my sample, collected from OECD database.  
Table 11 contains an overview of all control variables used in this study 
Table 11. Overview: Description of control variables 
Variable Description 
HQsize Log of the number of employees working at the HQ 
unit.  
Revenues Log of the amount of firm revenues 
Degree_of_internationalization Proportion of foreign revenues on total revenues 
Industry Categorical variable from 1 to 4 
Status Dummy variable: 1 in case of M&A, and 0 otherwise 
Tax Corporate tax rate per each year 
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9 Descriptive section 
9.1 Descriptives of sample 
My sample counts 126 HQ movements in the European countries (EU-25 plus Norway and 
Switzerland) in the time frame 2000-2012. Unlike Laamanen et al. (2011), I found empirical 
evidences of multiple relocations realized by the same enterprise. Totally, I found 6 multiple 
relocations and three of them were relocations back, i.e. HQs moved back to the same place 
where they were before the first relocation (Barner-Rasmussen et al. 2007). Even if these 
multiple movements could be very interesting to investigate, the few observations would not 
allow a significant quantitative analysis. Thus, I leave aside multiple relocations from my 
sample. 
 
9.1.1 HQ size, location and performance 
On average, in my sample the HQ units are operating with 219 employees and are mostly 
located in the main central European countries. This matches roughly the characteristics of 
HQ units of similar studies in the field of international business. 
HQ size 
Considering the size of HQ units in terms of the number of employees working for the HQs, 
the sample is made up of more than one third (around 40%) relatively small HQ units with 
100 employees or less. 28% of the sampled HQ units are very large with more than 500 
employees; 18% of them operate with 101 to 200 employees and 14% with 201 to 500 
employees.  
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Table 12. Distribution of number of employees – sample of HQ relocations 
Employees per 
HQ units 
Number of 
HQ unit 
In % 
0-100 50 40% 
101-200 23 18% 
201-500 18 14% 
>500 35 28% 
Sum 126 100% 
 
The distribution of HQ size in the sample (n=126) is nearly identical in the control group 
(n=200), even if smaller HQ units are more likely to relocate, as the following Figure 5 
shows: 
Figure 5. Distribution of number of employees – sample of HQ relocations vs. control group 
 
The following Table 13 shows the statistical differences in the mean of employees between 
the relocation and the control group. 
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Table 13. t-test between control group and relocation group  
Variable Control Group Relocation group t-test for difference 
Employees 35550 48997 -5.98** 
The table shows mean for employees in the control group (n=200) and in the sample-relocation group (n=126), as well as the 
t-statistic for the difference between them, assuming unequal variance. 
+, *, and ** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
HQ location 
With regard to the location of each HQ unit in the sample, it is interesting to take into account 
their home country both before and after the relocation. As I wrote in the methodological 
part, I consider HQ relocations inward and outward EU-25 plus Switzerland and Norway. So, 
28% of HQs in my sample move out from England; 13% from Germany; 9% from France, 
and 6% from Netherlands and Switzerland. Moreover, 15% of the HQs in my sample were 
settled outside the European countries before to relocate in Europe. Of course, these data 
could be influenced by the sampling process and, especially, by the news databases used to 
find out relocation events. Consequently, only relevant HQ relocations are included in the 
sample.        
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Figure 6. HQ home country before relocation 
 
Looking at the home country after the relocation event, the countries, that received more 
HQs, are Switzerland (22%), England (19%), Germany (13%), and Netherlands (11%). 
Moreover, only 4% of the HQs in my sample relocate into a non-European country. The 
following Figure 7 shows the phenomenon in more details. 
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Figure 7. HQ Home country after relocation 
 
HQ performance 
Switching quickly the attention on the HQ performance, I measured the ROA (Return On 
Asset) of HQ unit in the year before the relocation and in the year after the conclusion of 
relocation. This comparison refers only to the relocation group. Analyzing data, there is on 
average an increase in HQ performance after the relocation, as highlighted in the following 
Table 14. Thus, it means that the movement of HQ unit could generate better future 
performance. However, it is important to underline that many other and different factors can 
affect firm or unit performance and relocation is only one of them. 
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Table 14. Comparison between ROA before and after relocation decision, mean and t-test. 
Variable Mean Std. Error t-test for difference 
ROA before 10.87 0.56 
-4.83** 
ROA after 11.22 0.53 
The table shows mean for ROA (before and after relocation) in the sample-relocation group (n=126), as well as the paired t-
statistic for the difference between them. 
+, *, and ** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
9.1.2 Parent characteristics 
Parent revenues and home nationality 
Table 15 provides detailed data on parent characteristics, regarding to the revenues and the 
country of origin of the HQ units in the sample. The total amount of revenues generated by 
the firm in the last available year of activity could be considered as a proxy of firm size and it 
is expressed in thousand (th) USD. The nationality is related to the domicile of corporate HQ. 
I figure out five different turnover ranges. Looking at data, the sample is made up of one third 
(34%) of parent firms that generate revenues between 1.000.001 and 10.000.000 th USD. 
29% of the sample are in the first turnover range, 21% in the third and 9% in the fourth. Only 
7% of the sample is composed by really big enterprises that generate revenues more than  $ 
100 billion. On average, the size of enterprises in my sample is around 30.000.000 th USD, 
matching roughly the expectations in literature, where especially big firms are ready to move 
out HQ units. Yet, a careful examination of these data reveal that from one hand they are in 
line with previous research (Forsgren et al., 1995; Birkinshaw et al., 2006; Benito et al., 
2011; Lamaanen et al., 2011); on the other, they could be a consequence of sampling process. 
As written before, the relocations are identified in two news databases LexisNexis and 
Factiva. Consequently, only those relocation events, that are important enough to be reported 
by the financial press, are included in the sample.   
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Table 15. Size (thousand USD) and nationality of firms.  
 1.000-
1.000.000 
1.000.001-
10.000.000 
10.000.001-
50.000.000 
50.000.001-
100.000.000 
100.000.001-
oltre 
Europe 12% 12% 8% 6% 3% 
North-
America 
13% 17% 10% 2% 3% 
Asia-Pacific 4% 5% 3% 1% 1% 
Total 29% 34% 21% 9% 7% 
Source: Own sample data. 
 
Table 16. Number of parent firms per size and nationality 
 1.000-
1.000.000 
1.000.001-
10.000.000 
10.000.001-
50.000.000 
50.000.001-
100.000.000 
100.000.001-
oltre 
Europe 15 15 10 8 4 
North-
America 
16 21 13 3 4 
Asia-Pacific 5 6 4 1 1 
Total 37 43 26 11 9 
Source: Own sample data 
 
Switching attention on the parent nationality, North-American firms, considering both USA 
and Canada, are the largest part in the sample (45%), followed by European (41%) and 
Asian-Pacific (14%) ones. In the Asian-Pacific countries I include Japan, China, South 
Korea, India, Singapore, and Australia/New Zealand. Figure 8 shows clearly the geographical 
distribution of parent nationality of the HQ units in my sample.      
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Figure 8. Distribution of parent nationality in sample 
 
Source: Own sample data. 
The distribution of parent nationality in the sample of HQ relocations is nearly identical in 
the control group, as the following Figure 9 shows: 
Figure 9. Distribution of parent nationality – sample vs. control group 
 
Source: Own sample data. 
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Parent industry 
A breakdown by industry indicates that the large majority (56%) of parent firms is 
manufacturing products or product groups. Roughly one third (25%) of the parent firms are 
service companies. 10% of them are involving both in finance activities and in commercial 
activities (for example retail trade, wholesale and transportation).  
Table 17. Parent industry - sample 
Industry Number of parent firms % of parent firms 
Manufacturing 70 56% 
Commerce 12 10% 
Finance 12 10% 
Services 32 25% 
Total 126 100% 
Source: Own sample data  
The distribution of the parent activities in the control group (n=200) mirrors nearly the 
distribution in the main sample, as the following Figure 10 shows:  
Figure 10. Parent industry distribution of the sample vs. control group 
 
Source: Own sample data 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
Services
Finance
Commerce
Manufacturing
Sample (n=126) Control group (n=200)
91 
 
Table 18 shows the statistical difference between control group and relocation group 
considering industry variable. To check the presence of significant differences between 
control group and relocation group for the industry variable, I split this categorical variable in 
4 different dummies. Each dummy corresponds to an industry sector. For example, 
“industry_dummy1” is manufacturing, industry_dummy2 is commerce, and so on. The 
results show that there are not significant differences between control group and relocation 
group per each industry dummy. 
Table 18. t-test of industry variable between control group and relocation group 
Variable Control Group Relocation group t-test for difference 
Industry_dummy1 0.51 0.55 -2.89** 
Industry_dummy2 0.085 0.095 -1.14** 
Industry_dummy3 0.115 0.095 2.02** 
Industry_dummy4 0.290 0.253 2.55** 
The table shows mean for industry in the control group (n=200) and in the sample-relocation group (n=126), as well as the t-
statistic for the difference between them, assuming unequal variance. 
Industry is a categorical variable that takes values from 1 to 9 depending from 2-digit SIC code, as explained before. 
+, *, and ** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
9.2 Descriptives on “ whether” to relocate  
9.2.1 Relocation trend 
Starting as an occasional and random phenomenon, the relocation of HQ units is turning out 
to be a growing trend (Wanner et al., 2004). The increasing research for competitive 
advantage is pushing transnational companies to take always new internationalization 
strategic decisions. Firms are reconfiguring their organizational structure by setting up 
regional and divisional headquarters, relocating specific core functions and/or moving their 
full headquarter to another country or even continent. Actually, “the new holy grail of 
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management is that any function has to add to the bottom line” (Warner et al, 2004, p.65). 
Figure 11 shows this increasing mobility of HQs in the time frame 2000-2012, in line with 
Wanner’s results (2004) that report a growing number of HQ relocations especially to 
Switzerland, and with Lamaanen et al. (2011), that consider relocations across the European 
countries. Moreover, in terms of year of relocation, Figure 11 highlights an increase of this 
phenomenon after 2006. The highest number of relocations occurs in 2011, when 16 HQ 
movements have been taken in Europe. Moreover, Figure 11 splits up the total number of 
relocations in corporate and regional/divisional headquarters per each year from 2000-2012. 
Immediately, it leaps the different mobility of each HQ unit, distinguishing between 
corporate and divisional/regional HQs. Following Birkinshaw et al. (2006), they play 
different roles in MNCs and establish different relationships with various internal and 
external stakeholders. In their paper, Birkinshaw et al (2006) take into consideration the 
differences in the reasons to relocate, without considering the propensity to relocate. My 
results in Figure 11 are in line with Lamaanen et al. (2011), who find inertia for corporate 
HQ, maybe because it is constrained by institutional embeddedness, nationalistic pressure 
and symbolic values. The relocation of a corporate HQ is viewed as a negative and dramatic 
event that impacts on the social and economic stability of the country in which HQ is 
traditionally located. “The location of the corporate HQ ….. is likely to be treated with more 
emotional attachment than the relocation of regional HQ” (Lamaanen et al., 2011, p.8-9). 
Moreover, the costs of regional/divisional HQ relocation are lower than those of the corporate 
HQ, because at these units limited parenting functions are usually managed (Lamaanen et al., 
2011). These factors explain the lower mobility of corporate HQ with respect to regional and 
divisional ones. The number of regional/divisional HQs relocations is constantly up to the 
number of corporate HQ relocations. Only in 2007 the number of corporate HQ relocations 
(5) is equal to the regional and divisional one.  
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Figure 11. Time and type distribution of relocation events. 
 
Source: Own sample data. 
 
Switching the attention to the nationality of relocated enterprises, prior research takes into 
consideration different approaches, as written in the literature review. As for the other studies 
on this topic, only Laamanen et al. (2011) take into consideration an international dataset. In 
line with this study, my data includes all movements of HQ units within the 27 European 
countries during 2000-2012. Figure 12 shows the distribution of HQ relocations in my 
sample, distinguishing between European and foreign companies per each year. The 
nationality of the firm is defined considering where the corporate HQ, in terms of legal 
domicile, is located. I find a uniform distribution of HQ relocations between the European 
and foreign companies in line with Lamaanen et al. (2011), with a predominance of the 
foreign ones up to 2009. After 2009, the number of the relocated European companies grows 
up more than the foreign ones in 2010 and 2012, instead in 2011 there are not differences 
among them.   
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Figure 12. Distribution of relocations between European and foreign companies per each year. 
 
Source: Own sample data. 
 
The previous figures show an increase in HQ relocations in 2002 and from 2007 to 2012, 
with just an exception in 2010, where the number of relocations experiences a contraction. 
This trend could be explained taking into consideration the exogenous economic shocks, 
previously defined as economic crisis, occurred in the last ten years. For example, in the early 
years of the twenty-first century there was the dot-com bubble, where some companies, like 
Pets.com, failed completely, while others, like Cisco or Amazon, experienced a considerable 
lost in their market capitalization. Moreover, the actual economic crisis, compared to the 
Great Depression for some common features, has started at the end of 2007 in 
correspondence to the constant increase in the number of HQ relocations. Of course, it could 
be a casual coincidence, but it deserves more careful academic investigations.    
Figure 13 shows the possible relation between economic crisis (at the European level) and the 
HQ relocation trend. As defined in the methodological section of the thesis, years of crisis are 
identified considering jointly the GDP per capita growth and the employment rate growth at 
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the European level. The interesting aspect is to explore the growth in HQ relocations during 
the crisis years, i.e. 2002, 2003, 2008, 2009, 2011 and 2012. Particularly, in the past few 
years when the effects of economic crisis were stronger, the number of relocations grew 
considerably. 
Figure 13. Relocation trend and Economic crisis 
 
Source: Own sample data 
 
9.2.1 Managerial motivations of HQ relocations 
As I wrote in the methodological part, the sampling procedure is based on LexisNexis and 
Factiva, as well as on company’s annual reports and interviews to corporate and/or 
divisional/regional managers. These sources report also the managerial explanations, given to 
the HQ movement or conveyed outside.  
Figure 14 shows every managerial explanations of HQ movements in my sample, announced 
by the company in their annual reports or reported by the newspapers. The frequency is 
measured “as the number of occurrences when a reason falling into that category was used 
as a justification for the relocation” (Laamanen et al., 2011; p. 13). Furthermore, some firms 
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give more than one justification, while others don’t give proper reasons for the movement of 
HQ. In line with Laamanen et al. (2011)’s findings, the first three explanations are related to 
the need to be closer to main customers, to the organizational restructuring and to the high 
corporate taxation in home country. But, I find also different and interesting justifications, 
announced by the firm, for example, the institutional characteristics/quality of the home 
country, in terms of bureaucracy, corruption, regulatory quality or law effectiveness. 
Moreover, according to managerial explanations, HQ relocations are driven also by the 
central location of target countries, the closeness to main stakeholders and shareholders, and 
the behaviour of other firms, especially competitors. Cost cutting, one of the most important 
explanations of this phenomenon in literature, is ranked eighth, followed by international 
image, agglomeration factors, and the availability of business services and qualified 
employees in the home country.   
Figure 14. The frequency of managerial explanations of HQ relocations, as publicized by the 
newspapers and the companies 
 
Source: Own sample data 
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9.3 Descriptives on “where” to relocate 
9.3.1 Relocation and home/target country 
In my sample I consider the HQ relocations occurred in the EU-25 plus Norway and 
Switzerland from 2000 to 2012. Figure 15 summarizes the observed relocations of HQ units 
taking into consideration the net change between inflow and outflow (see the appendix 13.3 
for more details). As it is possible to see from the Figure 15, some countries experience more 
than one relocation, like for example England, Switzerland, and Germany. Others don’t 
experience any relocation events like Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, and 
Portugal. It could be a consequence of my sampling procedure, because I don’t have data on 
relocation events that are not important enough to be reported by the financial press (or those 
where the company is otherwise stock market listed). Furthermore, unlike Laamanen et al. 
(2011), there is only one relocation out involving Italy, Greece, Slovak Republic and 
Slovenia. In line to Laamanen et al. (2011), the highest activity occurs in Central and Western 
Europe, where there are important economies close to the main European markets. The 
highest gross flow interests England and Switzerland, and especially from England to 
Switzerland. In line with Wanner et al. (2004), Switzerland is one of the most attractive 
European country for HQ units, gaining 28 HQs in the last twelve years and losing only 8 in 
the same period of time (net change is +20). England, on the other side, gained 24 units, but 
also lost 35 HQs (net change -11). Germany shows a relatively high activity with no clear 
direction, and an equal number between inflow and outflow. The Netherlands and Ireland 
show a net increase in the number of HQ with relatively strong inflow. Completely different 
is the situation in France, where the number of HQ outflow is greater than inflow. For the 
Scandinavian countries, the flow is very small and approximately equal, with just one 
exception, Denmark, that experiences only relocations out in the considered time frame.       
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Figure 15. Net change between inflow and outflow of HQ relocations in each country. 
 
Source: Own sample data 
 
9.3.2 Relocation trend and country characteristics 
Reasonably, MNCs should relocate their HQs towards attractive countries. A European 
country can be defined attractive from a firm’s perspective, if it fits two important criteria at 
the same time: 1. “good governance” and 2. closeness to main European markets. The 
goodness of governance can be measured through institutional characteristics and quality, 
defined following the Kauffman index. The six specific indicators of Kauffman index are: 
voice and accountability; political stability and absence of violence; government 
effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; control of corruption. High value of Kauffman 
index means that a country has high quality institutions, low corruption, and bureaucracy. On 
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the other side, a European country is attractive if it is close to the main European markets, i.e. 
to the main customers of firms. Usually, the main markets are located in the central part of 
Europe (Warner et al. 2004). So, I define attractive a country that is able to fit at the same 
time these two criteria. For example, following this logic, the Scandinavian countries, i.e. 
Denmark, Sweden and Norway, are considered unattractive, because they are peripheral 
economies (Benito et al., 2011), even if they present high values in institutional quality. At 
the same time, some central countries, like for example France, cannot be considered 
attractive, because they experience low level of institutional quality. 
Table 19 and Table 20 show the number of HQ relocations with respect to the attractiveness 
of home and target countries. As I supposed, attractive target locations get the most of HQ 
relocations from both attractive and unattractive countries. 55% of my sample is composed 
by relocations from attractive home countries, while 45% from unattractive ones. 
Considering the target location, 83% of relocations are directed to attractive countries, while 
only 17% to unattractive ones. Going in details, 54 HQs (43% of my sample) are moved 
within attractive and central European countries. 51 HQs (40% of my sample) moved from 
unattractive to attractive; 15 (12%) from attractive to unattractive and, only, 6 (5%) between 
unattractive countries.  
Table 19. HQ relocations and countries’ attractiveness 
From/To Attractive Unattractive Total 
Attractive 54 15 69 
Unattractive 51 6 57 
Total 105 21 126 
Source: Own sample data 
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The following Table 20 shows the percentage of HQ relocations taking into consideration the 
attractiveness of Home and Target country. 
Table 20. HQ relocations and countries’ attractiveness (in %) 
From/To Attractive Unattractive Total 
Attractive 43% 12% 55% 
Unattractive 40% 5% 45% 
Total 83% 17% 100% 
Source: Own sample data 
 
Furthermore, these HQ relocations have taken place in different years in my time frame 
2000-2012. As written before, two important economic crises have characterized my time 
frame: the first was the dot-com bubble at the beginning of twenty-first century; the second is 
the current crisis started at the end of 2007. It is interesting to understand if the presence of 
economic crisis can influence the behaviour of firm in relocating their HQ units and in 
choosing the target country. In theory, it is easy to suppose that during years of economic 
crisis MNCs are more likely to relocate their HQs from unattractive to attractive countries. In 
these highly uncertain situations, firms try to establish themselves in countries, characterized 
by high level of institutional quality and closer to the main European markets that are able to 
better minimize the negative effects of crisis. 
The following Table 21 and Table 22 shows the movements of HQ units considering 
simultaneously the characteristics of home and target countries and the crisis/no-crisis year in 
which the relocation takes place. An immediate outcome of this analysis is the 72 relocations 
that happen during times of economic crises, i.e. 57% of my sample. Moreover, as expected, 
most of  the HQs (48%) move to attractive countries during economic crises and the 
movement is from unattractive home location (26%). Furthermore, during economic crises 
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22% of relocations take place within attractive countries; 6% from attractive to unattractive 
and only 3% within unattractive ones. In times of stability, HQs move between attractive 
countries (21%) when compared to the movement from unattractive to attractive ones (14%).  
Table 21. HQ relocations, crisis and countries’ attractiveness 
 Attractive to 
attractive 
Unattractive to 
attractive 
Attractive to 
unattractive 
Unattractive to 
unattractive Total 
Crisis                                                                                                                     28 33 7 4 72 
No-Crisis 26 18 8 2 54 
Total 54 51 15 6 126 
Source: Own sample data 
 
The following Table 22 shows the percentage of HQ relocations taking into consideration the 
attractiveness of Home and Target country and the crisis years. 
Table 22. HQ relocations, crisis and countries’ attractiveness (in %) 
 Attractive to 
attractive 
Unattractive to 
attractive 
Attractive to 
unattractive 
Unattractive to 
unattractive Total 
Crisis 22% 26% 6% 3% 57% 
No-Crisis 21% 14% 6% 2% 43% 
Total 43% 40% 12% 5% 100% 
Source: Own sample data 
 
9.3.3 Euro-Zone and relocation events. 
During my time frame (2000-2012) Europe experienced an ongoing process of economic and 
monetary integration, changing the location advantages within the European countries. At the 
beginning of 2002 Euro currency was introduced making more similar the economic and 
monetary policies and conditions of the Eurozone member states (Bevan & Estrin, 2004; 
Radulescu & Druica, 2011). At the same time, it increased economic differences among the 
Eurozone and non-Eurozone member states (Arnold & Lemmen, 2008). It has been shown, 
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for example, that these differences can influence the location and FDI decision of MNCs 
between Euro countries and non-Euro countries (e.g. Foad, 2007). According to Foad (2007), 
non-Euro countries are losing inflow FDIs in favor of Euro-countries because of the 
elimination of nominal exchange rate volatility within the currency union.  
The following Table 23 describes the movements of HQs inside and outside Eurozone 
member states. I investigate descriptively if the economic and monetary differences among 
Eurozone and non-Eurozone member states can influence the HQ relocation decision of 
MNCs. The data show that in my sample 54 relocations are originated from Euro member 
states, while 72 from non-Euro member states. Moreover, it is interesting to consider their 
relocation behavior. The most of HQs previously located in Eurozone (59%) relocate outside, 
while those previously located in non-Euro member states (56%) move into Eurozone. This 
opposite behavior could be interpreted as a consequence of underestimating own location 
advantages. In particular, both HQs located into Eurozone and those outside don’t understand 
properly the benefits of their location and desire something different. So, both of them try to 
move away. Moreover, in the light of institutional theory, this different behavior could be 
interpreted also as descriptive evidence that the point of reference for isomorphism of MNCs 
subunits in terms of HQ relocation is the own institutional field, which is in this case the 
affiliation of the state in which the HQ is initially located (Eurozone membership or not).       
Table 23. Relocations inside and outside Eurozone member states. 
From/to Euro member states Non-Euro member states Total 
Euro member states 22 (41%) 32 (59%) 54 
Non-Euro member states 40 (56%) 32 (44%) 72 
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10 Analysis and results 
10.1 Cross-sectional logit model  
Starting from my panel dataset, I constructed a cross-sectional dataset as explained before in 
details. Furthermore, I lagged one year the value of each independent variable (xt-1). 
So, I run a simple logistic regression to analyze the determinants of  the decision to relocate 
an HQ unit: 
nnnn rxy    
Where yn is the company’s observed decision to relocate (it is a binary variable: move or not 
move), xn is a vector the variables related to the country where HQ was placed before the 
relocation, and rn is a vector of firm variables. The probability that yn is equal to 1 is the 
result of the following formula: 
   
 

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


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exp
1  
Following the same procedure of Laamanen et al. (2011), I estimate the economic 
significance for the probability that yn changes when the independent variable x changes by 
Δx as in the following formula (Laamanen et al., 2011; p.12): 
   jijjijj xxxxx   ,,   
Where xj “represents the initial value of the independent observable variable of interest for 
hypotheses and Δxj is a change from 0 to 1 for binary independent variables and one 
standard deviation from the mean for other independent variables, and where other 
independent variables jix   are held at their means” (Laamanen et al., 2011; pp.12-13). 
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Finally, the pseudo R
2
 in Table 25 is McFadden’s pseudo R2, as a result from the following 
formula: 
U
R
L
L
ln
ln
1  
In the previous formula, LR and LU represent the likelihoods of the model with and without 
regressors, respectively. 
 
10.1.1 Replicating the results of Laamanen et al. (2011)’s model 
The study of Laamanen et al. (2011) was the first one to analyze the HQ relocation 
phenomenon through an international dataset and, especially, in the European countries. It 
was also the first to investigate theoretically and empirically the institutional isomorphism as 
a possible explanation of HQ relocation even if with questionable statistical results. Its 
contributions to relocation literature have inspired my current study. Furthermore, as written 
over and over again in the methodological section, I followed its sampling procedure, even if 
my sample counts more observations (326 in my sample vs. 252 in Laamanen et al. (2011)). 
For these motivations before to introduce my analysis and to investigate empirically my 
hypotheses, I try to replicate the Laamanen et al. (2011) study, using my data. In this way, I 
check the goodness of my data and also I test again its main expectations with more 
observations.   
Table 25 contains the results of my logit analysis, replicating the study of Laamanen et al. 
(2011). I don’t consider variables that don’t receive significant statistical support in 
Laamanen et al. (2011). The variables used can be easily classified in two main groups: home 
country variables and firm variables. The first group refers to the characteristics of the 
country in which the HQ unit is located before relocation; the second one to the 
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characteristics of firm. Following Laamanen et al. (2011)’s procedure, I run four different 
models: 
1. Model 1 considers only home-country variables; 
2. Model 2 considers only firm variables; 
3. Model 3 combines the home-country and firm variables; 
4. Model 4 considers both categories plus the trend variable. 
The trend variable is measured like in Laamanen et al. (2011), i.e. “the number of relocation 
events in the year prior to the firm-year observation” (Laamanen et al., 2011; p.14). The 
model 4 is the most comprehensive one that considers all variables.  
The following Table 24 shows descriptive statistics for the variables used and, especially, 
compares their means for the group of firms that relocated their HQ units with those for the 
control group. Considering the results in the Table 24 based on simple univariate tests, HQs 
relocate, on average, from country characterized by lower-GDP per capita, higher 
employment rate and tax rate, and greater distance from CHQ home country and from 
subsidiaries’ location. Switching to firm characteristics, firms more internationalized and 
with higher revenues are more likely, on average, to move their HQs overseas. Moreover, 
CHQ and larger HQ unit (in terms of number of employees) are, on average, less relocated.   
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Table 24. Descriptives between control group and moved/relocation group 
Variables Control Group 
(N=200) 
Mean 
Relocation Group 
(N=126) 
Mean t-test for difference 
GDP/per capita 
(USDth) 
41293 39915 1.55** 
Employment Rate 68.64 69.88 -2.02** 
Tax Rate 29.10 31.51 -2.78** 
Geo-Remoteness 
from CHQ (in Km
2
) 
952.91 4102.58 -9.77** 
Geo-Remoteness 
from subsidiaries  
12.95 13.68 -0.81** 
CHQ 0.51 0.21 5.64** 
Degree of 
internationalization 
13.18 14.14 -2.98** 
Revenues 14.46 14.54 -0.26** 
HQ size 517 288 2.69** 
The table shows means for each variable in the control group (n=200) and in the sample-relocation group (n=126), as well as 
the t-statistic for the difference between them, assuming unequal variance. 
+, *, and ** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
9.1.1.1 Results and discussion 
Starting from home country variables, Laamanen et al. (2011) use GDP per capita as a proxy 
for the wage level, predicting that high wage level increases the probability of relocation. 
They found GDP per capita positive and borderline significant in model 1, but no longer 
significant in the model 3 and 4. Using my data, I achieved a different result. In fact, this 
variable is not significant in any models. 
Then, like in Laamanen et al. (2011), I found a positive and significant relation between 
employment rate and the relocation decision. It could be explained that the increase in the 
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employment rate in the home country can reduce the availability of qualified employees 
(Laamanen et al., 2011), pushing the HQ unit to go away. I found support at the 5% 
confidence level for this variable in model 1, 3 and 4.  
Unlike Laamanen et al. (2011), I found support at the 5% confidence level for the tax variable 
also in the comprehensive model. So, my results largely confirm that higher corporate taxes 
in the home country are related to a higher likelihood of HQ relocation. In Laamanen et al. 
(2011), this variable is significant at 10% confidence level in the model 3 and 4, but when 
firm specific variables are not included (model 1), it becomes not significant and its p-value 
rises above 10%.    
Then, Laamanen et al. (2011) consider the geographical remoteness
14
 of the HQ location with 
respect to its center of gravity without finding significant results. I measure this variable in a 
more sophisticated way. I split it in two different variables: 
1. the geographical distance of the location of HQ unit from the location of corporate 
HQ (geo-distance from CHQ);  
2. the geographical remoteness between the location of HQ unit and the location of each 
local subsidiary under HQ control (Geo-remoteness from subsidiaries) as the sum of 
the logarithms of distances between the country’s HQ and the countries of each local 
subsidiary.  
I found a positive and significant support (at 5% confidence level) between the geographical 
distance from corporate HQ and the relocation decision in every model. It means that the 
distance from corporate HQ increases the likelihood of HQ relocation. At the same time, I 
find also a positive and borderline significant relation (at 10% confidence level) between the 
relocation decision and the remoteness to each subsidiary only considering the home-country 
                                                 
14
 Laamanen et al. (2011) measure the geographical remoteness as the sum of logarithms of geographical 
distances between the country’s capital and the capitals of the other 16 countries. 
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variables. When firm specific variables are included (model 3 and 4), the p-value rises above 
10%. However, it means that an increase in remoteness between the HQ location and the 
location of each subsidiary under its control increases the likelihood of HQ relocation. More 
carefully academic investigations should be done on the effects of the remoteness on the 
relocation decision.  
Switching the attention on firm variables, the results confirm the higher mobility of regional 
and divisional HQs with respect to corporate ones, in line with the prior findings of Brouwer 
et al. (2004) and Laamanen et al. (2011). The variable CHQ is negative and constantly 
significant at 1% confidence level in every model. It means that corporate HQs have a less 
likelihood of relocation than regional and divisional ones. This result confirms the inertia of 
CHQ. 
Furthermore, in line with Laamanen et al. (2011), I found a highly significant and positive 
relation between exports and the relocation of HQ. Exports can be considered as a measure of 
the internationalization degree of firm. Thus, a higher degree of internationalization increases 
the likelihood of HQ relocation. This result justifies the theoretical definition of this 
phenomenon as the third degree of internationalization process (Forsgren et al., 1995; Barner-
Rasmussen et al., 2007). 
Unlike Laamanen et al. (2011), using my data I found negative and high significant relation 
between the HQ size and its relocation overseas. It means that smaller HQs are more likely to 
be relocated. This variable is still significant at 1% confidence level also in the most 
comprehensive model 4.  
Finally, one of the most important difference with respect to Laamanen et al. (2011)’s results 
is about the trend variable. The trend variable included in my model 4 comes out as positive 
and significant at the 5% confidence level, capturing an imitative behavior by companies in 
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my sample. So, it means that previous HQ relocations increase the number of future HQ 
relocations. It supports the imitative behavior in HQ relocation decisions, taken by MNCs. 
This significant result could be explained statistically by the higher number of observations 
of HQ relocations in my sample compared to Laamanen et al. (2011). This interesting finding 
deserves more academic investigations. At this stage of analysis, I run again the same 
regression measuring in a more sophisticated way the trend variable in Table 25. As written 
in the methodological section, I don’t consider only the number of relocations taken by other 
MNCs in the previous year, but the accumulated number of relocations in the years prior to 
the firm-year observation. As explained previously, this measure could better capture the 
isomorphic behavior of firms. My results show a positive and significant coefficient at the 
1% confidence level for this variable (“accumulatedtrend”).  
The following Table 25 shows the results of my logit regression and easily compares them to 
the comprehensive model of Laamanen et al. (2011). Furthermore, the second column of 
model 4 shows the results considering the accumulated trend variable.   
In summary, replicating the Laamanen et al. (2011)’s model, my strongest findings, that 
deserve more further academic investigations, relate to the effects of remoteness, and, 
especially, of isomorphic behavior. The significant role of imitation in HQ relocation 
decision can give an important contribution to institutional theory, answering one of the 
institutional provocations in Kostova et al. (2008) and clarifying the isomorphism in 
international business. 
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Table 25. Cross-sectional logit model of HQ relocation and comparison to Laamanen et al. 
(2011) 
 1 2 3 4 
Home-
country 
variables 
Firm 
variable
s 
All 
variables 
All variables + accumulated trend 
 Present 
Study 
Present 
Study 
Present 
Study 
Present 
Study 
Present 
study
(f) 
Laamanen 
et al. (2011) 
GDP per 
capita 
0.002 
(0.002) 
 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.09 
(1.42) 
Employment 
Rate 
0.058* 
(0.025) 
 
0.054* 
(0.026) 
0.052* 
(0.026) 
0.053* 
(0.0264) 
0.09
+
 
(1.68) 
Tax Rate 0.041* 
(0.018) 
 
0.036* 
(0.018) 
0.041* 
(0.019) 
0.049* 
(0.018) 
0.07
+
 
(1.66) 
Geo-
remoteness 
from CHQ 
(a)
 
0.035** 
(0.017) 
 
0.231** 
(0.035) 
0.236** 
(0.036) 
0.258** 
(0.039) 
-0.06 
(-0.76) 
Geo-
remoteness 
from 
subsidiaries
(b) 
0.253* 
(0.033) 
 
0.022 
(0.019) 
0.019 
(0.019) 
0.0197 
(0.019) 
Industry 
(c)
 0.0024 
(0.059) 
 
0.046 
(0.063) 
0.052 
(0.063) 
0.0565 
(0.069) 
 
Concentration 
(c)      
-0.0003 
(-1.22) 
CHQ 
(d) 
 
-1.28** 
(0.026) 
-0.891** 
(0.029) 
-0.845** 
(0.029) 
-0.885** 
(0.299) 
1.90** 
(4.08) 
Degree of 
internat.
(e)  
1.14** 
(0.015) 
1.241* 
(0.019) 
1.249* 
(0.021) 
1.155* 
(0.059) 
3.32 
(3.67) 
Revenues 
 
0.001 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.010) 
0.0001 
(0.01) 
0.002 
(0.26) 
HQ size 
 
-0.01** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0007** 
(0.00026) 
-0.0007** 
(0.00027) 
-0.0007** 
(0.0002) 
-0.008 
(-0.46) 
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Trend  
   
0.095* 
(0.041) 
0.092**
(e) 
(0.04) 
-0.1 
(-1.07) 
Constant -6.174** 
(1.942) 
-1.673* 
(0.670) 
-7.410** 
(2.146) 
-8.48** 
(2.241) 
-8.471** 
(2.229) 
-8.18 
(-0.770) 
N 
326 326 326 326 326 252 
Pseudo R
2
 
0.198 0.120 0.256 0.289 0.298 0.304 
Country-level variables in this table are the main characteristics of the home country of the company. In the present study, 
Robust Standard Error (RSE) is in the parentheses below the coefficients, while t-statistics in Laamanen et al. (2011). 
+, *, and ** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
(a) and (b) the remoteness variable is measured in completely different way between the present study and Laamanen et al. 
(2011). In the present study, I identify two different geographical remoteness measures. Geo-remoteness from CHQ: the sum 
of logarithms of the geographical distance between the location of HQ unit and the location of CHQ; Geo-remoteness from 
subsidiaries: the sum of logarithms of the geographical distance in Km2 from the location of HQ unit and each location of 
subsidiaries under its control. In Laamanent et al. (2011), remotes is measured as the sum of logarithms of distance between 
the country’s capital and the capitals of the other 16 countries. 
(c) In the present study industry is a categorical variable related to the SIC code of the firm. In Laamanen et al. (2011) 
industry is a concentration variable, measured like the number of companies in the same NACE classification as the 
company of interest. So, in the table I name concentration the industry variable of Laamanen et al. (2011).  
(d) This variable is the type of HQ unit. In the present study the meaning of this variable is completely opposite to Laamanen 
et al. (2011). I measure through this dummy variable the mobility of CHQ, rather than Laamanen et al. (2011) measure the 
mobility of RHQ.  
(e) I measure the degree of internationalization like the ratio between the exports and the total amount of firm revenues. In 
Laamanen et al. (2011), it is named “exports” and measured like the amount of revenues generated outside home country. 
(f) Here, trend is calculated in an accumulated way. It is the sum of relocations in the years prior to the firm-year 
observation. 
 
 
10.1.2 Testing the hypotheses in a cross-sectional logit model 
In the present paragraph, I test my main theoretical framework and hypotheses through a 
cross-sectional logit model. Table 26 compares the means of variables used for the group that 
relocated with those for the control group. Based on simple univariate tests, HQs that move 
away follow a mimetic behavior, are characterized by more dispersed ownership, are more 
institutionally distant from CHQ and their center of gravity and are from less institutional 
quality countries. Furthermore, looking at only descriptive results, relocated HQs are 
characterized by a smaller size, and higher degree of internationalization than non-relocated 
HQs. 
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Table 26. Relocations vs. control group 
Variables Control Group 
(N=200) 
Mean 
Relocation Group 
(N=126) 
Mean 
t-test for 
difference 
Accumulatedtrend 44.840 50.640 -3.21** 
Ownership_dummy1 0.370 0.627 -4.66** 
Distance_from_CHQ 0.335 0.531 -3.92** 
Inst_remoteness_factor 0.097 0.155 -3.23* 
Inst_quality 1.207 1.161 1.21** 
Country_crisis 0.323 0.444 -1.24** 
Year_crisis 0.265 0.507 -4.58** 
HQsize 5.36 4.63 4.61** 
Revenues 14.54 14.46 -0.26** 
Degree_of_internationalization 0.458 1.487 -1.80** 
Status 0.150 0.158 -0.21** 
Tax 29.10 31.51 -3.99** 
The table shows means for each variable in the control group (n=200) and in the sample-relocation group (n=126), as well as 
the t-statistic for the difference between them, assuming unequal variance. 
+, *, and ** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 27 and Table 28 show the correlation matrix among each independent variable. The 
two tables consider a different measure for the crisis variable: the first one crisis at country 
level; the second at the European level. I don’t put these two variables in the same table, 
because they are highly correlated to each other, measuring the same construct. 
Table 29 and Table 30 contain the results of the cross-sectional logit model, testing my 
previously formulated hypotheses. The variables used have been explained in detail in the 
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methodological section of the current dissertation. The three alternative specifications are 
based on the following logic: 
1. Specification 1 contains the base model with country crisis, considering at first only 
control variables, then only institutional variables and finally all variables; 
2. Specification 2 contains the base model with the European crisis (“EU_crisis”); 
3. Specification 3 contains the interaction effects15, splitting the sample in crisis vs. non-
crisis and comparing the results; 
In the specification 3 I left out the control variables (except for taxes) because of limited 
sample size and degree of freedom. In my discussion of the results, I rely especially on the 
specification 1c (with all variables) and specification 3 (with the interactions), as they are the 
most comprehensive. I next proceed to describe results in relation to my hypotheses. In the 
hypothesis 1a I predicted that previous HQ relocations, taken by other MNCs, increase the 
likelihood of further imitative HQ relocations. I used the accumulated trend, as explained 
before, like a proxy for the institutional isomorphism. The corresponding coefficient is 
positive and significant at the 1% confidence level in the model 1c and at the 5% in the model 
1b. The hypothesis 1a is significantly confirmed. In the hypothesis 1b I predicted that the 
institutional isomorphism is strongly during times of economic crises. This interaction effect 
is confirmed in the model 3, where the coefficient during crisis is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% confidence level. Moreover, the coefficient is higher than the coefficient 
in non-crisis period (positive and significant at the 10% confidence level). 
In the hypothesis 2a I predicted that an increase in ownership concentration decreases the 
likelihood of HQ relocation. Ownership structure is used as a proxy of the internal coercive 
pressure. My results largely confirm that higher ownership concentration is associated with a 
                                                 
15
 I consider only country crisis, because I didn’t find statistically support for crisis measured at the European 
level.  
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higher likelihood of HQ relocations. I find support for hypothesis 2a at the 1% confidence 
level in the model 1c. When I consider only institutional variables in the model 1b, the p-
value rises above 0.01, and the coefficient is still significant at the 5% confidence level. 
During times of economic crises I predicted a stronger effect of ownership concentration on 
the likelihood of HQ relocations (hypothesis 2b). Although in the model 3a (during non-crisis 
period) the coefficient is still significant, in the model 3b (during crisis) the p-value rises 
above 10%. Moreover, during crisis the coefficient is less than the coefficient during non-
crisis. Hypothesis 2b is not confirmed. 
In the set of hypothesis 3 I addressed the effects of the institutional distance from CHQ and 
the remoteness from centre of gravity on the likelihood of HQ relocations. In details, in the 
hypothesis 3a I predicted that an increase in institutional distance from CHQ increases the 
likelihood of HQ relocations. I find support for the hypothesis 3a at the 1% confidence level 
in each model. Hypothesis 3b, that predicts an increase in institutional remoteness between 
HQ units and local subsidiaries increases the likelihood of HQ relocation, is also significantly 
confirmed at the 1% confidence level. During times of economic crises, I expect a stronger 
effect of these two institutional variables on the likelihood of HQ relocations (hypotheses 3c). 
My results don’t confirm completely my expectations. In the model 3 my results largely 
support the first part of hypothesis 3c, i.e. during times of economic crises an increase in the 
institutional distance from CHQ increases the likelihood of HQ relocation (at the 1% 
confidence level). I don’t find statistical support for the institutional remoteness from local 
subsidiaries in model 3, comparing the results between crisis and non-crisis period. In 
particular, during crisis period the p-value of institutional remoteness rises above 10% and it 
is statistical insignificant, even if the coefficient is positive. 
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Table 27. Correlation matrix with country crisis 
 
 
Table 28. Correlation matrix with European crisis 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1.Accumulatedtrend 1
2.Ownership_dummy1 0.1459 1
3.Distance_from_CHQ 0.2106 0.0928 1
4.Inst_remoteness_factor 0.0517 0.1683 0.0717 1
5.Inst_quality 0.0896 -0.0171 0.2407 -0.0484 1
6.Country_crisis 0.1771 0.1673 0.2438 0.0059 0.0997 1
7.Hqsize -0.0547 0.0649 -0.1832 0.0067 0.0399 -0.0515 1
8.Revenues -0.0362 0.0649 0.0397 -0.026 0.0557 -0.0385 0.0996 1
9.Degree_of_internationalization 0.0019 0.0828 0.0932 -0.0321 -0.0336 0.0773 -0.0107 -0.012 1
10.Tax -0.0013 0.0343 0.043 -0.1219 -0.1622 0.0783 -0.076 0.0248 0.0413 1
11.Industry -0.0192 -0.0617 -0.0839 0.0825 -0.0584 -0.0316 0.0683 -0.0132 -0.037 0.0364 1
12.Status 0.007 -0.1615 0.0643 -0.075 -0.0798 -0.1032 -0.0704 -0.068 -0.0476 -0.0733 0.074 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1.Accumulatedtrend 1
2.Ownership_dummy1 0.1459 1
3.Distance_from_CHQ 0.2106 0.0928 1
4.Inst_remoteness_factor 0.0517 0.1683 0.0717 1
5.Inst_quality 0.0896 -0.0171 0.2407 -0.0484 1
6.EU_crisis 0.1937 0.1219 0.2741 -0.0423 0.0546 1
7.Hqsize -0.0547 0.0649 -0.1832 0.0067 0.0399 -0.0616 1
8.Revenues -0.0362 0.0649 0.0397 -0.026 0.0557 0.0107 0.0996 1
9.Degree_of_internationalization 0.0019 0.0828 0.0932 -0.0321 -0.0336 0.0881 -0.0107 -0.012 1
10.Tax -0.0013 0.0343 0.043 -0.1219 -0.1622 0.0398 -0.076 0.0248 0.0413 1
11.Industry -0.0192 -0.0617 -0.0839 0.0825 -0.0584 -0.0594 0.0683 -0.0132 -0.037 0.0364 1
12.Status 0.007 -0.1615 0.0643 -0.075 -0.0798 -0.0795 -0.0704 -0.068 -0.0476 -0.0733 0.074 1
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In the hypothesis 3d, I predicted a stronger effect of institutional distance than institutional 
remoteness during times of economic crises. Looking at coefficient, this expectation is 
largely confirmed in stable environment, where the institutional distance from CHQ 
(coefficient 1.57) has a stronger effect on the likelihood of HQ relocations than the 
institutional remoteness from local subsidiaries (coefficient 0.84). During times of economic 
crises, I don’t find support for the hypothesis 3d because the coefficient of the institutional 
remoteness is non-significant. However, looking only at the coefficient of 
“distance_form_CHQ” and of “Inst_remoteness_factor”, I can argue that this hypothesis 
could be supported, because the first coefficient is still higher than the second. 
In the hypothesis 4a I predicted that a decrease in the institutional quality of the HQ location 
increases the likelihood of relocation. I observe the expected negative sign, and a p-value 
below 1% in each model. HQ units in lower institutional quality location are more likely to 
relocate away.  
Finally, it is really interesting to observe the direct effects of economic crisis on the 
likelihood of HQ relocations, even if it is not previously hypothesized. I measured economic 
crises at the European and at the country level. I based my analysis on the effects of country 
crisis (base model). I tested also the effects of the European crisis in the model 2. I find 
statistically support only for the effects of country crisis on the likelihood of HQ relocations. 
Coefficient is positive and highly statistically significant at the 5% confidence level.        
In summary, my strongest findings concern the effects of institutional isomorphism, the 
concentration of ownership structure, the institutional distance from CHQ and the remoteness 
from local subsidiaries, and the institutional quality of HQ location. Furthermore, economic 
crises and especially country economic crises impact positively on the likelihood of HQ 
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relocations. About the moderator role of economic crises I find questionable statistical 
support.   
Table 29 Results of cross-sectional logit model 
 1.Base model with Country crisis 
2. Base model 
with EU_crisis 
Variables 
1a – only 
control 
1b – only 
institutional 
variables 
1c – all 
variables 
2 – all 
variables 
with 
EU_crisis 
Accumulatedtrend  
0.01* 
(0.008) 
0.02** 
(0.005) 
0.02** 
(0.005) 
Ownership_dummy1  
0.80* 
(0.32) 
0.79** 
(0.33) 
0.83* 
(0.33) 
Distance_from_CHQ  
1.69** 
(0.22) 
1.57** 
(0.22) 
1.56** 
(0.22) 
Inst_remoteness_factor  
0.59** 
(0.22) 
0.84** 
(0.25) 
0.87** 
(0.26) 
Inst_quality  
-1.93** 
(0.60) 
-1.64** 
(0.50) 
-1.60** 
(0.51) 
Country_crisis  
0.71** 
(0.31) 
0.68* 
(0.34) 
 
EU_crisis    
0.65 
(0.33) 
Revenues 
019** 
(0.06) 
 
0.14 
(0.07) 
0.12 
(0.07) 
HQsize 
-0.54** 
(0.11) 
 
-0.42* 
(0.14) 
-0.41* 
(0.14) 
Degree_of_internationalization 
0.13 
(0.11) 
 
0.13 
(0.08) 
0.13 
(0.05) 
Status 
0.37 
(0.34) 
 
0.59 
(0.45) 
0.58 
(0.44) 
Tax 
0.05** 
(0.01) 
 
0.08** 
(0.022) 
0.08** 
(0.022) 
Industry     
2 
-0.099 
(0.411) 
 
-0.206 
(0.582) 
-0.09 
(0.51) 
3 
-0.50 
(0.44) 
 
-0.225 
(0.640) 
-0.24 
(0.47) 
4 
-0.13 
(0.30) 
 
-0.051 
(0.459) 
-0.51 
(0.42) 
Constant 
-2.2* 
(0.93) 
 
-3.815* 
(1.447) 
-3.66* 
(1.47) 
N 326 326 326 326 
Pseudo R
2 
0.11 0.35 0.41 0.41 
In the present study, Robust Standard Error (RSE) is in the parentheses below the coefficients. the pseudo R2 is McFadden’s 
pseudo R2. 
+, *, and ** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 30 Results of cross-sectional logit model with interaction effects 
 1.Base model with 
country crisis 2 
3. Base model with split 
sample “country crisis” 
Variables 1c - all variables 3a no crisis 3b crisis 
Accumulatedtrend 
0.02** 
(0.005) 
0.01+ 
(0.006) 
0.04** 
(0.013) 
Ownership_dummy1 
0.79** 
(0.33) 
1.04** 
(0.36) 
0.66 
(0.65) 
Distance_from_CHQ 
1.57** 
(0.22) 
1.68** 
(0.26) 
2.40** 
(0.54) 
Inst_remoteness_factor 
0.84** 
(0.25) 
0.78* 
(0.27) 
0.19 
(0.57) 
Inst_quality 
-1.64** 
(0.50) 
-1.66** 
(0.54) 
-1.10 
(1.45) 
Country_crisis 
0.68* 
(0.34) 
  
EU_crisis    
Revenues 
0.14 
(0.07) 
  
HQsize 
-0.42* 
(0.14) 
  
Degree_of_internationalization 
0.13 
(0.08) 
  
Status 
0.59 
(0.45) 
  
Tax 
0.08** 
(0.022) 
0.08** 
(0.02) 
0.08** 
(0.04) 
Industry    
2 
-0.206 
(0.582) 
  
3 
-0.225 
(0.640) 
  
4 
-0.051 
(0.459) 
  
Constant 
-3.815* 
(1.447) 
-2.50* 
(1.12) 
-4.93+ 
(2.91) 
N 326 217 109 
Pseudo R
2 
0.41 0.33 0.47 
In the present study, Robust Standard Error (RSE) is in the parentheses below the coefficients. The pseudo R2 is McFadden’s 
pseudo R2. 
+, *, and ** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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10.1.3 Multicollinearity 
I also checked for multicollinearity. The largest Variance Inflations Factors (VIF) doesn’t 
exceed 7, which is below the critical threshold of 10 (Myers, 1990; O’Brien, 2007). 
Furthermore, the average VIF is not substantially above 3.0 being 2.00 in the base model 1b, 
2.48 in 1c, 3.54 in 3a, and 3.67 in 3b. Also the tolerance doesn’t fall below 0.1 (Hair et al., 
2006). To sum up, multicollinearity is not a serious issue for the model indicated. 
Table 31. Collinearity diagnostics model 1c 
  Tolerance VIF 
Accumulatedtrend .370 3.17 
Ownership_dummy1 .478 2.09 
Distance_from_CHQ .859 1.16 
Inst_remoteness_factor .899 1.11 
Inst_quality .260 6.98 
Country_crisis .638 1.57 
Revenues .867 1.15 
HQsize .638 1.47 
Degree_of_internationalization .920 1.09 
Status .824 1.21 
Tax .220 7.65 
Industry   
2 .786 1.27 
3 .746 1.34 
4 .565 1.77 
   
10.1.4 Robustness check: Regression with crisis at the European level 
As mentioned in the methodological section of the current study, economic crisis could be 
measured at different levels: at the macro level (European crisis) and at the micro one 
(country crisis). I used country crisis in my base model. To avoid possible measurement 
problems, in the previous model 2 (Table 29) I estimated the same logit model with the 
EU_crisis variable, which measures the crisis at the European level. The results are very 
similar to the results in the base model with the variable country_crisis. Moreover, to make 
more robust my analysis, I run also the model with the interaction effects with the variable 
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EU_crisis, as shown in the following Table 32. I use the same hierarchical order of variables 
in the previous model 3 to be able to compare easily the findings. 
Table 32. Results of interactions with EU-crisis 
 1.Base model with country 
crisis 2 
4. Base model with split 
sample “EU_crisis” 
Variables 1c - all variables 4a no crisis 4b crisis  
Accumulatedtrend 0.026** 
(0.009) 
0.01* 
(0.007) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
Ownership_dummy1 0.71** 
(0.33) 
0.84** 
(0.41) 
0.65 
(0.52) 
Distance_from_CHQ 1.61** 
(0.23) 
1.70** 
(0.29) 
2.14** 
(0.45) 
Inst_remoteness_factor 0.93** 
(0.26) 
0.99** 
(0.31) 
0.19 
(0.38) 
Inst_quality -1.59** 
(0.52) 
-1.87** 
(0.67) 
-0.17 
(0.94) 
Country_crisis 0.87* 
(0.36) 
  
Year_crisis    
Log_revenues 0.144 
(0.075 
  
Log_HQsize -0.35* 
(0.14) 
  
Degree_of_internationalization 0.10 
(0.05) 
  
Status 0.76 
(0.50) 
  
Tax 0.099** 
(0.025) 
0.10** 
(0.03) 
0.08** 
(0.04) 
Industry    
2 -0.206 
(0.582) 
  
3 -0.225 
(0.640) 
  
4 -0.051 
(0.459) 
  
Constant -3.815* 
(1.447) 
-2.67* 
(1.29) 
-5.22** 
(1.91) 
N 326 185 141 
Pseudo R
2 
0.41 0.34 0.44 
In the present study, Robust Standard Error (RSE) is in the parentheses below the coefficients. The pseudo R2 is McFadden’s 
pseudo R2. 
+, *, and ** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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The analysis shows nearly identical results between the model 3 and the model 4. Overall, the 
pseudo R-square is 34% in the non-crisis model and 44% in the other one. Comparing the 
values of pseudo R-square to the base model 3, they are strongly similar. The main 
independent variables are significant in the both models and present more or less identical 
coefficient. In fact, the hypotheses get similar support as in the previous model. Accumulated 
trend is positive and significant (at the 1% during crisis and at the 5% in stable times), and its 
effects on HQ relocation are higher during times of economic crises. The ownership 
concentration is positive, but significant at the 1% confidence level only in the stable times, 
like in the model 3. The institutional distance from CHQ (“distance_from_CHQ) gets similar 
statistical support with respect to the previous model. It is positive and significant. The 
institutional remoteness (“inst_remoteness_factor”) is still significant only in the stable times. 
In this robustness check I also left out the control variables (except for taxes) because of 
limited sample size and degree of freedom. However, the unique control variable considered 
(tax) is positive and significant like in the base model.      
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11 Conclusion 
11.1 Overall findings and discussion 
Recent work in international management demonstrates an increased interest in the 
movement of HQ units or parenting activities overseas (Baaij et al., 2012; Barner-Rasmussen 
et al. 2007; Benito et al. 2011; Birkinshaw et al. 2006; Forsgren et al. 1995; Laamanen et al. 
2011; Strauss-Kahn & Vives 2009). Much of this study has focused especially on efficiency 
and effectiveness explanations of relocation decisions, considering HQ relocation as a 
rational and intentional decision to minimize costs. While increased attention to relocation 
decisions is clearly important and needed, given the increase in HQ relocations of large 
multinationals, little attention has thus far been paid to the notion that decisions are not 
always driven by purely economic and managerial reasons. To fill this gap, some scholars 
have started to speculate on institutional factors as potential antecedents of HQ relocations 
(Birkinshaw et al., 2006; Benito et al., 2011; Laamanen et al., 2011). Building on insights 
from organizational institutionalism (Di Maggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), 
such work emphasizes how MNCs may seek to establish or maintain institutional legitimacy 
through imitating competitors or following main stakeholders (Benito et al., 2011; 
Birkinshaw et al., 2006; Laamanen et al., 2011). However, even such studies still emphasize 
the cost minimization and value creation motives of HQ relocations. Instead, whether and 
how HQ relocations are driven by broader institutional considerations still remains relatively 
under-researched. 
In the current study, I have sought to address this gap by recognizing the limits on HQ 
relocations that are imposed by social constrains. The basic assumption of this study is that 
HQ relocations are not only driven by managerial and efficiency-enhancing motives, but also 
by behavioural and institutional factors, and that these drivers are stronger during times of 
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economic crises, that increase environmental uncertainty and discontinuities. The current 
study investigates a peculiar phenomenon through a different theoretical perspective, since 
extant theory doesn’t give a complete explanation of the phenomenon fully.  
I develop a model that links isomorphic, normative and coercive institutional pressures to the 
likelihood of HQ relocation. Hence, I suggest a new set of items for research in relocation 
decision (e.g., institutional pressures and institutional quality). Starting from the assumption 
that firm decisions are not always based on purely efficiency motives, I hypothesize and find 
statistical support that the relocation of parenting activities can be considered as an answer to 
multiple institutional pressures faced by MNCs in their multiple institutional environments. I 
argue that international reconfiguration of HQ activities is driven by the need to answer to 
coercive, isomorphic and normative pressures that come from MNC institutional 
environments. I stress the legitimacy need of MNCs, as a complementary explanation of 
relocation decision. Furthermore, I investigate the relationship between HQ relocation and 
institutional drivers in two different settings, characterized by a different degree of 
environmental uncertainty: economic crises vs. economic stability. I hypothesize and find 
statistical support that firms react more strongly to coercive, isomorphic, and normative 
pressures during times of economic crises. The study can be considered representative of 
European relocations of HQ units. 
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Table 33. Summary of results 
Hypothesis Dep. Variable Expected sign Results 
H1a - Accumulatedtrend Relocations + Supported 
H1b –Accumulatedtrend in 
economic crises 
Relocations 
> than in stable 
environment 
Supported 
H2a – Ownership concentration Relocations + Supported 
H2b – Ownership concentration 
in economic crises 
Relocations 
> than in stable 
environment 
Not supported 
H3a – Distance from CHQ Relocations + Supported 
H3b – Inst. Remoteness Relocations + Supported 
H3c – Distance and Remoteness 
in economic crises 
Relocations + Partially supported 
H3d – Distance > Remoteness in 
economic crises 
Relocations  Partially supported 
H4a – Institutional quality Relocations - Supported 
Country economic crises Relocations + Supported 
 
11.2 Theoretical contribution 
The results of my regression model strongly confirm the basic assumption of my study. 
Taken together, these results allow me to draw a number of considerable conclusions on how 
institutional factors drive the decision to relocate HQs. I offer a considerable contribution to 
the re-location literature providing a complementary explanation of HQ relocation by 
drawing from institutional theory. HQ relocations are not influenced only by the myopic 
efficiency-enhancing reasons (Benito et al., 2011; Birkinshaw et al., 2006; Forsgren, et al., 
1995; Laamanen et al., 2011), but also by institutional pressures. Each institutional pressure 
(isomorphic, coercive and normative) is able to push MNCs to relocate their HQ units 
overseas.  
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A key finding from the current research is the isomorphic behaviour of HQs in their 
relocation decision. Respect to Laamanen et al. (2011), I find that imitation plays a 
significant role in relocation decisions as well as in other contexts (e.g., Ethija & Zu, 2008; 
Haveman, 1993; Jonsson, 2009). This result could be interpreted also as a sign of firm 
insecurity in taking important organizational and strategic decisions, especially in high 
uncertainty environments, like during economic crises. Firms find easier and safe to follow 
other actors that have just taken the same decisions. For example, in 2008, Yahoo! relocated 
its European Headquarters from London to Switzerland, after studying and speaking to other 
“comparable” companies that had moved there. In terms of the broader theoretical 
implications, this result offers statistically significant evidences of the applicability of this 
institutional construct to the international business literature. Up to now, literature has 
consistently underplayed the role of isomorphism in shaping the MNCs behaviour (Kostova 
et al., 2008). The multiplicity and ambiguity of MNCs organizational fields are considered as 
constrain to isomorphic behaviour (Kostova et al., 2008). “The diversity among the many 
institutional systems that they are exposed to and the unique sets of arrangements that each 
MNC unit faces give these organizations broader latitude in picking and choosing which 
models to adopt and to what extent they should respond to institutional influences” (Kostova 
et al., 2008; p.999). My results address this provocative comment, showing an isomorphic 
behaviour of MNCs in the decision to move HQs overseas. In line with the traditional 
argumentation of Institutional Theory (IT) (Di Maggio & Powell, 1983; Haveman, 1993; 
Kostova & Zaheer, 1999), I also find support that an increase in environmental uncertainty, in 
this case caused by an exogenous shock, like economic crises, is a powerful force that 
encourages imitation, pushing organizations to model themselves on the others.  
Moreover, Kostova et al. (2008) relate the limited institutional isomorphism in MNCs to the 
difficulty in identifying a precise organizational field for this type of organizations. “The 
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notion of organizational field in the traditional institutional sense does not apply to MNCs” 
(Kostova et al, 2008; p.997), that operate in different, fragmented, nested, and sometimes 
conflicting institutional environments. To answer to this additional provocative comment, I 
adopt a different definition of organizational field, switching my attention from the meso- to 
the meta-level of analysis. Meta-definition of institutional field is broader than meso-one, but 
it encompasses better the various institutional actors and agents that interact with MNCs. In 
this direction, my results suggest the possibility of developing a richer conceptualization on 
the use of this new perspective in defining organizational field for MNCs.  
Another interesting finding is the effect of institutional distance and remoteness on the 
relocation of HQ units. It sheds more light on the internal configuration and complexity of 
HQ system, and also on the internal struggle to achieve legitimacy. HQ units (e.g., DHQ and 
RHQ) are intermediary lines of control between CHQ and local subsidiaries (Forsgren et al., 
1995). They are subject to push and pull pressures. In particular, Forsgren et al. (1995) show 
a stronger resistance of CHQ to locate HQ units abroad (pull pressure), because it is 
interested in keeping the division heads together as a close team. However, they don’t find 
statistically support on the distance issue and its effect on relocation decision. My results 
overcome Forsgren et al (1995)’s limitations, showing, in particular, that the institutional 
distance from CHQ has a stronger effect on the relocation of HQ units than the institutional 
remoteness from local subsidiaries. These results could be interpreted as a need of HQ units 
to establish and regain their internal legitimacy and power. CHQ plays a pivotal and 
fundamental role within MNCs. An increase in institutional distance from CHQ is negatively 
perceived by intermediary HQs more than the distance from local subsidiaries under their 
control. Divisional and regional managers are more confident if their HQ units are located 
close to CHQ, sharing the same cultural, political and administrative knowledge, and 
ensuring a rich, quick, and unbiased communication (Lunnan et al., 2011). To maintain and 
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foster their internal legitimacy and power, divisional and regional HQs are more likely to 
move closer to CHQ than their centre of gravity. This effect is exacerbated during times of 
economic crises in line with the results of previous research on firm behaviour and crisis 
(Staw et al., 1981; Greening and Johnson, 1997; Singh and Yip, 2000). Future research could 
investigate further the direction of HQ relocation.       
Finally, I shed more light on the role of economic crisis in shaping organizational behaviours. 
My results show that economic crises play a dual role on the internal configuration of HQ 
activities. Although economic crises influence the relation between institutional factors and 
the likelihood of relocation, thereby exacerbating isomorphic, coercive and normative 
pressures, they may also impact directly on the relocation decision. On one side, these above-
mentioned findings contribute to the institutional theory by explaining how institutional 
factors act on MNCs behaviours under varying, floating, and dynamic environmental 
conditions. In particular, they suggest that unexpected external events (like economic crises) 
exacerbate mainly the complexity of fragmented and multiple institutional environments in 
which MNCs operate. The increase in complexity and uncertainty of institutional 
environment due to economic crises pushes MNCs to react more strongly to isomorphic, 
coercive and normative pressures to regain lost internal and external legitimacy. On the other 
side, I find statistical support of the direct effect of the country economic crisis on the 
decision of HQ relocation. This result shows that specific location decisions are strongly 
influenced by local micro-conditions, even if they are taken by firms that operate worldwide. 
It could be interpreted also that international/macro-crises impact on the overall local 
stability, but not directly on the strategic and organizational decision of MNCs. This is in line 
with previous study on the impact of economic crises on MNCs behaviours (Chung and 
Beamish, 2005; Chung et al., 2010; Chung et al., 2008).      
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11.3 Country policy and managerial implication 
This study shows an intensive competition among countries to attract a growing number of 
HQs. This competition highlights two different categories of countries: winners and losers. 
The first ones are countries that are characterized by high location advantage and are able to 
promote themselves as countries to move on. They are experiencing an increase in gaining a 
growing number of HQs. On the other side, there are countries (“losers”) that are losing HQs. 
Looking at Figure 15 and in line with Laamanen et al. (2011), the United Kingdom is losing 
its traditional status as an attractive location for HQ units. The net change between gained 
and lost HQs is equal to -11. Several reasons could be counted. For example, Laamanen et al. 
(2011) relate this negative trend to “the increase in proficiency in the English language 
elsewhere in Europe” (Laamanen et al., 2011; p. 19). However, other possible explanations 
could be a decrease in institutional quality, or an increase in corporate taxes. For example, 
Aviva Group, the world's sixth largest insurance group, moved its HQ from London to 
Dublin in 2009 for taxation issues. Although its central location, France is also a clear loser. 
It is negatively affected by the low institutional quality and the less used English language.  
The clear winner in this competition is Switzerland, in line with the results in Laamanen et al. 
(2011). Switzerland is gaining an increasing number of HQs, attracted by its centrality 
position, high institutional quality, and low corporate tax rate. Moreover, this country is also 
a good communicator, that is strongly promoting outside its main attractive characteristics 
through consultant reports (for instance, Wanner et al. (2002)). Scandinavian countries, 
instead, achieve questionable results, due to their peripheral location. For the other 
“traditional” European economies there is not a clear trend, for example Germany shows a 
relatively high activity with no clear direction, and an equal number between inflow and 
outflow. 
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My results highlight also the important role played by institutional quality and central 
location in the decision of HQ relocation. It is most probably not a coincidence that the 
countries with the highest institutional quality and closer to the central European market are 
also the major gainers. A clear policy implication of the current study is to support 
empirically that institutional quality matters for losing and gaining HQs. Countries have to 
improve continuously the quality of their state political and legal institutions and governance 
infrastructure to win the competition for gaining HQs. Moreover, high bureaucratic 
procedures and political corruption are negatively considered by MNCs in their location 
choices (Tan & Wang, 2011).  
For public policy makers the above-mentioned issues are extremely important because 
corporate and intermediary HQs represent a major source of high value-added jobs. The 
relocation of many HQs overseas could negatively impact on the economy and stability of 
such countries. There is also a serious risk that professional service providers, like bankers, 
accountants, lawyers, and so on, move away as well following HQ units. Home country 
policy-makers should better analyse the factors of HQ relocation, identifying those on which 
they can have some control (e.g., governance effectiveness, economic stability, bureaucracy, 
corporate tax rates, corruption, and so on) and those that are truly exogenous (e.g. the 
geographical remoteness of the country to the main markets). In this direction, the current 
study can be helpful for policy makers.     
Finally, there are some potentially important implications for the worlds of management 
practice. The study documents an increasing trend toward relocation of HQs. MNCs are 
competing on the geographical location of HQ activities that typically are located in the home 
country. They are looking for new forms of competitive advantage also reconfiguring their 
HQ system. HQ managers should better understand this phenomenon, its drivers and 
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implications to anticipate competitors. In this direction, the current study can be helpful for 
them.  
Moreover, the study offers to HQ managers also new tools to take location decision. It 
highlights how this decision is also influenced by institutional factors. Managers shouldn’t 
restrict their evaluations on home and target location at the efficiency factors, even if they 
generate benefits in the short term. There are many other variables that should be taken into 
consideration, like the quality of institutions, bureaucracy, corruption, or internal cultural and 
administrative distance. These factors generate considerable benefits in the long term, even if 
they cannot be efficient in terms of immediate and direct effects on performance. For 
managers, the challenge is to balance these two types of different factors in taking a location 
decision. Here, my research provide a way of thinking through the institutional drivers of 
relocation and helps them to frame the choice in a more structured way.     
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12 Limitations and future research 
This study is based on a unique hand-collected dataset of European firms between 2000 and 
2012 constructed through a multi-methodological approach, merging primary and secondary 
data both at firm and country level. The relocation events have been identified in two 
different news databases, LexisNexis and Factiva that collect information from the main 
newspapers, journals, reports and magazines. This can be considered as being more critical in 
terms of potential sampling biases since my sample doesn’t include information on small 
companies and on their relocations that don’t bait the attention of financial press. This is a 
frequent limitation in the studies that start from news databases to construct their sample. 
Through these databases I take into account only relocation phenomena occurred in Europe 
between 2000 and 2012 and important enough to be considered by international press and by 
stock exchange documents. I don’t have information about HQ relocations of small firms that 
could be potentially influenced by completely different variables. 
Another limitation is that I do not take full advantage of the panel nature of my data. I just 
run cross-sectional logit model to investigate the main assumption of my study. However, 
future research will address this important issue. 
Another important limitation is related to the absence of business and infrastructure services 
among control variables. American studies on the topic have highlighted the important role of 
these types of services in affecting relocation decision (Aarland et al., 2007; Henderson & 
Ono, 2008; Davis & Henderson, 2008; Strauss-Khan & Vives, 2009). However, previous 
studies on cross-border relocations in Europe found a questionable effect of services on the 
decision to move HQs (Birkinshaw et al., 2006; Laamanen et al., 2011).  
The study also has limitations regarding measurement. Some measures do not show very 
good construct validity properties. It refers especially to the measure of economic crisis. I 
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measure economic crisis at the European and country level, without measuring it also at 
industry level. This is an important limitation when I study the effects of crisis in shaping 
organizational behavior. I don’t consider that at the same time some industries could be non-
cyclical and not influenced by economic crises respect to others (cyclical industry). 
Moreover, related to the difference between cyclical and non-cyclical industry, I don’t 
consider also that some industries could perform better when another industry is in crisis. 
Furthermore, another limitation is related to the measure of internal coercive pressure. I 
measure it through the ownership structure and, in particular, through the difference between 
dispersed and concentrated ownership. My measure doesn’t capture the family ownership. I 
easily include family owner in the concentrated ownership structure without capturing their 
possible different effects on the relocation decision. This is an important limitation, because 
the familiarity of firms’ internal environment creates a stronger internal identity, and so 
internal coercive pressure, than a concentrated ownership structure. Furthermore, I don’t have 
data about the nationality of the largest owner. Previous study shows that when foreign 
owners dominate they are more likely to change the focus of MNCs from home national 
country to an international one moving out HQ (Birkinshaw et al., 2006). In my model I don’t 
control for the nationality of the larger owner that could be another possible explanation of 
HQ relocation. This could be another important limitation in my study.    
I measure the institutional distance through the differences in the administrative, political and 
cultural distance between two or more different countries. Some studies define institutional 
distance as a multi-dimensional construct covering many other institutional aspects like, for 
instance, economic (Berry et al., 2010; Zaheer and Zaheer, 1997), financial or demographic 
distance (Berry et al., 2010; Capron and Guillèn, 2009). In my measure of institutional 
distance I capture only the political/administrative and culture differences among different 
locations, neglecting completely the possible impacts of other distance dimensions on the 
133 
 
relocation decision. Thus, it could be a possible limitation in the measurement of this 
construct (institutional distance) in my study. Moreover, I controlled for previous foreign 
acquisitions that can explain the movement of HQs abroad by growth rather than relocation 
of existing units, through a binary variable. However, more fine-grained measures could be 
found for that control variable. 
Finally, another limitation could be the absence of a control for firm performance, even if in 
previous study this variable has questionable effects on the decision of HQ relocations.    
Future research should overcome the limitations of the present study and also add more 
complexity to my theoretical framework, considering other hypotheses that may be distilled 
from my reasoning. For example, it could be possible to consider another form of mimetic 
isomorphism like the competitive one. Respect to institutional isomorphism, competitive 
isomorphism is rather a consequence of rational and economic explanations like to follow the 
main customers. While it is common to establish facilities close to main customers, a firm 
may also choose to move its HQ closer to the location of a customer on which it is 
particularly dependent. Such co-location can help establish or maintain a positive relationship 
with the customer, signal commitment and “insidership”, and help secure fundamental source 
of revenues. So, future research could investigate the effects of competitive isomorphism on 
relocation decision. Furthermore, I consider as normative pressure the institutional quality of 
HQ country. Another strong normative pressure could be the specific market nature of the 
firm’s location. The government setup as well as the cultural expectations can display varying 
degrees of market and strategic coordination (Hall & Soskice, 2001). At one end of the 
spectrum stand liberal market economies (LME) where relations among firms and other 
institutional actors are managed primarily by competitive markets, characterized by arm’s 
length relations and formal contracting. At the other end, there are coordinated market 
economies (CME), where firms typically engage in more strategic relations with 
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governments, trade unions, and other institutional actors. It could be interesting to investigate 
the effects of different markets on the HQ relocation decision.  
Moreover, in this study I consider institutional antecedents as a complementary explanation 
of the relocation phenomenon, but this could be open to different interpretations. For 
example, efficiency and institutional factors could be considered as alternative drivers of 
relocation decisions. Future study could analyse and compare the relative impact of 
institutional motives versus efficiency enhancing motives on relocation decisions.  
The current study is based especially on “whether” to move HQs overseas. Further study 
could also analyse how institutional factors can influence the decision to “where” re-locate 
HQs. 
Finally, scholars have paid little attention to the consequences of HQ relocation on the 
performance of MNCs, as well as the relocation decision process itself. Future study, both 
theoretical and empirical, could contribute to a better understanding of these relations and 
processes. Moreover, they would be highly important as the next step to validate the different 
antecedents of HQ relocation.           
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13 Appendices 
13.1 Mahalanobis distance vs. Euclidean distance 
In literature, there is not an agreement about the best way to measure distance. In particular, 
two different methods are used: Euclidean distance and Mahalanobis distance. This appendix 
shows the main characteristics and differences of these two different methods, considering 
how they are able to satisfy the five desirable properties, distance measures should exhibit: 
 symmetry,  
 non-negatively,  
 identification,  
 definiteness, 
 triangle inequality.  
The Euclidean method is commonly defined as the geometrically shortest possible distance 
between two points. It uses to meet all five of the desirable characteristics listed above.  
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A main problem with this method to measure distance is that, “although it is a metric, it 
doesn’t take into consideration the correlation between the variable indicators used to 
computing it” (Berry et al., 2010; p.1469). Then, the Euclidean distance doesn’t consider the 
variance of the variables and, finally, it is sensitive to the scale of measurement.  
An alternative method is the Mahalanobis one, originally formulated in 1936. It is based on 
correlations between variables and it meets the five desirable properties listed above, and also 
it fixes the three key problems of the Euclidean Method. In fact, it takes into account the 
variance-covariance matrix and it is scale-invariant. 
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The main disadvantages of the Mahalanobis method in comparison to the Euclidean one are 
that “none of the variables can be perfectly collinear, and there have to be more points than 
variables in the data so that one can calculate the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix” 
(Berry et al., 2010; p.1469). 
The following Table 34 shows the properties of different methods to calculate dyadic 
distance. 
Table 34. Euclidean Method vs. Mahalanobis Method 
Property Explanation Euclidean Mahalanobis 
Symmetry dij=dji for all i and j Yes Yes 
Non-negativity dij≥0 for all i and j Yes Yes 
Identifications dij=0 for all i Yes Yes 
Definiteness dij=0 only if xi=xj Yes Yes 
Triangle inequality dij≥ dik +dki for all i j 
and k 
Yes Yes 
Sensitive to 
correlation 
Variables not 
assumed to be 
orthogonal to each 
other 
No Yes 
Sensitive to 
variance 
Variables not 
assumed to have 
equal variance 
No Yes 
Scale invariant Measure not sensitive 
to scale variables 
No Yes 
Ability to handle 
over determination 
Number of points can 
be smaller than 
number of variables 
Yes No 
Source Berry et al. (2010); Mimmack et al. (2001) 
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13.2 GDP and Employment rate  
In this appendix, I show the GDP growth rate (annually and quarterly) and the employment 
growth rate at the European country level. 
Table 35. Growth rate compared to the same quarter of previous year 
 Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Slovak 
 Republic 
Q1-2000 4.51 4.83 4.00 5.73 4.32 3.49 .. .. 3.73 -1.66 
Q2-2000 3.94 4.14 3.51 4.33 4.15 4.49 .. .. 3.81 1.09 
Q3-2000 3.20 3.09 3.71 6.07 3.55 3.20 .. .. 4.13 2.49 
Q4-2000 2.85 2.74 2.91 5.17 3.27 2.04 .. .. 3.90 3.63 
Q1-2001 2.28 2.00 1.13 3.25 2.65 2.43 3.31 9.28 3.26 3.17 
Q2-2001 -1.16 -1.22 -0.61 -2.99 -2.19 1.44 2.59 -5.97 -2.15 3.24 
Q3-2001 -0.39 -0.52 -0.90 -1.88 -1.92 1.22 4.79 -4.46 -1.23 3.04 
Q4-2001 0.26 -0.54 0.19 1.06 0.50 1.48 6.11 1.93 0.41 4.46 
Q1-2002 -0.94 -0.27 -0.10 -0.59 0.64 -0.35 2.88 3.29 -0.38 4.22 
Q2-2002 -1.92 -1.08 1.82 2.62 0.89 -0.19 4.34 5.23 -0.65 4.11 
Q3-2002 2.02 1.82 -0.07 -0.07 0.94 0.51 3.83 7.04 0.90 5.76 
Q4-2002 1.51 2.27 0.03 2.36 1.31 0.13 2.71 7.03 0.62 4.24 
Q1-2003 1.08 1.21 1.38 1.83 0.91 -0.29 6.56 4.41 0.39 5.23 
Q2-2003 0.86 -0.65 -1.18 1.20 0.39 -0.68 5.87 3.71 -0.47 5.52 
Q3-2003 0.83 -0.51 -0.53 2.48 0.82 -0.58 5.31 1.15 -0.29 3.69 
Q4-2003 0.87 0.86 1.88 2.53 1.56 0.00 6.04 6.27 0.48 4.68 
Q1-2004 1.25 2.59 1.14 3.54 1.82 0.80 3.90 5.18 1.39 4.49 
Q2-2004 2.07 3.31 3.11 4.05 2.63 1.22 4.75 4.81 1.84 3.93 
Q3-2004 2.91 3.76 2.86 3.87 2.32 0.58 4.45 5.30 1.93 5.90 
Q4-2004 2.96 3.32 2.09 5.03 2.54 0.19 4.37 2.41 1.07 5.89 
Q1-2005 2.59 2.23 0.53 3.69 2.14 -0.06 1.96 4.57 0.55 5.94 
Q2-2005 2.46 1.73 4.14 3.12 1.69 -0.38 1.55 7.00 1.08 7.33 
Q3-2005 2.52 1.32 2.89 3.05 1.85 1.31 2.64 6.04 1.10 6.72 
Q4-2005 3.31 1.93 2.22 1.84 1.72 1.62 2.96 5.93 1.61 6.63 
Q1-2006 3.80 2.43 4.45 4.34 2.30 2.90 4.78 7.19 2.06 7.72 
Q2-2006 3.36 2.41 3.15 4.00 3.03 3.75 5.95 3.87 1.90 7.93 
Q3-2006 3.43 2.85 3.11 4.30 2.55 3.95 5.52 6.91 2.14 8.18 
Q4-2006 3.93 2.97 2.91 5.01 2.70 4.95 4.43 3.79 2.97 9.50 
Q1-2007 4.27 3.11 2.93 4.86 2.61 4.42 5.45 7.43 2.46 9.12 
Q2-2007 4.15 2.99 -0.20 5.81 2.07 3.44 4.20 5.73 1.98 9.32 
Q3-2007 3.41 2.88 1.48 5.24 2.45 3.33 3.91 2.35 1.72 9.84 
Q4-2007 2.90 2.47 2.16 5.43 1.87 2.39 3.59 6.27 0.05 13.55 
Q1-2008 2.82 2.22 -0.09 2.66 1.59 2.79 1.59 -0.83 0.46 8.64 
Q2-2008 2.45 2.22 1.91 1.39 0.48 1.80 1.48 -0.67 -0.24 7.38 
Q3-2008 0.95 1.03 -0.78 0.23 -0.49 0.53 0.97 -0.02 -1.87 6.26 
Q4-2008 -1.86 -1.62 -4.12 -3.02 -2.33 -1.87 0.06 -6.93 -2.99 1.17 
Q1-2009 -4.53 -4.01 -4.94 -8.98 -4.29 -6.81 -1.14 -5.70 -6.91 -5.14 
Q2-2009 -5.25 -4.22 -7.97 -10.01 -3.73 -6.17 -2.66 -5.39 -6.56 -5.04 
Q3-2009 -3.37 -2.75 -5.92 -8.12 -3.10 -5.05 -3.49 -6.65 -4.99 -4.95 
Q4-2009 -0.75 0.08 -3.74 -7.00 -1.05 -2.19 -2.06 -4.10 -3.48 -4.63 
Q1-2010 0.75 1.01 -1.52 0.30 -0.95 2.64 -2.85 -2.91 0.07 1.20 
Q2-2010 1.02 1.01 1.09 1.76 1.62 4.65 -3.10 -1.29 0.88 1.70 
Q3-2010 1.86 1.48 1.14 1.84 1.92 4.56 -4.09 0.79 0.93 1.22 
Q4-2010 1.20 1.19 1.65 2.42 1.80 4.24 -7.39 0.39 1.19 1.44 
Q1-2011 -1.96 -1.88 -1.10 -1.06 -1.37 4.82 -5.45 -0.15 -1.31 1.34 
Q2-2011 3.68 2.00 1.60 2.00 1.75 3.02 .. 1.83 0.97 3.31 
Q3-2011 2.08 1.45 -0.33 3.11 1.53 2.68 .. -0.82 0.43 3.07 
Q4-2011 1.01 0.93 0.30 0.99 -1.16 1.91 .. 2.91 -0.47 3.19 
Q1-2012 -0.70 0.36 -0.06 1.44 -0.24 1.18 .. 1.67 -1.31 -2.88 
Q2-2012 0.51 -0.32 -1.20 -0.15 -0.10 -0.99 .. 0.07 -2.32 -2.61 
Q3-2012 0.69 -0.35 -0.36 -1.08 0.00 -0.86 .. 0.79 -2.40 2.47 
Q4-2012 .. -0.40 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
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 Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Spain Sweden Switzerland England Czech 
Republic 
Hungary 
Q1-
2000 
5.41 4.48 5.19 .. 4.18 3.60 4.42 3.54 4.67 
Q2-
2000 
7.21 4.59 4.00 .. 5.75 4.14 5.56 4.65 4.62 
Q3-
2000 
5.85 3.94 2.74 .. 5.00 4.11 4.07 5.20 3.80 
Q4-
2000 
9.33 3.11 1.22 .. 3.49 2.85 2.94 4.81 3.61 
Q1-
2001 
2.84 2.87 0.97 4.01 -2.38 2.51 3.30 -4.34 -4.23 
Q2-
2001 
2.08 2.24 1.90 3.60 -0.68 1.80 2.54 -3.38 -3.88 
Q3-
2001 
3.00 1.66 2.11 3.91 0.83 0.74 2.79 2.51 3.88 
Q4-
2001 
2.19 1.23 2.97 3.17 1.77 -0.04 2.93 2.15 3.36 
Q1-
2002 
2.38 0.06 1.18 2.78 2.06 -0.32 -0.90 -1.86 4.55 
Q2-
2002 
6.78 0.05 3.25 3.00 3.20 -0.08 -0.08 1.86 4.28 
Q3-
2002 
3.60 0.19 0.74 2.35 2.53 0.32 2.48 2.08 4.57 
Q4-
2002 
3.72 0.02 0.86 2.72 2.20 0.18 3.07 2.41 4.61 
Q1-
2003 
-0.90 0.69 -0.26 3.06 3.39 -1.02 3.26 3.38 3.34 
Q2-
2003 
-0.81 -0.06 -0.61 2.94 1.54 -0.48 3.65 3.52 3.83 
Q3-
2003 
2.58 -0.03 2.18 3.08 2.66 0.18 4.04 3.98 3.89 
Q4-
2003 
4.24 0.61 1.13 3.27 2.32 1.41 4.30 4.17 4.23 
Q1-
2004 
5.72 1.43 4.78 3.27 3.03 2.72 4.44 3.83 4.58 
Q2-
2004 
3.90 2.14 4.88 2.96 4.15 2.90 3.44 4.16 4.86 
Q3-
2004 
4.61 2.44 2.41 3.73 3.75 2.41 2.19 4.71 4.74 
Q4-
2004 
3.43 2.11 3.77 3.08 3.96 1.67 1.62 5.60 4.41 
Q1-
2005 
7.91 1.50 1.41 3.22 2.80 1.62 1.49 6.27 3.79 
Q2-
2005 
5.95 2.03 2.22 3.80 2.94 2.31 2.50 7.13 4.35 
Q3-
2005 
4.66 2.38 3.87 3.25 3.56 3.13 3.32 6.96 3.95 
Q4-
2005 
2.69 2.78 2.88 4.05 3.31 3.71 3.78 6.94 4.26 
Q1-
2006 
3.40 3.28 2.22 4.03 4.16 4.06 3.66 7.60 4.71 
Q2-
2006 
3.25 3.78 1.80 4.10 4.68 3.68 2.70 7.16 3.88 
Q3-
2006 
4.82 3.36 1.90 4.21 4.76 3.49 2.10 7.28 3.77 
Q4-
2006 
8.21 3.42 3.23 3.97 4.61 3.78 1.97 6.88 3.40 
Q1-
2007 
6.63 3.92 2.61 3.89 4.23 3.92 2.61 7.01 1.31 
Q2-
2007 
8.42 2.96 2.25 3.52 3.31 4.02 3.56 5.25 -0.05 
Q3-
2007 
7.22 4.04 3.10 3.41 2.50 3.93 4.57 5.23 -0.37 
Q4-
2007 
4.08 4.72 2.64 3.11 3.71 3.52 3.78 5.43 -0.38 
Q1- 3.30 3.87 1.16 2.73 1.38 3.13 2.71 3.53 1.82 
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2008 
Q2-
2008 
1.30 2.81 1.31 1.93 0.75 3.22 0.53 4.83 2.28 
Q3-
2008 
-0.74 1.48 -0.63 -0.34 0.03 2.67 -2.39 3.33 -0.84 
Q4-
2008 
-6.77 -1.00 -1.69 -1.38 -5.14 -0.32 -4.61 0.04 -2.27 
Q1-
2009 
-6.80 -3.71 -1.07 -3.40 -6.40 -2.29 -6.12 -3.74 -6.74 
Q2-
2009 
-7.24 -4.65 -2.04 -4.42 -6.05 -3.16 -5.42 -5.47 -7.71 
Q3-
2009 
-3.99 -3.93 -1.29 -4.00 -6.03 -2.40 -3.34 -5.22 -7.50 
Q4-
2009 
2.19 -2.31 -1.09 -3.15 -1.29 0.14 -0.87 -2.97 -4.64 
Q1-
2010 
1.24 0.32 0.96 -1.48 1.85 2.31 1.23 0.91 -0.24 
Q2-
2010 
1.33 1.28 0.77 -0.18 2.83 3.26 2.13 2.71 1.19 
Q3-
2010 
1.82 1.67 -1.27 0.03 2.37 2.96 2.35 2.81 2.20 
Q4-
2010 
2.18 1.01 0.47 0.37 3.00 3.60 1.49 2.90 2.07 
Q1-
2011 
2.17 2.13 -1.10 0.51 5.74 2.88 1.34 3.04 2.40 
Q2-
2011 
2.05 1.55 0.32 0.53 4.27 2.47 0.76 -1.50 1.65 
Q3-
2011 
0.98 1.08 4.19 -0.63 4.02 1.50 -0.71 -0.90 1.34 
Q4-
2011 
-0.44 -0.43 -1.98 -0.01 1.15 0.88 0.87 -0.90 1.21 
Q1-
2012 
-0.30 -0.80 -0.90 -0.70 1.32 1.07 -0.17 -0.46 -1.33 
Q2-
2012 
0.90 -0.55 2.48 -1.36 1.33 0.44 -0.34 -1.03 -1.37 
Q3-
2012 
-0.07 -1.32 -1.46 -1.60 -0.66 1.27 0.04 -1.28 -1.59 
Q4-
2012 
         
 
Table 36. Annual GDP growth rate  
 Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Slovak  
Republic 
2000 3.42% 3.39% 3.19% 5.11% 3.15% 2.92% 4.26% 7.94% 3.46% 1.28% 
2001 0.63% 0.53% 0.36% 2.05% 1.27% 1.35% 3.98% 3.43% 1.56% 3.40% 
2002 1.49% 1.16% 0.11% 1.58% 0.36% -0.16% 3.22% 4.25% 0.20% 4.48% 
2003 0.69% 0.62% 0.02% 1.79% 0.34% -0.43% 5.72% 2.36% -0.46% 4.65% 
2004 2.44% 3.10% 1.93% 3.92% 1.95% 1.18% 4.16% 2.23% 0.87% 4.92% 
2005 2.28% 1.57% 2.09% 2.74% 1.22% 0.74% 2.08% 2.63% 0.11% 6.50% 
2006 3.57% 2.56% 3.05% 4.25% 1.85% 3.82% 5.35% 2.63% 1.63% 8.18% 
2007 3.62% 2.77% 1.26% 5.19% 1.66% 3.41% 2.82% 2.54% 0.88% 10.33% 
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2008 1.33% 0.84% -1.42% 0.86% -0.67% 1.29% -0.31% -5.07% -2.09% 5.74% 
2009 -3.87% -2.94% -5.48% -8.32% -3.28% -4.86% -3.38% -8.26% -5.80% -5.04% 
2010 2.27% 2.18% 1.47% 3.55% 0.93% 3.94% -3.63% -1.35% 0.12% 4.11% 
2011 2.85% 2.10% 0.97% 3.00% 1.09% 3.22% -5.59% 0.05% 0.10% 2.75% 
2012 -2.24% -2.43% -5.11% -2.57% -2.82% -2.54% -3.65% -2.63% -3.15% 1.44% 
 
 Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Spain Sweden Switzerland England Czech  
Republic 
Hungary 
2000 6.90% 3.22% 2.59% 4.18% 4.29% 3.10% 3.51% 4.29% 4.47% 
2001 1.13% 1.19% 1.48% 2.51% 1.08% 0.54% 2.06% 3.18% 3.89% 
2002 2.72% -0.54% 1.05% 1.25% 2.32% -0.25% 1.71% 2.21% 4.68% 
2003 0.22% -0.10% 0.57% 1.43% 2.15% -0.83% 2.43% 3.82% 4.06% 
2004 3.06% 1.92% 3.43% 1.63% 4.05% 1.95% 2.43% 4.79% 5.00% 
2005 4.11% 1.84% 2.33% 1.91% 2.98% 2.11% 1.56% 6.80% 4.12% 
2006 3.68% 3.26% 1.89% 2.37% 4.13% 3.15% 2.18% 7.08% 4.01% 
2007 5.35% 3.73% 2.35% 1.69% 3.15% 3.22% 2.01% 5.80% 0.23% 
2008 -0.45% 1.44% 0.37% -0.65% -0.77% 1.73% -0.70% 3.18% 1.03% 
2009 -6.41% -4.01% -2.05% -4.54% -5.32% -2.17% -5.42% -4.61% -6.67% 
2010 1.49% 1.18% 0.01% -0.52% 5.47% 2.46% 0.78% 2.84% 1.41% 
2011 0.42% 1.32% 2.08% 0.20% 3.82% 1.47% 0.09% 1.91% 1.57% 
2012 -1.20% -2.28% -1.73% -6.41% -2.29% -1.49% -2.62% 2.92% 1.49% 
 
Table 37. Annual Employment growth rate 
 Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Slovak  
Republic 
2000 0.50% 0.47% 0.50% 0.20% 0.20% 0.10% 1.50% 0.10% 0.01% 0.00% 
2001 0.87% -0.05% 0.76% -0.12% 0.21% -0.77% 3.76% -0.05% -1.30% 0.02% 
2002 0.22% -0.60% -1.73% -0.48% 1.85% -1.07% 2.12% -0.13% 1.02% 1.56% 
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2003 -1.71% 1.74% 0.75% -0.22% 0.67% 0.66% 0.82% 1.59% 2.21% -1.30% 
2004 1.31% 1.23% 0.29% 1.08% -0.12% 0.72% 1.19% 2.34% 0.07% 1.26% 
2005 2.20% -0.14% 1.94% 1.55% -0.07% 2.55% 1.47% 1.49% 1.61% 2.92% 
2006 1.77% 1.74% -0.46% 1.27% 1.00% 2.73% 0.63% 1.08% 0.44% 2.15% 
2007 2.10% 0.57% 1.10% 1.13% 0.88% 1.66% 0.80% -1.60% 0.11% 2.62% 
2008 -1.76% -1.28% -3.23% -4.03% -1.24% 0.32% -0.99% -8.18% -2.13% -3.39% 
2009 0.15% 0.67% -2.66% -0.16% -0.27% 1.09% -2.76% -3.36% -1.04% -2.33% 
2010 0.53% -0.15% -0.26% 1.38% -0.04% 1.99% -6.71% -1.37% -0.11% 1.26% 
2011 0.12% -0.20% -0.20% 0.12% -0.19% -0.10% -0.10% -0.19% -0.26% -0.83% 
2012 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 
 Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Spain Sweden Switzerland England Czech  
Republic 
Hungary 
2000 1.00% 0.10% 0.10% 0.50% 0.10% 0.03% 0.03% 0.10% 0.10% 
2001 1.05% 0.16% -0.46% 1.05% -0.41% -0.36% -0.20% 0.60% 0.04% 
2002 -2.27% -0.81% -1.75% 2.08% -0.90% -1.21% 0.34% -1.26% 1.42% 
2003 0.43% -2.03% -0.23% 2.22% -0.80% -0.66% 0.14% -0.97% -0.43% 
2004 1.82% 0.50% -0.52% 3.57% 0.48% -0.26% -0.01% 0.86% 0.28% 
2005 -0.06% 1.42% 0.39% 2.31% 0.85% 0.96% -0.09% 0.76% 0.69% 
2006 0.96% 2.56% 1.88% 1.26% 1.48% 0.84% -0.27% 1.26% 0.00% 
2007 -1.17% 2.05% 1.52% -1.94% 0.08% 1.16% 0.36% 0.73% -1.15% 
2008 2.80% -0.41% -2.05% -7.14% -4.68% -0.60% -2.82% -1.82% -2.21% 
2009 0.03% -1.13% -1.45% -2.06% 0.60% -0.55% -0.49% -0.56% -0.01% 
2010 -0.95% 0.23% -0.02% -1.53% 1.95% 0.93% 0.19% 1.12% 0.76% 
2011 -0.15% -0.12% -0.19% -0.12% 0.12% 0.10% 0.14% -1.87% -2.90% 
2012 1.00% 0.10% 0.10% 0.50% 0.10% 0.03% 0.03% 0.10% 0.10% 
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13.3 Number of HQ gained and lost.  
Table 38. Total number of HQ gained and lost by each country in the sample  
 Austria Belgium Czech 
Republic 
Denmark England Finland France Germany Greece Hungary 
Number 
lost 
4 3 0 4 35 2 11 16 1 1 
Number 
gained 
3 0 3 0 24 4 5 16 0 3 
Net change -1 -3 3 -4 -11 2 -6 0 -1 2 
 
 Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Slovak 
Republic 
Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland 
Number 
lost 
4 1 1 8 2 1 1 3 1 8 
Number 
gained 
10 0 5 14 1 0 0 2 3 28 
Net 
change 
6 -1 4 6 -1 -1 -1 -1 2 20 
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13.4 Factor analysis of institutional remoteness  
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
    Zcul_remot~s     0.9815        0.0366  
    Zpol_remot~s     0.9373        0.1214  
    Zadm_remot~s     0.9684        0.0622  
    Zgeo_remot~s     0.9748        0.0498  
                                           
        Variable    Factor1     Uniqueness 
                                           
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(6)  = 2.7e+04 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
        Factor4         0.03780            .            0.0094       1.0000
        Factor3         0.07229      0.03449            0.0181       0.9906
        Factor2         0.15996      0.08767            0.0400       0.9725
        Factor1         3.72995      3.56998            0.9325       0.9325
                                                                              
         Factor      Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative
                                                                              
    Rotation: (unrotated)                          Number of params =        4
    Method: principal-component factors            Retained factors =        1
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =     4238
                           
         Factor1    1.0000 
                           
                   Factor1 
                           
Factor rotation matrix
                                           
    Zcul_remot~s     0.9815        0.0366  
    Zpol_remot~s     0.9373        0.1214  
    Zadm_remot~s     0.9684        0.0622  
    Zgeo_remot~s     0.9748        0.0498  
                                           
        Variable    Factor1     Uniqueness 
                                           
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(6)  = 2.7e+04 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
        Factor1         3.72995       0.9325
                                                                              
         Factor        Variance   Proportion    Rotated factors are correlated
                                                                              
    Rotation: oblique promax (Kaiser off)          Number of params =        4
    Method: principal-component factors            Retained factors =        1
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =     4238
Scale reliability coefficient:      0.9758
Number of items in the scale:            4
Average interitem covariance:      .909616
Test scale = mean(unstandardized items)
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Moreover, I checked these results also per each year. Some results below. 
2001 
 
 
 
 
KMO               =     0.870
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy
 
 
H0: variables are not intercorrelated
p-value            =             0.000
Degrees of freedom =                 6
Chi-square         =         27183.285
    
Bartlett test of sphericity
                                           
    Zcul_re~2001     0.9812        0.0372  
    Zpol_re~2001     0.9192        0.1550  
    Zgeo_re~2001     0.9708        0.0575  
    Zadm_re~2001     0.9707        0.0578  
                                           
        Variable    Factor1     Uniqueness 
                                           
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(6)  = 2035.91 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
        Factor4         0.03643            .            0.0091       1.0000
        Factor3         0.06812      0.03169            0.0170       0.9909
        Factor2         0.20301      0.13488            0.0508       0.9739
        Factor1         3.69244      3.48943            0.9231       0.9231
                                                                              
         Factor      Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative
                                                                              
    Rotation: (unrotated)                          Number of params =        4
    Method: principal-component factors            Retained factors =        1
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =      326
                           
         Factor1    1.0000 
                           
                   Factor1 
                           
Factor rotation matrix
                                           
    Zcul_re~2001     0.9812        0.0372  
    Zpol_re~2001     0.9192        0.1550  
    Zgeo_re~2001     0.9708        0.0575  
    Zadm_re~2001     0.9707        0.0578  
                                           
        Variable    Factor1     Uniqueness 
                                           
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(6)  = 2035.91 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
        Factor1         3.69244       0.9231
                                                                              
         Factor        Variance   Proportion    Rotated factors are correlated
                                                                              
    Rotation: oblique promax (Kaiser off)          Number of params =        4
    Method: principal-component factors            Retained factors =        1
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =      326
Scale reliability coefficient:      0.9720
Number of items in the scale:            4
Average interitem covariance:     .8967384
Test scale = mean(unstandardized items)
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2006 
 
 
 
KMO               =     0.861
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy
 
 
H0: variables are not intercorrelated
p-value            =             0.000
Degrees of freedom =                 6
Chi-square         =          2029.620
    
Bartlett test of sphericity
                                           
    Zcul_re~2005     0.9829        0.0339  
    Zpol_re~2005     0.9454        0.1062  
    Zadm_re~2005     0.9616        0.0754  
    Zgeo_re~2005     0.9776        0.0444  
                                           
        Variable    Factor1     Uniqueness 
                                           
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(6)  = 2090.44 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
        Factor4         0.03875            .            0.0097       1.0000
        Factor3         0.07350      0.03475            0.0184       0.9903
        Factor2         0.14759      0.07410            0.0369       0.9719
        Factor1         3.74016      3.59257            0.9350       0.9350
                                                                              
         Factor      Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative
                                                                              
    Rotation: (unrotated)                          Number of params =        4
    Method: principal-component factors            Retained factors =        1
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =      326
                           
         Factor1    1.0000 
                           
                   Factor1 
                           
Factor rotation matrix
                                           
    Zcul_re~2005     0.9829        0.0339  
    Zpol_re~2005     0.9454        0.1062  
    Zadm_re~2005     0.9616        0.0754  
    Zgeo_re~2005     0.9776        0.0444  
                                           
        Variable    Factor1     Uniqueness 
                                           
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(6)  = 2090.44 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
        Factor1         3.74016       0.9350
                                                                              
         Factor        Variance   Proportion    Rotated factors are correlated
                                                                              
    Rotation: oblique promax (Kaiser off)          Number of params =        4
    Method: principal-component factors            Retained factors =        1
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =      326
Scale reliability coefficient:      0.9768
Number of items in the scale:            4
Average interitem covariance:     .9131073
Test scale = mean(unstandardized items)
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2010 
 
 
 
KMO               =     0.872
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy
 
 
H0: variables are not intercorrelated
p-value            =             0.000
Degrees of freedom =                 6
Chi-square         =          2083.985
    
Bartlett test of sphericity
                                           
    Zpol_re~2011     0.9437        0.1094  
    Zcul_re~2011     0.9826        0.0346  
    Zadm_re~2011     0.9719        0.0555  
    Zgeo_re~2011     0.9761        0.0473  
                                           
        Variable    Factor1     Uniqueness 
                                           
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(6)  = 2154.77 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
        Factor4         0.03602            .            0.0090       1.0000
        Factor3         0.06575      0.02973            0.0164       0.9910
        Factor2         0.14501      0.07925            0.0363       0.9746
        Factor1         3.75322      3.60821            0.9383       0.9383
                                                                              
         Factor      Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative
                                                                              
    Rotation: (unrotated)                          Number of params =        4
    Method: principal-component factors            Retained factors =        1
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =      326
                           
         Factor1    1.0000 
                           
                   Factor1 
                           
Factor rotation matrix
                                           
    Zpol_re~2011     0.9437        0.1094  
    Zcul_re~2011     0.9826        0.0346  
    Zadm_re~2011     0.9719        0.0555  
    Zgeo_re~2011     0.9761        0.0473  
                                           
        Variable    Factor1     Uniqueness 
                                           
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(6)  = 2154.77 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
        Factor1         3.75322       0.9383
                                                                              
         Factor        Variance   Proportion    Rotated factors are correlated
                                                                              
    Rotation: oblique promax (Kaiser off)          Number of params =        4
    Method: principal-component factors            Retained factors =        1
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =      326
Scale reliability coefficient:      0.9780
Number of items in the scale:            4
Average interitem covariance:     .9174575
Test scale = mean(unstandardized items)
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KMO               =     0.870
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy
 
 
H0: variables are not intercorrelated
p-value            =             0.000
Degrees of freedom =                 6
Chi-square         =          2148.113
    
Bartlett test of sphericity
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13.5 Factor analysis of institutional distance from CHQ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
    Z_geo_dist~Q     0.8415        0.2919  
    Z_cult_dis~Q     0.8142        0.3370  
    Z_pol_dist~Q     0.9224        0.1492  
    Z_adm_dist~Q     0.4936        0.7564  
                                           
        Variable    Factor1     Uniqueness 
                                           
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(6)  = 6966.99 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
        Factor4         0.18412            .            0.0460       1.0000
        Factor3         0.49567      0.31155            0.1239       0.9540
        Factor2         0.85463      0.35896            0.2137       0.8301
        Factor1         2.46558      1.61095            0.6164       0.6164
                                                                              
         Factor      Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative
                                                                              
    Rotation: (unrotated)                          Number of params =        4
    Method: principal-component factors            Retained factors =        1
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =     4228
                           
         Factor1    1.0000 
                           
                   Factor1 
                           
Factor rotation matrix
                                           
    Z_geo_dist~Q     0.8415        0.2919  
    Z_cult_dis~Q     0.8142        0.3370  
    Z_pol_dist~Q     0.9224        0.1492  
    Z_adm_dist~Q     0.4936        0.7564  
                                           
        Variable    Factor1     Uniqueness 
                                           
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(6)  = 6966.99 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
        Factor1         2.46558       0.6164
                                                                              
         Factor        Variance   Proportion    Rotated factors are correlated
                                                                              
    Rotation: oblique promax (Kaiser off)          Number of params =        4
    Method: principal-component factors            Retained factors =        1
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =     4228
Scale reliability coefficient:      0.7764
Number of items in the scale:            4
Average interitem covariance:     .4647003
Test scale = mean(unstandardized items)
KMO               =     0.673
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy
 
 
H0: variables are not intercorrelated
p-value            =             0.000
Degrees of freedom =                 6
Chi-square         =          6965.344
    
Bartlett test of sphericity
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Moreover, I checked these results also per each year. Some results below. 
2001 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
    Z_geo_dist~Q     0.7967        0.3652  
    Z_cult_dis~Q     0.8302        0.3108  
    Z_pol_dist~Q     0.8855        0.2158  
    Z_adm_dist~Q     0.5009        0.7491  
                                           
        Variable    Factor1     Uniqueness 
                                           
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(6)  =  401.87 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
        Factor4         0.28493            .            0.0712       1.0000
        Factor3         0.49663      0.21171            0.1242       0.9288
        Factor2         0.85939      0.36275            0.2148       0.8046
        Factor1         2.35905      1.49967            0.5898       0.5898
                                                                              
         Factor      Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative
                                                                              
    Rotation: (unrotated)                          Number of params =        4
    Method: principal-component factors            Retained factors =        1
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =      324
                           
         Factor1    1.0000 
                           
                   Factor1 
                           
Factor rotation matrix
                                           
    Z_geo_dist~Q     0.7967        0.3652  
    Z_cult_dis~Q     0.8302        0.3108  
    Z_pol_dist~Q     0.8855        0.2158  
    Z_adm_dist~Q     0.5009        0.7491  
                                           
        Variable    Factor1     Uniqueness 
                                           
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(6)  =  401.87 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
        Factor1         2.35905       0.5898
                                                                              
         Factor        Variance   Proportion    Rotated factors are correlated
                                                                              
    Rotation: oblique promax (Kaiser off)          Number of params =        4
    Method: principal-component factors            Retained factors =        1
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =      324
Scale reliability coefficient:      0.7546
Number of items in the scale:            4
Average interitem covariance:     .4295456
Test scale = mean(unstandardized items)
KMO               =     0.706
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy
 
 
H0: variables are not intercorrelated
p-value            =             0.000
Degrees of freedom =                 6
Chi-square         =           400.626
    
Bartlett test of sphericity
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2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
    Z_geo_dist~Q     0.8379        0.2979  
    Z_cult_dis~Q     0.7996        0.3606  
    Z_pol_dist~Q     0.9315        0.1324  
    Z_adm_dist~Q     0.4788        0.7708  
                                           
        Variable    Factor1     Uniqueness 
                                           
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(6)  =  557.98 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
        Factor4         0.15759            .            0.0394       1.0000
        Factor3         0.53395      0.37636            0.1335       0.9606
        Factor2         0.87007      0.33611            0.2175       0.8271
        Factor1         2.43839      1.56833            0.6096       0.6096
                                                                              
         Factor      Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative
                                                                              
    Rotation: (unrotated)                          Number of params =        4
    Method: principal-component factors            Retained factors =        1
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =      326
                           
         Factor1    1.0000 
                           
                   Factor1 
                           
Factor rotation matrix
                                           
    Z_geo_dist~Q     0.8379        0.2979  
    Z_cult_dis~Q     0.7996        0.3606  
    Z_pol_dist~Q     0.9315        0.1324  
    Z_adm_dist~Q     0.4788        0.7708  
                                           
        Variable    Factor1     Uniqueness 
                                           
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(6)  =  557.98 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
        Factor1         2.43839       0.6096
                                                                              
         Factor        Variance   Proportion    Rotated factors are correlated
                                                                              
    Rotation: oblique promax (Kaiser off)          Number of params =        4
    Method: principal-component factors            Retained factors =        1
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =      326
Scale reliability coefficient:      0.7594
Number of items in the scale:            4
Average interitem covariance:     .4658366
Test scale = mean(unstandardized items)
KMO               =     0.630
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy
 
 
H0: variables are not intercorrelated
p-value            =             0.000
Degrees of freedom =                 6
Chi-square         =           556.257
    
Bartlett test of sphericity
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2010 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
    Z_geo_dist~Q     0.8357   -0.1537        0.2780  
    Z_cult_dis~Q     0.7181    0.1279        0.4679  
    Z_pol_dist~Q     0.9155   -0.0287        0.1611  
    Z_adm_dist~Q     0.3513    0.1791        0.8445  
                                                     
        Variable    Factor1   Factor2     Uniqueness 
                                                     
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(6)  =  619.34 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
        Factor4        -0.13604            .           -0.0667       1.0000
        Factor3        -0.07222      0.06381           -0.0354       1.0667
        Factor2         0.07290      0.14512            0.0357       1.1021
        Factor1         2.17568      2.10278            1.0663       1.0663
                                                                              
         Factor      Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative
                                                                              
    Rotation: (unrotated)                          Number of params =        6
    Method: principal factors                      Retained factors =        2
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =      326
                                    
         Factor2   -0.1562   0.5533 
         Factor1    0.9877   0.8330 
                                    
                   Factor1  Factor2 
                                    
Factor rotation matrix
                                                     
    Z_geo_dist~Q     0.8726   -0.0315        0.2780  
    Z_cult_dis~Q     0.4297    0.3526        0.4679  
    Z_pol_dist~Q     0.7840    0.1695        0.1611  
    Z_adm_dist~Q     0.0668    0.3425        0.8445  
                                                     
        Variable    Factor1   Factor2     Uniqueness 
                                                     
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(6)  =  619.34 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
        Factor2         1.53197       0.7509
        Factor1         2.12434       1.0412
                                                                              
         Factor        Variance   Proportion    Rotated factors are correlated
                                                                              
    Rotation: oblique promax (Kaiser off)          Number of params =        6
    Method: principal factors                      Retained factors =        2
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =      326
Scale reliability coefficient:      0.7985
Number of items in the scale:            4
Average interitem covariance:     .4752737
Test scale = mean(unstandardized items)
KMO               =     0.695
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy
 
 
H0: variables are not intercorrelated
p-value            =             0.000
Degrees of freedom =                 6
Chi-square         =           617.424
    
Bartlett test of sphericity
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13.6 Factor analysis of institutional quality 
 
 
 
 
                                           
    control_of~n     0.8376        0.2985  
     rule_of_law     0.8943        0.2003  
    regulator~ty     0.7871        0.3805  
    government~s     0.5984        0.6419  
    political~ty     0.7808        0.3904  
    voice_acco~y     0.7967        0.3653  
                                           
        Variable    Factor1     Uniqueness 
                                           
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(15) = 1.8e+04 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
        Factor6         0.10275            .            0.0171       1.0000
        Factor5         0.20349      0.10075            0.0339       0.9829
        Factor4         0.34241      0.13892            0.0571       0.9490
        Factor3         0.42298      0.08057            0.0705       0.8919
        Factor2         1.20532      0.78234            0.2009       0.8214
        Factor1         3.72305      2.51773            0.6205       0.6205
                                                                              
         Factor      Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative
                                                                              
    Rotation: (unrotated)                          Number of params =        6
    Method: principal-component factors            Retained factors =        1
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =     4228
                           
         Factor1    1.0000 
                           
                   Factor1 
                           
Factor rotation matrix
                                           
    control_of~n     0.8376        0.2985  
     rule_of_law     0.8943        0.2003  
    regulator~ty     0.7871        0.3805  
    government~s     0.5984        0.6419  
    political~ty     0.7808        0.3904  
    voice_acco~y     0.7967        0.3653  
                                           
        Variable    Factor1     Uniqueness 
                                           
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(15) = 1.8e+04 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
        Factor1         3.72305       0.6205
                                                                              
         Factor        Variance   Proportion    Rotated factors are correlated
                                                                              
    Rotation: oblique promax (Kaiser off)          Number of params =        6
    Method: principal-component factors            Retained factors =        1
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =     4228
Scale reliability coefficient:      0.8540
Number of items in the scale:            6
Average interitem covariance:     .0761951
Test scale = mean(unstandardized items)
KMO               =     0.714
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy
 
 
H0: variables are not intercorrelated
p-value            =             0.000
Degrees of freedom =                15
Chi-square         =         18157.610
    
Bartlett test of sphericity
153 
 
I checked the results of factor analysis also per single year. I show some examples. 
Year 2000 
 
 
 
                                           
    control_of~n     0.7798        0.3919  
     rule_of_law     0.9091        0.1735  
    regulator~ty     0.8406        0.2934  
    government~s     0.7665        0.4125  
    political~ty     0.8291        0.3127  
    voice_acco~y     0.8713        0.2408  
                                           
        Variable    Factor1     Uniqueness 
                                           
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(15) = 1438.81 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
        Factor6         0.16150            .            0.0269       1.0000
        Factor5         0.18548      0.02398            0.0309       0.9731
        Factor4         0.29027      0.10479            0.0484       0.9422
        Factor3         0.39291      0.10263            0.0655       0.8938
        Factor2         0.79456      0.40166            0.1324       0.8283
        Factor1         4.17528      3.38071            0.6959       0.6959
                                                                              
         Factor      Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative
                                                                              
    Rotation: (unrotated)                          Number of params =        6
    Method: principal-component factors            Retained factors =        1
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =      324
                           
         Factor1    1.0000 
                           
                   Factor1 
                           
Factor rotation matrix
                                           
    control_of~n     0.7798        0.3919  
     rule_of_law     0.9091        0.1735  
    regulator~ty     0.8406        0.2934  
    government~s     0.7665        0.4125  
    political~ty     0.8291        0.3127  
    voice_acco~y     0.8713        0.2408  
                                           
        Variable    Factor1     Uniqueness 
                                           
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(15) = 1438.81 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
        Factor1         4.17528       0.6959
                                                                              
         Factor        Variance   Proportion    Rotated factors are correlated
                                                                              
    Rotation: oblique promax (Kaiser off)          Number of params =        6
    Method: principal-component factors            Retained factors =        1
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =      324
Scale reliability coefficient:      0.8914
Number of items in the scale:            6
Average interitem covariance:     .0777564
Test scale = mean(unstandardized items)
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Year 2006 
 
 
 
KMO               =     0.828
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy
 
 
H0: variables are not intercorrelated
p-value            =             0.000
Degrees of freedom =                15
Chi-square         =          1434.330
    
Bartlett test of sphericity
                                           
    control_of~n     0.8966        0.1962  
     rule_of_law     0.9186        0.1561  
    regulator~ty     0.6981        0.5127  
    government~s     0.6367        0.5947  
    political~ty     0.8436        0.2884  
    voice_acco~y     0.7918        0.3731  
                                           
        Variable    Factor1     Uniqueness 
                                           
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(15) = 1603.82 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
        Factor6         0.08050            .            0.0134       1.0000
        Factor5         0.11530      0.03480            0.0192       0.9866
        Factor4         0.33827      0.22297            0.0564       0.9674
        Factor3         0.55799      0.21971            0.0930       0.9110
        Factor2         1.02912      0.47113            0.1715       0.8180
        Factor1         3.87882      2.84970            0.6465       0.6465
                                                                              
         Factor      Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative
                                                                              
    Rotation: (unrotated)                          Number of params =        6
    Method: principal-component factors            Retained factors =        1
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =      326
                           
         Factor1    1.0000 
                           
                   Factor1 
                           
Factor rotation matrix
                                           
    control_of~n     0.8966        0.1962  
     rule_of_law     0.9186        0.1561  
    regulator~ty     0.6981        0.5127  
    government~s     0.6367        0.5947  
    political~ty     0.8436        0.2884  
    voice_acco~y     0.7918        0.3731  
                                           
        Variable    Factor1     Uniqueness 
                                           
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(15) = 1603.82 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
        Factor1         3.87882       0.6465
                                                                              
         Factor        Variance   Proportion    Rotated factors are correlated
                                                                              
    Rotation: oblique promax (Kaiser off)          Number of params =        6
    Method: principal-component factors            Retained factors =        1
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =      326
Scale reliability coefficient:      0.8826
Number of items in the scale:            6
Average interitem covariance:     .0710963
Test scale = mean(unstandardized items)
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Year 2010 
 
 
 
KMO               =     0.705
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy
 
 
H0: variables are not intercorrelated
p-value            =             0.000
Degrees of freedom =                15
Chi-square         =          1598.855
    
Bartlett test of sphericity
                                           
    control_of~n     0.8679        0.2468  
     rule_of_law     0.8884        0.2107  
    regulator~ty     0.7898        0.3762  
    government~s     0.6414        0.5886  
    political~ty     0.8460        0.2843  
    voice_acco~y     0.8472        0.2822  
                                           
        Variable    Factor1     Uniqueness 
                                           
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(15) = 1783.94 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
        Factor6         0.05453            .            0.0091       1.0000
        Factor5         0.10816      0.05363            0.0180       0.9909
        Factor4         0.36049      0.25233            0.0601       0.9729
        Factor3         0.47316      0.11267            0.0789       0.9128
        Factor2         0.99259      0.51943            0.1654       0.8339
        Factor1         4.01107      3.01848            0.6685       0.6685
                                                                              
         Factor      Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative
                                                                              
    Rotation: (unrotated)                          Number of params =        6
    Method: principal-component factors            Retained factors =        1
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =      326
                           
         Factor1    1.0000 
                           
                   Factor1 
                           
Factor rotation matrix
                                           
    control_of~n     0.8679        0.2468  
     rule_of_law     0.8884        0.2107  
    regulator~ty     0.7898        0.3762  
    government~s     0.6414        0.5886  
    political~ty     0.8460        0.2843  
    voice_acco~y     0.8472        0.2822  
                                           
        Variable    Factor1     Uniqueness 
                                           
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(15) = 1783.94 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
        Factor1         4.01107       0.6685
                                                                              
         Factor        Variance   Proportion    Rotated factors are correlated
                                                                              
    Rotation: oblique promax (Kaiser off)          Number of params =        6
    Method: principal-component factors            Retained factors =        1
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =      326
Scale reliability coefficient:      0.8862
Number of items in the scale:            6
Average interitem covariance:      .071886
Test scale = mean(unstandardized items)
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KMO               =     0.666
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy
 
 
H0: variables are not intercorrelated
p-value            =             0.000
Degrees of freedom =                15
Chi-square         =          1778.424
    
Bartlett test of sphericity
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